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PREFACE
As a consequence of socioeconomic changes in the last
decades, unemployment has appeared, financial security has
decreased and social inequalities have intensified. On top of the
social hierarchy a few live in unprecedented wealth, while at
the bottom many are destitute. Individualism, aggrandizement
and rivalry result in social distrust. Personal and community
relations realign or disintegrate. These changes have proved
that solidarity disappears without community relations;
collective interests cannot be effectively pursued without
common action, and the majority are exposed to the decisions
of the wealthy influential elite without social collaboration.
It has become obvious that the ignorance of community
aims and the exclusive priority of individual ones, i.e.
professional competition, the desire for career and purchasing
unaffordable consumer goods at all costs, atomizes society and
deprives communities and relationships of trust. Under the
present circumstances, in this highly individualistic society that
lacks the sense of community, the most important social task
would be to revive and strengthen individual sociability and the
need for community. Community life would later encourage
public participation and solidarity towards the socially
disadvantaged. The initial hypothesis and motto of our research
was the following: the need for community relations enhances
the chance of democratic renewal. The two key terms are
community life and public participation, and their correlation is
discussed in the present book. Moreover, our aim was to
describe the degree of community and public involvement of
 10 
individuals, in other words, the individual level of social
participation.
Based on research data, we present the distinct lack of
public participation. However, our conclusions are more
promising in connection with communities. First and foremost,
the functioning of immediate communities and individual
relation structures is not as inadequate as we have assumed
from the degree of atomization and general distrust, or as
public opinion supposes consequently to the rapid social
changes. The overwhelming majority of the society live in
solidary families. Although family itself has undergone radical
changes as well, its members retained a strong sense of
cohesion and solidarity.
Almost three quarters of the society is attached to
groups of friends, some people to several similar groups
simultaneously. Three quarters of the members of these groups
believe that they would receive help from at least one of the
other members in case of need. Mutual trust and assistance are
important in these groups; common identity and the sense of
belongingness result in everyday solidarity which multiplies
the members’ resources. However, only every fourth
respondent is attached to organised civil communities.
Apparently, small communities work considerably well in the
society, and they provide security for the majority of the
population. It is obvious, nevertheless, that the level of
organised civil collaboration that could easily lead to public
participation is insufficient compared to the proportion of small
communities.
Only every fifth respondent participates intensively in
public life. They are people with at least high school diploma
who live in financial security, or at least not in grave poverty,
and who are open to social problems. Low-educated people
whose financial situation is insecure relinquish public
participation; in fact they ‘voluntarily’ hand over the right of
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taking public decisions to the wealthy upper fifth with higher
status and educational attainment. If the population is
characterised by highly unequal levels of education and
extreme differences in socioeconomic situation, democracy
becomes mere formality instead of representing the majority
opinion. Public life requires individuals who possess decently
secure financial background and the necessary level of
education to acquire and process information.
Furthermore, this book tries to ‘find the drop in the
ocean’ by revealing the characteristics of local groups and
public life in village communities. Two categories of villages
were distinguished: the first still preserves traditional values
and culture of the community; and the second is already losing
traditional values due to its advancement in the modernisation
process. The community and public life of both village types
are presented. The persistent power of the village is strong
everywhere: three fourth of the respondents of rural origin has
never considered leaving the village permanently. However,
livelihood issues are sometimes stronger than the emotional
attachment to the home and inhabitants are often compelled to
commute or to find a job abroad, yet they continuously plan to
return.
The book also aims to draw a comparison between the
international levels of public and community participation. Out
of 28 countries of Europe, the Scandinavian and the most
prosperous Western European countries show an outstanding
level of social participation. Southern European countries and
the post-communist countries of East-Central Europe had the
lowest results. People often say self-deceptively about the
societies of former Eastern Bloc states (including the
Hungarian) that the deficiencies will soon vanish, because
these nations are still ‘learning’ the democracy. But our
research results indicated that active community and public life
do not depend on time or on acquisition. To ensure the
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independence of personal opinion, financial security is
necessary, and to form individual opinion a certain level of
education is needed, without these the majority have no choice
but to endure the decisions of the people with higher standards
of living.
The book seeks answers for questions concerning
community, public life and social participation by relying on
several research databases. I hope that readers will encounter
some conclusions in this book that would inspire further
consideration.
The author
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I. WITHOUT COMMUNITY NO PUBLIC LIFE
Some of our earlier analyses of human relationships1 have
shown that primarily those people had wider relationship
networks beyond family and friends whose living conditions
were considerably favourable. In other words, community
relations are the privileges and practice of people with
advantaged social and economic capital (Utasi 2002). This
conclusion was the motivation for our next research: we
intended to specify what living conditions have to be improved
to foster the need for community ties in wider social strata. We
also investigated what changes would be necessary to engage a
greater proportion of society in shaping community and public
life.
An international examination of 24 European countries
(ESS, 2005) confirmed that remarkably lower proportions of
the population feel attached to any communities or
organisations in post-communist countries than in modern
Western societies. Former Eastern Bloc nations comprised
smaller numbers of respondents with friendship circles, or any
other informal relationships which were reinforced recurrently
through mutual visits, whereas a significantly greater number
of inhabitants considered their own participation in public life
useless (Utasi 2008).
                                                
1
 We examined the effects of relationships on life quality and contentment
(OTKA, T046301, ESS 2005), and their role in the evolution of social
solidarity and in social integration (OTKA, T25584).
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International comparative data also revealed that
relationships were more intensive in traditional societies and
prosperous societies of market economy than in post-
communist countries. Why is the community network of post-
communist, asymmetrically modernised and relatively poor
market societies less dense than elsewhere? The answer is
undoubtedly the almost complete disintegration of traditional
social groups, while new types of civil communities fail to
appear. As a consequence, the majority of the population do
not possess civil consciousness and sociability. The incomplete
nature of modern civil development and its underlying
contradictions increased the lack of relationships and
communities, and this caused atomization and isolation.
Although the disintegration of traditional communities
started decades ago, the deficiency in relationships has
aggravated, and consequently attracted sociological attention
only in the past few years (Utasi 2002). Before the political
transition, the division of labour depended on state property,
and the inevitable collaboration of families and smaller groups
sustained the communities that rested on strong and solid
relationships. Full employment ensured long-term collegial
relations, and combined with interdependency of co-workers,
occupational communities were more likely to form. The
neighbourhood relationships functioned better than nowadays
as well. Mutual solidarity and austerity resulted in instrumental
cohesion; the long time span spent together in the living place
improved and deepened trust which preserved a community
network of strong personal relationships. At that time,
communities emerged primarily from traditional motivation,
but the next step after the primary relationship network, namely
civil groups were not organised. Other communities fell under
state control. The communist regimes oppressed personal
inclination for creating civil communities.
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The state ceased to care for the population in many
aspects after the political transition; and market economy
inevitably deepened social inequalities, so the need for civil
communities, as forums of the protection of interests, grew.
Sociological questions were formulated gradually, but more
and more definitively: how could social integration be
preserved in a society that is adapted to market economy, but
lacks resources, how could the society be prevented from
splitting into extremely unequal classes, if the majority of the
population feels incompetent to intervene in the issues of their
immediate communities, incompetent to shape their own lives
(Utasi 2002).
The Interaction of the Need for Community Life
with Public Life
The interaction of the need for community life with public life
and their extreme variation in society have not been closely
examined by Hungarian sociology yet. One reason for this
deficiency is that many researchers adopted an expectant
attitude after 1989. According to their argument, social
participation could not reach a general level in the transition
period, because the majority needed time to acquire how to
deal with the democratic system. It was anticipated that a
strong middle class would emerge from the gradual evolution
of market economy, and civil consciousness would form
simultaneously. However, social trends have failed to meet the
expectations so far. Other sociologists have emphasized in the
political transition period that social transformation might be
delayed for over sixty years after the introduction of market
economy, if it could happen in democracy at all. It has been
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impossible to trace the slightest sign of social change until now
(Dahrendorf 1990, Offe 1992).
After many years, it has become obvious that
community life and civil consciousness have not progressed, or
what is worse, traditional communities have disappeared.
Diminution in the network of human relationships, atomization
and the lack of communities do not only endanger social
integration, but mean obstacles to the functioning of
democratic public life. These conditions hinder the majority in
public participation and expression of personal opinions on
issues which affect their own individual lives.
International sociological examinations have proved,
nevertheless, that the disintegration of communities is evident
not only in the former Eastern Bloc countries which have been
‘learning democracy’ in the last decades, but social bonds are
loosening in most of the societies of modern market economy
as well (Putnam 2002). It is also true that the deficiency in
social participation, the lack of community ties and rapidly
changing society constitute a more acute problem in the post-
communist countries, as the governments that have been
functioning with market economy for decades, or centuries, are
capable of mobilizing a greater deal of financial resources for
the preservation of formal elements of democracy.
The Formation of Communities
The examination of the interaction of community with public
life requires an exact understanding of both elements. Max
Weber derives the description of community relations from the
definition of social action. According to his theory, community
relationships come into being, if individual actions with
identical rational content are directed at one another.
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Relationships are shaped by various motivations, thus
community relations can emerge from dominantly traditional,
emotional, value-rational or instrumental motivation.
Communities motivated by tradition have the least significant
role in the foundation of public life, while communities with
other motivation types apparently take a decisive part in it
(Weber 1987).
The motivational factors which the community rests on
change the common aims and/or collective values of the
participants and determine their common interests. These
factors constitute the basis of common consciousness, called
the community identity, which furnish individuals who are
drawn towards each other by their similar motives with the
capability to act conformably and share solidarity (Hankiss
2004).
Formation, functioning and sustainment of a
community do not require the simultaneous presence of all
motivation types or aims, though apparently the more types of
motivation connect the members of the community, the
stronger the sense of cohesion becomes. In the ideal situation,
different motivations and common action establish spirituality,
a solid emotional and psychic foundation for community
identity.
The members of communities with different
motivational factors often know each other, or at least many of
them are in direct and regular contact. This can be equally true
for macro-communities, like nations, or for smaller
communities, like the inhabitants of a town. The traditional
motivation of common origin of a nation creates cohesion
which is reinforced by their shared culture and language.
Culture and language facilitate direct communication between
the members of the macro-community, even if they did not
know each other or were not connected before their encounter,
such as in the case of fellow countrymen meeting abroad.
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People living in the same town are bound together by common
past and tradition, many of them are in everyday contact; thus
they experience belongingness to the same place. The existence
of this kind of emotional attachment is confirmed by the
accidental, but joyful encounters of ‘compatriots’ in a foreign
city, country or even on another continent. The cohesive power
of communal spirituality is easily perceived on occasions, such
as international sport events when the national flag is raised, or
on national cultural contests when a competitor living in or
coming from our town, ‘one of us’ wins. There is still hope that
small local communities or even public life can be revived by
relying on the mostly dormant or latent communal identity
described above.
Nowadays quasi-communities, whose members never
meet personally, but virtually, tend to form more and more
often. There is no traditional motivation or source of their
affinity, the community is motivated by a common value,
interest or goal. However, online communities might evolve
into groups of direct and personal interactions; members of
virtual communities occasionally express their mutual
solidarity through concrete actions. National or international
demonstrations of solidarity are organised more and more
frequently via the Internet. It is still a question, though, how
real the collective identities of online communities are, or how
sufficiently they can fulfil the criteria of community and where
the limits of the members’ solidarity lie.
Despite the fact that there are some similarities, the
common identity and spirituality of the communities which
operate on direct relations and the identity and spirituality of
the indirectly–mainly online–organised communities differ
significantly. Members of direct communities, or at least many
of them, know each other personally, hence their strong trust,
and the information flow is relatively rapid and reliable which
strengthens solidarity. However, various international
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examinations have drawn attention to the contradiction that the
number of direct civil communities is low and even dropping in
technologically advanced societies, meanwhile the
manifestations of virtually organised communities multiply,
demonstrative events that mobilize a growing number of
people, i.e. ‘Critical Mass’, are more and more frequent
(Putnam 2002).
The actions of virtually organised quasi-communities
raise many questions, such as whether these communities are
able to function similarly to direct communities, and if yes,
under what circumstances. What is the probability of the
transformation of online connections into direct relationships,
into a direct community? How real is the danger that
participants of virtually organised manifestations who do not
known each other become victims of manipulation, or misuse?
Are the virtual communities capable of systematic solidarity,
can they behave as a real community with collective identity,
common goals and values?
Dynamics of Continuous Disintegration
and Formation of Communities
The sense of belongingness, the ‘we-consciousness’ is essential
both to social integration and to the security of individuals. In
our view, it cannot be ensured by online relations, only by the
involvement in direct communities. It is also true, on the other
hand, that changes in individual life path or in the society
sometimes alienate and replace people who were members of
the same community with common goals by radically
modifying their values and interests.
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As a consequence of these changes, the collective sense
of former relationships ceases, and the solidarity and trust
towards the members of the former community disappear as
well. Individuals, nevertheless, follow their basic need for
community life and try to attach themselves to new people with
similar values and interests, to adapt to the new circumstances
and form a new community.
Community relations influenced by life circumstances
repeatedly disintegrate and emerge with new members even
without massive social trauma. In this way, social integration
remains uninterrupted; individuals do not drop out of every
surrounding community simultaneously. However, dynamic
and rapid changes in society cause quicker oscillation of
individuals between communities, more dramatic ruptures, and
faster disintegration and emergence of communities (Hankiss
2004).
Experience confirms that those communities endure
whose motivations include traditional factors. The members of
communities that rest on traditional motivation are bound
together by such a strong connection that frequently remains
constant throughout a lifetime. If these communities do
dissolve due to a radical impact, the lack of traditional bonds
weakens the identity of the person, and this hinders his/her
integration into new groups organised with other motivational
factors. This difficulty leads to deficient relationship network
that is observed for example in the case of immigrants, or the
status-free countrymen who moved to a city (Bordieu 1978).
Rapid changes that affect the entire social structure are
the major causes of ruptures in community relations. In
Hungary, the value system and interests realigned very quickly
according to the new property relations in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Consequently, many of earlier relationships and
communities vanished. The hasty conversion of the production
system crumbled former communities of people with
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homogenous social status. Former collegial ties loosened or
broke up, the political transition pluralized political values;
groups of political interests were restructured. Neighbourhoods
disintegrated due to the migration and geographic mobility; and
the polarization of incomes destroyed friendship circles.
The structural changes radically modified social
relations, and former communities disappeared as a
consequence of the individual aims and value preferences
which were adopted under the new circumstances. People
sought and organised new communities and new groups.
However, many of them were not able to keep up with the
remodelling and could not compensate for the loss in their
relationship network, the number of their connections
decreased, and their social ties were limited to the close family,
or they even became isolated (Ferge 2000, Utasi 2002).
Socio-psychological studies suggest that the lack of
relations increases the chance of several illnesses and shortens
life expectancy. Some researchers even assert that the changes
in the mortality rate in Hungary, and especially the low life
expectancy of men, is directly related to the diminishing
relationship network of people (Kopp-Skrabski 2001, Ferge
2000, Castel 1993).
Effects of Globalisation on the Community
The main motive for global capitalism is the establishment of a
supranational economic alliance and unity by abolishing the
borders of national economies, so as to facilitate the free flow
of national capital. Globalised society emerges from the fusion
and expansion of European labour and consumer market, and
this commercial and financial space is sometimes called
‘community’. We cannot accept this concept. The global
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society might be a union which ensures some kind of economic
integration, but it cannot become a community, since it does
not possess the fundamental criteria described in our definition
of community: direct solidarity, ‘we-consciousness’ and sense
of mutual responsibility of the members. The dominant
motivational factors of the international market in European
global capitalisation are the temporary economic interests
which cannot correspond to the national interests of all
participating countries simultaneously. This is clearly
illustrated by the transnational conflicts of interests because of
the differentiated financial support for agriculture, or by the
currently aggravating problem of banks and their subsidiaries.
Short-term and profit-oriented economic interests cannot
provide lasting international reciprocity, which would
neutralize the conflicts of interests; they rather depress
solidarity and escalate the disagreement. Every nation pursues
their own interests, after all, which implies contradiction with
others, and so do the recurring demand for harmonization of
the interests. Transnational unions of market economies lack
communal identity; and without identity they are mere
alliances or collaborations. While consumer culture becomes
more and more globalised nowadays, protective reactions of
nation states intensify. The homogeneity of values and/or
interests of the members as a motivational factor is absent, so
the common identity, the solidarity and spirituality cannot
develop at an international level.
However, international or world-wide communities
with shared values that are independent of or directed against
the profit-oriented world of globalisation follow a different
pattern. These are, for example, peace movements,
environmental organisations, international charity
organisations and religious groups serving a transcendent
power. They have universal and general human objectives as
motivational factors which are more comprehensive, and
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represent more than local or national interests. In this case, the
shared value or interest of the transnational community does
not contradict the national identity. Members of value-
communities working for universal aims in a transnational
framework are not compelled to ignore the interests and values
of another, smaller (national or local) community which is
based on traditional motivation. For a greater purpose, the
participants embrace the joint and wider solidarity in addition
to their already existing solidarity network.
Modern mass production with its short-term rationality
rends the network of relations and attacks the norms of
communities continuously and inevitably, as it strives for
immediate profit. Thus, production sites and employees are
moved from one place to another, and companies prefer
dismissal to innovation. This policy ruins collegial groups, or
sometimes even informal relationships. Some workers are
always on the move or even professionally neglected which
destroys their relationship networks (Fukuyama 2000, Korten
1996, Beck 2005).
The Change of Community Values and Norms
It was demonstrated in the last chapter how globalised market
economy undermines social relations, but it is also true that it
initiates new ones by changing former values and norms. It
urges people to form new communities whose motivations
correspond to the demands of the actual production structure.
The new communities with altered norms and short-term
rationality entail rivalry and individualization which weaken,
or sometimes destroy trust; the members’ altruistic solidarity
and sense of mutual responsibility which was characteristic for
traditional societies also diminish. Because of the dynamic
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improvement and modification of production technology,
collegial communities are designed for short-term periods.
Labourers adjust to restart, fluctuation and to the repeated
leaving of collegial communities. Erosion of values, trust and
responsibility comes first, so the continuous remodelling takes
place without any difficulty.
It is obvious, nevertheless, that the isolated people who
recurrently abandon their communities cannot become
‘individuals’, as the notion of ‘individual’ exists exclusively in
relation to the community. Community life is indispensable to
the realisation of individual goals. “It’s useless to bathe in
yourself, wash your face in other faces” as Atilla József, the
poet expressed (transl. Péter Hargitai 2005). In this
interpretation, the lack of community does not only cause
isolation, but it deprives individuals of the opportunity for
personal perfection. Leaders of economic production recognise,
of course, that results cannot be optimized by isolated
individuals, community cooperation is more efficient. To fulfil
the demands of production, they build communities artificially
and temporarily through professional trainings (Korten 1996,
Sen 1999, Szalai 2006).
The norms widely accepted nowadays are believed to
have developed gradually after the introduction of large-scale
production many decades or in some more advanced countries
one and a half century ago. Industrial production replaced
traditional family farming, and combined with market
competition it reinforced individualism and instrumental
rationality, and confused the people’s social network. The
moral that had relied on mutual trust, familial care, the sense of
duty and responsibility collapsed (Weber 1982, Hirsch 1977).
The preferences of large-scale industrial production,
such as cleverness, smartness and individual competition,
became highly esteemed. The new value preferences displaced
the moral compulsion often maintained through religious faith
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earlier, secularisation spread and the traditional values and
principles of communities gradually disappeared. Mechanical
solidarity of the communities and honest mercifulness towards
the disadvantaged lost their roles. The change of the
community moral is, therefore, the direct consequence of the
technological and productivity improvement, since personal
advancement, competition, individual aims and rights cannot
be pursued without harming others’ rights and interests.
Instrumental rationality, unrestricted enforcement of individual
interests strengthened by the change of values and morals
prevailed over former traditional community values.
Traditional communities were conjoined by altruistic solidarity
and by traditional principles expected from and imposed on the
members, but groups formed under the new circumstances of
mass-production are prompted by instrumental rationality and
self-interests (Beck 1999, Lorenz 2002, Weber 1982).
The Development of Solidarity Networks
Solidarity, responsibility and belongingness are concomitants
of community life. It is questionable, though, whether
traditional ethics and value system could be sustained despite
the changes of mass society. As it has been noted earlier,
communities might have various motivations, since people
pursue more values and interests at the same time. They enter,
therefore, different communities that grow concentrically in
size (family-friends-co-workers-hobby/value/political organi-
sations-local/national/transnational-universal), but they might
belong to various groups on every horizontal level and adopt
more communal identities simultaneously.
Relationships evolve into communities less and less
frequently in globalised economic environment which
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encourages competition and rivalry. It is hard to admit that the
choice for long-term interests and general values is more
beneficial than instrumental rationality. Globalised market
economy generates such rapid changes that prevent
communities from developing long-term interests and trust
which would be essential for solidarity and altruism. Thus,
only the strong ties of family and communities with traditional
motivation provide people with mutual solidarity and long-
term reciprocity in the actual economic system. Self-sacrifice
hardly occurs outside family or friendships. Communal
solidarity lost its importance; it is actually ‘imprisoned’ by
instrumental motivation (Fukuyama 2000, Utasi 2002).
Despite the destructive effects of market economy on
traditional norms and values, different forms of communal
altruism and solidarity do appear outside family and groups of
friends. After having succeeded in their own goals, more and
more people realise that it is a necessary commitment and a
general human duty to support the disadvantaged in their own
communities or even in the wider society. Members of solidary
communities possibly arrive at the logical conclusion that the
present social circumstances, including high risk, insecurity,
profit-oriented attitude, rapid social changes and unpredictable
conditions can force anyone to ask the help of others (Beck 2003).
Natural disasters are the most common cause of the
realisation how necessary solidarity and charity would be on
the macro-social level, but the quick and unexpected status loss
of groups or peoples also contributes to the attitude change.
Manifestations of communal solidarity are often organised
online, or the Internet is the medium of information exchange
and mobilization where the intention to help is conceived.
International solidarity and charity are quite commonplace as
well (aid for helpless people, for victims of earthquakes,
tsunamis, wars, diseases and for refugees).
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Solidarity network based on the exchange of work also
aims to reduce risks. However, its current nature differs from
the earlier forms of village collaborations which were initiated
by mutual help and trust amongst the members of traditional
communities. In modern solidarity networks, people who help
other members of the community get their salaries in a
symbolic currency (a specific object used as money within the
local community, like poker chips) or their work is simply
recorded. Later, the helper can rely on the compensation. In
other words, charity work, like an abstract form of community
cash is deposited in the ‘solidarity bank’ which is ready to loan
its customers in case of need (Beck 2005, Giddens 1999).
The community cooperation described above is
apparently a reciprocally functioning market-network,
especially in the case of cities where strangers cooperate, but it
might evolve into a new form of spontaneously and voluntary
organised web of solidarity, or community production.
Informal sales associations of agricultural products and
economic partnerships emerging in some regions are even
more promising. These organisations are initially motivated by
predominant economic interests, but the members know and
possibly trust each other, so there is a chance that later they
adopt a collective identity, the sense of mutual responsibility
and the need for public life.
The reason why solidarity materializes in small
communities more and more frequently is the recognition that
anyone can drop out of the system of global capitalism, and fall
back on direct community solidarity and altruistic help. People
start to understand that temporary cooperation and the
community’s easily available solidarity are indispensable.
Shocking events, tragedies, and natural catastrophes raise
public awareness and create solidarity even towards strangers.
In these cases, instrumental rationality, egoism and individual
interests are neglected for a short while.
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The development of solidarity networks is inhibited by
the lack of resources, or by the fact that resourceless societies
are cleaved in two. All who have lodgings and are able to
finance it, belong to the upper class. They have paid
workplace, professional skills, or physical strength that ensures
their continuous employment. This upper segment of the
society does not rely on the community’s help, on solidarity.
Reciprocal solidarity of the wealthy amongst each other is
designed to multiply their resources.
It is usually the shock of personal tragedies or
frightening social catastrophes that alarm members of the upper
class and raise their awareness of the fact that they are not fully
protected against social insecurity. Probably these experiences
imprint the belief that solidarity towards the disadvantaged and
altruistic help are long-term interests of the macro-community,
as anyone can be compelled by changes in circumstances, life
cycle or social structure to rely on the support and solidarity of
others at least for a certain time.
The ‘shadow-society’ of the lower segment consists of
the people who have difficulties with housing (they do not have
their own homes or they have barely enough money to
maintain it) because of their inability to work (caused by the
lack of qualifications, illness, age or restructured and shrinking
labour market). Many of them live day by day in absolute
insecurity, as they do not possess supplies or exchangeable
goods which would provide them with the possibility to
participate in the pursuit of common interests or in the
protection-oriented community organisations. The inequality
between the two layers of the society is so significant that the
discrepancies in the values, interests and aims shaped by
individual life circumstances preclude people of different status
from merging into mixed communities. These factors intensify
homogenous and caste-like organisation of formal and informal
communities.
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Solidarity from the Micro- to the Macro-level
The need for urgent re-democratization is commonly
emphasized in present societies (Giddens 1999). This statement
implies the notion that the actual form of democracy fails to
ensure majority engagement and to meet most citizens’
requirements. Modern market economy has unquestionably
expanded individual autonomy, independency and legal
freedom. However, economic competition has significantly
intensified the social inequalities both on the individual and on
the community levels. Market economy diminished the
solidarity emerging from the interdependency of traditional
communities, so basic principles of humanism would require
that the state, as the macro-community, cared for its socially
disadvantaged members. This recognition and the process of
institutionalised individualization urged societies to expand the
solidarity network from the micro- to the macro-communal
level (Durkheim 1986, Fararo és Doreian 1998).
The need for community support depends on individual
wealth and resources, as well as on the individuals’ cultural,
communal and material capital. However, the resourceless the
macro-communities (i.e. the states) of market economy are, the
less capacity/intention they have to support the disadvantaged.
The states of modern market economies are expected to take
two, seemingly contradictory actions: ensure individual
autonomy; and show solidarity, help the needy. The state as the
macro-community has to provide its citizens not only with the
maximal freedom and independence, but with social protection.
While autonomy is obviously an individual demand, social
welfare is the long-term interest of the community.
Modern societies are usually aware of the fact that
economic competition and large-scale production entail
inequalities and unpredictable risks, thus there are always
citizens who are not able to stay competitive and self-
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sustaining. Governments usually accept this necessity, but they
tend to neglect the double task of macro-communities in times
of recession. The institutionalised organic solidarity of the
macro-community is deliberately minimalized in these cases
(Durkheim 1986, Esping-Andersen 1990).
Most theorists of sociology assert that the maintenance
of social integration cannot rely solely on the citizens’ self-
support in globalised market economy. Because of the rapidly
changing economic situation, it is essential that the state, the
macro-community, has reserves, or takes resources from
productive members of the society in order to avoid
unexpected individual and community risks. The current
financial crisis convincingly verifies the indispensability of
macro-communal solidarity, since the most influential
businessmen, banks, bankers, asked and received support from
the government funds in the whole world.
It has become obvious recently that the resources of
macro-communities in the globalised world have to be
occasionally supplemented by financial reinforcement of supra-
governmental and transnational banks. The loans whose
burdens and interests rest on the macro-community are
profitable business, and by no means manifestations of
communal solidarity.
Participation in Direct and Representative Democracy
Democracy was originated in the ancient city-states, the poleis
where it meant the political practice of the people, the demos. It
is a system of self-administration that involves the active
participation of free citizens, and its operational principle
implies majority engagement in the decision-making process.
The polis comprised a countable number of citizens, so its
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direct democracy was a political structure that relied on the
network of more or less direct acquaintances of the free. This
kind of democracy was an exclusive one: non-native men,
slaves (not regarded as humans) and women were not allowed
to participate. Athens is commonly regarded as the most
democratic Greek city, but solely one quarter out of its 300 000
inhabitants had the right to vote as a result of the selective
system (Sartori 1999, Aristotle 1984).
Later in history the authorities did not concede
participation in public affairs to the social majority, not even
after the abolition of slavery. The proportion of electors
increased especially from the 19th century, and universal
suffrage was introduced in modern industrial societies by the
beginning of the 20th century.
Formal equality in political and legal terms was
extended firstly to all male, later to all female citizens as well.
However, leadership always had measures to manipulate
legislation: to limit or extend people’s possibilities of
interfering in social decision-making. It has to be added that
local communities (free towns) occasionally and sporadically
were able to assign direct public participation to a quite wide
range of the members.
As a consequence of population growth and
urbanization, the number of citizens in modern market
economies became unsuited to direct democracy, thus current
civil democracies function predominantly through elected
representatives. The opportunity to directly intervene in public
life and democratic issues is granted to the majority of the
citizens only once in every few years on the occasion of
elections (Utasi 2002). The proportions of directly participating
citizens could be increased, if the communities would be built
on each other as concentrically growing circles which would
facilitate information flow. But information exchange is
usually interrupted between the different levels of hierarchy in
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the societies which have deficiencies in the community
networks. Moreover, it is impossible to prevent the
concentration of property and commodities, and the
concentration of the concomitant power in competitive
industrial societies. In other words, the efficient formula for
reviving public life and for the renewal of democracy does not
exist (Lorenzo 2002).
Some sociologists believe that self-administration of the
community is to be improved by ‘electronic democracy’ in the
future, and a greater part of the population, if not the entire,
will be able to take decisions through the Internet and
complementarily to elections in issues concerning the macro-
community. Cyberculture can indeed enhance the human
aspects of direct democracy, since it accelerates civil
information flow and the spread of necessary knowledge for
taking decisions (Molnár 2003)
Internet and computer are believed to bring a
breakthrough in the formation of communities, democratic
attitude, public life and orientation by offering new ways for
the establishment and maintenance of human connections (such
as e-mail, debate forums, social networks, newsletters, blogs
etc.). Although it is still impossible to predict exactly how the
world-wide web will influence public activity and relationships
of people, the last results of international examinations indicate
that the Internet has not increased significantly the number of
communities of civic participation (Putnam 2002).
Putnam’s widely-known research has demonstrated
through the empiric data of 30 years that in the United States,
where the number of value-based civic communities was
supposed to be rather high, civil relationships and social capital
had decreased. Putnam pointed out that people’s relationships
and communities were significantly weaker and less trustful,
moreover, civic society of the macro-community functioned
apparently worse in the 1990s than earlier. He concluded that
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the chance of civic participation lessened due to the declined
intensity of community relations. In the 1990s US citizens
signed fewer petitions than 25 years earlier, people were less
likely to join civil organisations or association, and those who
did join, met the fellow members less frequently. According to
Putnam, the shrinkage of human and community relations is a
factor beyond human will, since it is caused by the system of
modern market economy. The phenomenon arises from the
changes in labour division, family structure, life expectancy,
lifestyle, female roles, technology (such as the invention of
television and computer) and other macro-communal processes
in the society. In post-communist countries a similar trend was
discovered as far as communities and relationships are
concerned, but the deficiency in relationships beyond family
was even more severe in these societies than in the American
case (Angelusz és Tardos 1998, Utasi 2008).
Basic Criteria of Democratic Public Life
Theoretical questions and different aspects of the
‘democratisation’ of democracy have caught the attention of
many scientists, including sociologists (Habermas 1971,
Bourdieu 1999, Putnam 1995, Arendt 1998, Riesman 1983,
Almond and Verba 1963). We also intended to study the
interaction between community and public participation, thus
we had to examine the elements of democracy and formulate
an acceptable theoretical framework for our research.
Dahl, the most well-known theoretician of pluralist
democracy lists some crucial prerequisites for the ideal
functioning of democracy (Dahl 1989). First and foremost, it is
essential that all citizens effectively participate in the decision-
making process; therefore the right to vote has to be granted to
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the entire society. Secondly, voters have to be informed about
the public issues prior to taking their decisions, since they
cannot form their opinions and cannot reach consensus without
the necessary information. Thirdly, the education of citizens
has to be ensured and improved continuously (schools, civil
education, trainings), so as they become able to understand and
process the information. Lastly, full civil control of the social
agenda is crucial.
In our research, we have applied Dahl’s view of the
democratic criteria by adjusting them to our possibilities and
aims, since the focus of our research was put predominantly on
the analysis of preconditions and on the discussion of the
attitude towards public life that emerges from the existing
community relations. It was assumed that the expansion of
communal relations might lead to a growing demand for civic
participation. Instead of the elitist democratic theory of
Schumpeter (Schumpeter 2012), our research adopted Barber’s
approach which claims that democracy requires social
participation, exchange of opinions, community dialogue and
interest in social affairs. Community actions of active citizens
with relationship networks are indispensable (Hoskins and
Mascherini 2009). Only these factors can turn citizens into
democrats. Development of relationships and interests in
community issues are basic criteria of democracy (Hoskins
2006). In Barber’s view, the community life itself is the
essence of democracy (Barber 2004).
Political Community and Public Life
Market economy is the dominant subsystem of the modernised
social system which is based on individual competition and
intensifies inequalities. These inequalities were supposed to be
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offset by other subsystems, especially by the
institutionalisation of organic solidarity and by the political
plurality, or multi-party system which articulates the values
and interests of every social stratum (Münch 1984).
However, there is a widespread disillusionment with the
political plurality, or more precisely with the multi-party
system. Only a low proportion of the society is affiliated to any
political group. According to the data of a comparative
international research (ESS 2008) involving 24 European
countries, the average of the sample was fairly low (4%), but
the number of members of political groups was the lowest in
Hungary (0, 7%) and in Poland (1%). In these two countries,
the social disappointment is growing and the respect for
political parties is shrinking. Parties are exclusive and elitist,
and instead of representing the interest of different social
groups, they prioritize their own ambition for power and the
interests of those elite and economic groups who support them
(Schumpeter 1950, Szalai 2006). The most important
accomplices of the parties are the media; the majority of people
mean only statistics or supporting cast in the play. One part of
the population accepts this low-prestige role in politics, as their
lack of information and knowledge makes them
impressionable. Political statements are designed to be
confusing, since the majority do not possess the necessary level
of education and understanding to recognise, comprehend and
solve contradictions. The majority live in insecurity with a low
demand for civic participation. These citizens tend to
underestimate their own social importance, so they distance
themselves from community issues and back out of politics.
Similarly, an immense disillusionment with politics
characterises the small group of people who are indeed
engaged in public life. This group emphasizes their political
neutrality and accept only civil assignments. Every level of
public life, especially the assessment of decisions concerning
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the surrounding environment, should rely on small
communities, since these are the basic components of political
structure and public life (Giddens 1999).
In Hungary, as well as in every resourceless country,
the number of small communities who are motivated by the
improvement of the surrounding social environment is
distinctively low. Public awareness emerges under resourceless
and disadvantaged life conditions very difficultly. Most
citizens are deprived of the financial stability, the necessary
level of education, and the essential quantity of information
which would enable the understanding of the circumstances,
opinion formation and participation in the self-administration.
Empiric data indicate that civic participation and social activity
are the privileges of people who are better qualified and more
affluent than the average (Putnam 1995, 2000 and Utasi 2008).
Many sociologists believe that the most urgent political
tasks of recent times would be to improve democracy and to
intensify community and civic participation. This process is
hindered by the fact that citizens have been recurrently
deceived in the course of history by governments that defined
themselves as democratic systems. Dictatorships that
annihilated thousands or tolerated only a minimal level of civil
participation were called “democracies” by their founders.
Political systems, even if they are declared to be democratic,
easily turn into extreme dictatorships without civil
communities, public control and community solidarity (Sen
1999).
The extension of individual freedom co-occurs with the
decrease of traditional communities and social atomization in
globalised market societies, so a great proportion of the
population becomes socially passive. The isolated individual
does not develop the demand for community relationships or
cannot acquire enough information to form an opinion, thus the
freedom of speech remains unexploited. In this situation the
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government does not consider majority interests, as it is not
compelled to do so. According to the TÁRKI/ISSP survey in
1996, the privatization of banks was opposed by 70% and the
privatization of the electric power distribution by 93% of the
population, yet the government disregarded the public opinion
and carried out the sale (Utasi 2008).
Representatives of the authority often refuse majority
opinion as being the will of the empty-headed mass, so closed
power groups associated with the elections gain authorisation
to follow their own interests in decision making; sometimes
they even utilize the media for self-affirmation. Actions of the
leaderships are entirely determined by the ambitions of
pressure groups, and without the benefits of community
existence the majority of the population become bystanders in
public life (Bibó 1957, Utasi 2008).
The Levels of Sociability and the Concentric Circles of
Communities
Living conditions form human needs. As the discrepancies in
social circumstances dictate, the most disadvantaged often lack
the need for wider community and for civic participation; for
them close family is the only source of contentment.
Improvement in living standards enhances communal and
public activity.
An earlier research found that family was considered as
the fundamental unit, and the groups of friends were the second
in the hierarchy of communities that contributed decisively to
people’s contentment. Relatively fewerrespondents regarded
groups united by a certain kind of hobby or values as necessary
elements of their general sense of well-being. One fifth of the
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population also felt readiness to serve public interests of the
macro-community (Utasi 2008).
Our former survey indicated that the family as the basic
community is of primary importance in Hungary, but it was
satisfactory on its own only for one tenth of the population. If
we follow the increase of the need for public life through the
concentrically growing communities, we find that it reaches its
peak by the most affluent one fifth of the society. Despite the
fact that one fifth of the people are characterised by the highest
levels of interest in macro-community issues and universal
values, the need for public life manifests itself in reality, in
actions and becomes practice only by some percentage of the
population (Utasi 2008).
Based on earlier research results and on the hierarchy of
needs, we firmly believe that the improvement of living
conditions intensifies the need for wider communities (Maslow
1954, Allardt 1993). Financial stability, community dialogue,
communication, high level of education to comprehend
information are the objective factors in an individual’s life that
contribute to the development of the need for civic
participation. Family is the foundation of the need for
community life. In this primary group of community
coexistence, traditional values and family interests generate
uniting aims and in the ideal case spirituality, family identity
and altruism as well. As the second most important informal
groups after the family, circles of friends provide the basis for
social integration and rehearsal for community life. People
whose need for community was shaped by well-functioning
family are more likely to join friendly groups. Relationships
with small communities in the immediate surrounding
(neighbours, colleagues, clubs, hobby or value groups)
constitute the next level of the sociability. Groups and circles
motivated by the awareness for local issues have a crucial role
in the formation of people’s attitude, since their patriotic ‘we-
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consciousness’ might become a catalyst of a more active public
life. Global and macro-communities with a sense of
responsibility for the whole humanity and with a certain kind
of universal identity constitute the widest circle of sociability.
The different levels of sociability rest on each other in a
hierarchy where the wider communities encompass the values
and needs of the smaller ones, thus various identities, solidarity
networks and belongingness to more groups can coexist, and
the individual is not compelled to give up any of the
communities.
Sometimes the need for communities is not fulfilled
through action. Sociability and public practice do not co-occur
simultaneously, because some dimensions of living conditions
prevent the individuals from the pursuit of their needs. Family
issues, illness, restriction in mobility due to age, or everyday
struggle for subsistence usually reduce the possibility and the
determination to engage in public life.
The former thoughts on community relations and public
life were intended to summarize the basic principles and to
raise questions about the topic. As there are many possible
directions in the research, our examination was not capable of
providing all the answers. We aimed to determine the central
issues, because their detailed discussion would present an
overview of community life, social structures, sociability,
social activity and civic participation in the contemporary
Hungarian society.
***
Three databases and samples are analysed in the present
volume. The development and functioning of communities, the
attitude towards public life and civic participation were
observed through the data of a national representative survey
carried out in 2009 (N=1051). The research questions in regard
to local communities were investigated in seven villages in
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three different countries through a sample recorded in 2011
(N=814). The specific features of the interaction of trust with
the community, and the characteristics of Hungarian civic
participation were considered in a European context through
the data of the European Social Survey of 2008 (record of the
file=2010, N=54454).
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II. PRIMARY GROUPS
Sociability is already established in childhood by the family
structure and the circle of close relatives. The composition,
functioning and the role of the family have been radically
altered by the civilization process and by the disappearance of
traditional system of family farming, yet family is the primary
environment for the acquisition of basic social patterns.
Although the influence of the family on later community life is
decisive even today, it would be insufficient on its own to the
preservation of societal networks, or to the macro-communal
integration and to community practice. The effects of
children’s groups, child care and educational institutions are
indispensable to the successful socialization.
Children’s Communities
Children learn the basic principles of community life beyond
family in the institutions, such as nursery schools and primary
schools, and also through extra-curricular activities, summer
camps, through participation in gangs or in children’s
organisations. According to the data of our nationally
representative sample, smaller proportion of the youngest
respondents (aged 18-29) used to engage in children’s
organisations or to participate in camps in their childhood than
the older age groups. The discrepancy between the age groups
 42 
indicates that the political transition meant a break in the
continuity of the institutionalised community education of
children. The reason for the dramatic decrease is the almost
complete disbandment of the pioneer movement that had
mobilized earlier the vast majority of children by relying on the
existing framework of education (Szabolcs et al. 2010).
Children’s camps that had been free of charge before
1989 became the privileges of those families who could afford
the fees, moreover, many children’s organisations ceased, and
this clearly afflicted the camping habits The comparison of the
answers of different age groups affirms that institutionally
organised practice of community education was the most
general by the respondents who had attended primary school
during the two decades preceding the political transition, but
also a higher proportion of the 45-59 age group used to
participate in children’s communities than people who were
educated after 1989. Involvement in extra-curricular activities
during the school years was also more common by the
presently middle-aged group than by the youngest respondents.
Workshops and study circle were organised by schools mainly
gratis before the political transition, nowadays community and
supplementary education of children follows the rules of the
competitive market, as private lessons and tutorials have been
turned into consumer goods. On the other hand, members of
the 18-29 age group were more likely to join children’s gangs
or sport clubs or to participate in trainings than the older
respondents. In sum, sport clubs, trainings and gangs were the
predominant forms of children’s communities after the political
transition, and the significance of extracurricular activities and
children’s organisations has diminished.
The 5 variables of childhood community relations and
practice (children’s organisations, extracurricular activities,
sport clubs, children’s camps, and gangs) were synthesised into
a 5-level scale (0-5) which confirmed that the secondary
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socialization of the 18-29 age group was less effective than that
of the respondents who had attended primary school before the
political transition. However, the results revealed that people
who were over the age of 60 at the time of the survey used to
have the fewest opportunities for community life in their
childhood.
The comparison of the organised community education
of different age groups shows that community practice of
children beyond family was the most intensive in the two
decades preceding the political transition, or in other words, the
society prepared the now middle-aged people for community
life the most successfully.
Figure 1:
The averages of the synthesising scale
of childhood community relations by age groups
(Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi
kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
The data of the community education in childhood collected in
different age groups signify the stream of commercial factors
in the socialization process, and consequently the community
education of children takes place in accordance with social
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stratification (Inátsy-Pap 2010). The community participation
and its intensity depend on the financial situation of the
parents. Wealthier parents can ‘purchase’ supplementary
education and community experience for their children, while
the children of disadvantaged families miss these opportunities,
and are ‘compensated’ by gangs or sport clubs. Moreover, the
inequality is also aggravated by regional and demographic
differences (Gazsó 1995).
Parents with higher educational attainment tend to
spend higher sums on the community education of their
children. Correlation diagrams of the fathers’ qualification and
the intensity of children’s relationships revealed that the
community participation of children grew significantly by the
families where the fathers had at least vocational qualification.
Unqualified parents with lower incomes and insecure
workplace cannot afford their children’s supplementary
education and community activities, or the family does not
develop the values which would require to do so, or both at the
same time.
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Figure 2:
The averages of the synthesising scale of childhood community
relations in relation to the qualification of the fathers (Z-scores2)
(Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi
kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
The correlation between the childhood socialization and the
qualifications of the respondents and that of their fathers
confirm that people with vocational qualification and working
as skilled workers possess the lowest degrees of sociability. As
it has been mentioned above, the proportion of those who were
socialized through secondary relationships in childhood starts
to rise dramatically by the respondents with vocational
education, and continues to increase with the educational
attainment. It was striking though, that the differences were
much less significant between the groups above the vocational
level.
                                                
2
 Z-scores allow calculating how many standard deviations make up the
distance between the variable and the mean. Diagrams using Z-scores reveal
the characteristic for groups, categories or countries so that 0 stands for the
mean of the sample, the positive values signify more favourable and the
negative values less favourable characteristics than the average.
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The number of youngsters who were involved in
extracurricular and institutionally organised community
activities has decreased in the last twenty years; middle-class
parents are more and more willing to spend on those
possibilities that promote their children’s future social
integration and ensure a more successful community practice.
According to the respondents of the older age groups,
girls and boys used to participate in the activities organised by
schools approximately in the same proportion in their
childhood, but the younger age groups reported a more
intensive female presence. Due to the differences in the
educational attitudes of parents towards the two genders, girls
are more sociable, hard-working; their achievements are better,
and this corresponds to the requirements of the parents better,
thus they join children’s communities more willingly than the
boys do. Before the political transition, the participation in the
institutionalised communities of children was obligatory for
both sexes, but the freedom of choice or refusal grew in the
childhood of the youngest age group. If they were not
motivated by individual ambition or by the deliberation of their
parents, boys opted against communities which obviously
entail obligations and duties.
In contradiction to childhood community practice, the
proportion of men in adult communities, and especially in
leading positions, is significantly higher. The asymmetry
between the two sexes grows further, if the community practice
is combined with power. As it will be discussed later, it is
nevertheless the secondary socialization through children’s
groups or communities that decisively influences the later civic
participation and community practice. Based on theories of
socialisation, we strongly believe that socialisation takes place
through community patterns, communication and interaction,
and this process is determined by the quality of interactions in
the family and in children’s communities (Csákó et al. 2010).
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Family Patterns of Community Life
Community Patterns of the Family of Orientation
In our view, the dominant agent of childhood socialization is
the family, or more precisely the community practice of the
parents. The respondents of our sample evoked that their
parents had met their relatives the most frequently in their
childhood. We observed a clearly distinguishable downward
trend in the intensity of the relations with the neighbours in
relation to age groups, as the older respondents reported regular
visits. It has to be added though, that a great proportion of the
older age groups came from rural settlements or traditional
villages where community life of neighbourhoods was a
common practice. In other words, the families of the
respondents had the most intensive informal relationships with
relatives and neighbours, then friends followed, and the
informal visits of colleagues were remarkably less frequent.
Traditional relationships are gradually diminishing due
to the civilization process and urbanization, thus the intensity
of the relationships and the frequency of the meetings
apparently depends on the degree of urbanization. It was also
striking that, except for Budapest, neighbours played the
second most important part in the community life of the family
of orientation in every settlement type; moreover, these
relationships were predominant in the smallest villages.
Similarly, collegial relations were described as the weakest of
strong ties in every settlement type.
The intensity of the interactions with the strong ties in
the family of orientation decreased with the respondents’ and
their fathers’ educational attainment. This trend indicates that
the well-qualified people of high social status build more
secondary relations, thus they (can) expend less time on their
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primary relationships. It can also be concluded that the number
of social activities of parents grew with the educational
attainment. These kinds of occupation increased the number of
secondary relations, and consequently people again had less
time for their strong primary relations. In addition, respondents
with a high educational level, but coming from villages were
often compelled to leave their homes due to the push-pull
factors, and consequently the traditional relationships of
migrants often loosened, or even broke. The collected data also
suggested that social mobility or migration of the parents
disintegrated traditional relationships, as friends, neighbours
and co-workers were replaced by new ones.
The Change of Preference for Different Relations
with Age
The relationships between different generations are usually
intense, but their quality change in accordance with the age.
The decrease of the intensity is the most remarkable in the case
of the young generation that experiences the separation from
the family of orientation and the start of an economically
independent life (people aged 30-39). Our data indicated that
around this age the connection with the family of orientation
and with other earlier communities became less important. The
intensity of these relationships stagnated for some years or
decades, until people in their fifties ‘rediscovered’ their
families and distant relatives, their visits became more
frequent, whereas the social interaction with friends and
colleagues decreased. Work and workplace start to lose their
roles in the social integration when people enter their sixties;
and consequently collegial relations diminish. At this age other
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factors, such as declining health, restricted mobility and
decease of friends reduce the number and intensity of strong
relations.
Due to the limitation in the scope of social action, local
relationships, especially with neighbours, gain in importance
with ageing. The revaluation of the relationship with the
neighbours is also noticeable when people enter their thirties,
since people usually become parents at this age and spend more
time at home with their small children; but these changes are
usually provisional. However, social interaction with the
neighbours intensifies strikingly over sixty, as the scope of
social interaction shrinks with age; relationships become
limited to the close family and to the immediate surroundings.
The correlation of the intensity of primary relationships
(except the relations with the neighbours) with the level of
qualification could be modelled by a cope. Respondents with
high school diploma were characterised by the strongest
primary relationships. At the same time, social interaction with
the neighbours decreases precipitously, if the educational
attainment increases. Age-group trends suggest that the
primary relationship networks of the graduates shrink mostly
with age, and they try to compensate the loss with other types
of community relationships.
The results indicated that the size of the settlement
decisively influences human relationships, as the respondents
from the smallest villages were characterised by the most
intensive social interaction with relatives and neighbours. The
capital remained competitive only in the case of friendly and
collegial relationships. A surprisingly great degree of isolation
was discovered in the large villages where the intensity of
relationships with friends, as well with colleagues was found to
be weaker than in other types of settlements. A possible
explanation for this anomaly is commuting to work and the
concomitant changes in the lifestyle. In the large villages,
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people communicate predominantly with relatives and
neighbours, but their social network often lacks the
relationships with friends and colleagues. This peculiarly
restructured community network is the consequence of their
specific time schedule, isolation or seclusion. The
asymmetrically modernised state of large villages generates an
unconventional pattern of relationship networks which is
neither urban, nor rural. Urbanization and the fact that a great
number of the people is compelled to commute destroys
traditional relationships, but commuting lifestyle precludes the
emergence of trust in their relationships that they build in the
cities of their workplaces.
The intensity of the interaction with the strong ties in
the respondents’ families of orientation and the intensity of the
respondents’ interactions with their own strong ties were
compared, and the results decreased with age. With the
exception of the interaction with friends, the intensity of the
relationships in the respondents’ family of procreation was
weaker than it used to be in their families of orientation. The
proportion of those who ‘never and/or rarely’ meet their
primary relationships also increased. The comparison of the
data of the two generations has confirmed that the intensity of
the primary relations decreased by the second generation. This
means that those family patterns of socialization that reflect
and might result in community cohesion are not reproduced in
the younger generation’s families of procreation.
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The proportions of primary relationships characterised by
rare or frequent interactions in the family of orientation
and in the family of procreation
The intensity of interactions
never and/or rarely at least weeklyRelationship
type in the family
of orientation
in the family
of procreation
in the family
of orientation
in the family
of procreation
With
relatives 5,9% < 9 49% > 42
With
friends 12% = 12 43% < 52
With
neighbours 16,6% < 31 56% > 45
With
colleagues 36% < 49 29% > 24
Family and Relatives as a Community
The present study examines primarily the dynamics of
relationships beyond the family, but as the social network of
the family and relatives mean the first step in the development
of individual sociability and community practice, it is
necessary to outline the ongoing changes in the family
structure. It is obvious that the wider social practice of the
respondents was essentially influenced by the intensity of
interactions with their family (such as with their parents,
children, siblings and distant relatives). The variation in the
intensity of certain relationship types was analysed in that
segment of the sample where the respondents still had the
studied ties at the time of the survey. (Faragó T. 1983, Cseh-
Szombathy 1979, Litwak and Szelényi 1969).
Our results suggest that family meetings are mainly
organised by women, they are responsible for the preservation of
 52 
family cohesion (Utasi 2008). This indicates that women interact
with family members more often than men do. However, our
data did not show significant discrepancy in the frequency of
face-to-face interaction with relatives in relation to sex. The
intensity of the relationships depended rather on closeness, in
terms of emotion and kinship distance. The respondents had the
firmest connection with their (adult) children; interactions with
the parents and siblings were less regular, and relatives beyond
the nuclear family were rarely met.
Apparently, the respondents’ relationships with their
(adult) children are distinctively intensive, but the reverse was
not true, as the respondents met their own parents much less
frequently. There are usually various explanations for the
divergence: alienation from one of the parents due to their
divorce, conflict with the parents over the choice of marriage
partner, or re-division of time between own parents and in-
laws. Another less possible explanation would be that children
are the most important for parents, and this logic replicates
itself in every generation. Additionally, age-group
characteristics generate contrasting changes in the two
generations’ community practice: the younger generation still
expands their relationship circles and supplement them with
secondary ties, while the range of relationships of older
generations starts to shrink above a certain age.
The decline of the family as a community is escalated
by the increase of the number of singles. Our earlier research
on the social networks in 1986 confirmed the prevalence of
traditional family and relationship models, but the proportion
of people living alone was significantly higher in the present
sample, while the proportion of respondents living in romantic
partnerships dropped. The reason for the change is most
possibly the impacts of modernisation, especially the
individualization process and the gradual disappearance of
traditional values. Consequently, people get married later, or
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change their partners more frequently, and the divorce rate is
rising as well. The proportion of single respondents in the
sample of 1986 was 27%, this grew to 42, 2% in 2009, while
the proportion of divorced and single respondents doubled
(from 3, 8% to 9, 5%).
The evaluation of the family as a social entity remained
consistently positive and the intensity of the family
relationships endures. However, the notion of the family life
has changed: nowadays it implies the interaction with the
upbringing parent(s), the sibling(s), the grandparent(s) and later
with the child/children in the family of procreation. Previously,
the unity of parents and children constituted the nuclear family,
but fluctuation, dissolution and deficiency of relationships
reshaped the family structure, and the cohabitation of single
parents with other family members (children, grandparents,
siblings) became the most prevalent form. The changes have
also had an impact on the practice of social interaction between
the members. However, the size of the network did not shrink,
nor did the intensity of social interactions, as the familial
community was supplemented by an increased number of
secondary members. Although the family persists as the most
common and most active group of interpersonal relationships,
it apparently closes up: the intensity of the communication with
the distant relatives (i.e. beyond the immediate family)
decreases, and these relations are nowadays considered
peripheral in the network of primary relationships.
The separate analysis of the data of different age groups
reaffirms the trend described above. The social interaction with
relatives diminishes with age, partly because of the decease of
family members, and partly because of restricted mobility.
Usually, there are two radical drops in the intensity of
relationships: the first occurs at the age of 30-44, and the
second over sixty. Only the relationship with the children
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preserves its strength, if there is no objective difficulty in the
interaction.
Other factors, such as the size of the settlement or
distance, influence the frequency of interaction with the family
members as well. The strength of family relationships is
inversely proportional to the size of the settlement: the smaller
the respondents’ living places were, the stronger relationships
they had. Only the parent-children interactions were not
affected by the settlement type, though residents of the capital
and large villages did diverge from the rest of the sample, as
the families were characterised by looser social ties in their
cases. As a consequence of the rare interaction with the family,
inhabitants of cities lose the social capital of everyday
assistance, in other words, the solidarity deteriorates. The
family relations of the inhabitants of large villages followed
patterns similar to the social practice of the cities’ population,
for this again their isolated and transient lifestyle, and the
advanced degree of urbanization of their settlements were
responsible.
The level of qualification influenced the intensity of
family interactions as well. The sample segment of people with
secondary qualification had the most intensive relationships,
while graduates and low-qualified people showed comparable
degrees of activity, and communicated with their family
members less regularly. In the case of the unqualified
respondents, it is usually the lack of resources and financial
stability that disintegrate family cohesion, while migration and
status shift reduce the opportunities for family interaction by
the graduates.
People, who have small families, or whose family
members have already deceased, tend to complete their
networks of primary relationships with their friends. It is
confirmed by the fact that their interactions with friends are
much more intensive than with their distant relatives. It was
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observed in relation to settlement size that residents of villages
and cities had the most coherent relationships with friends. In
the capital, the social interaction with friends was the second
after the connection with adult children in terms of intensity,
and this means that friends preceded every other type of
primary relations.
Mechanical Solidarity and Hope for Support
Solidarity is a decisive criterion of communities. Macro-
communal solidarity has theoretically expanded as a
consequence of globalisation in the last decades, and the
importance of solidarity in directly interacting communities
within certain nations has simultaneously increased as well.
Direct interactions lead more frequently to the emergence of
mutual trust, and later to solidarity. Due to the crises of welfare
states and social insecurity, organic solidarity is losing its
stabilizing role, thus more and more people have to rely on the
mechanical solidarity provided by their primary relationships
(Durkheim 1987, Smelser 1994, Fukuyama 2000).
The cooperation and mutual assistance of the members
of direct communities effectively ensure subsistence in case of
difficulties. In small communities of traditional societies,
mechanical solidarity is expected and conventional, it is the
natural form of collaboration. Due to the effect of mass
production, urbanisation and disappearance of family economy,
organic solidarity was necessarily developed in the macro-
community, in form of the institutionalised social service.
However, the help and the altruistic support of small
communities with traditional motivation are often crucial even
nowadays, especially in the deprived societies where the state
cannot help the disadvantaged, not even with the basic
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necessities (Durkheim 1986, Fararo és Doreian 1998, Utasi
2002, Janky 2005).
The majority of our sample presumed that they could
rely on the support of their primary relationships in their
everyday struggles. Answers were quite optimistic, since
almost four fifths of the respondents believed that their
strongest ties would help them with 1) finding difficultly
procurable commodities or services 2) administrative tasks 3)
financial problems and to a varying extent with 4) finding
medical assistance in case of illness. Almost one third of the
sample thought that somebody of their primary relationships
would assist them in 5) finding an employment. With the
exception of the last question, similar proportions of the
participants expected help in every option from the people in
their primary relationship network. Unemployment is one of
the greatest social problems nowadays, so support would
alleviate the most urgent problem in this case, yet respondents
trusted their solidarity networks the least in the fifth question.
Solidarity means mutuality and reciprocity rather than
altruism in strong relationships and in the small communities
as well. Accordingly, the more resourceful individuals are, the
more confidently they can rely on the support of their
acquaintances. Individuals strive for reciprocity even within the
circles of their primary relations, even in trouble, and they
expect help from a group of people whose economic situation
corresponds to their own. This is a particular type of demand
for reciprocity, since it is not generated by selfishness. On the
contrary, nobody wants to remain indebted, so they refuse to
ask help, if they would not be able to return the favour in the
future. The proportion of respondents who hope for support
increases with educational attainment: it is low in the most
unqualified segment of the sample, but it starts to rise by the
respondents with vocational qualification, and it reaches its
peak by the graduates.
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Figure 3:
The degrees of solidarity (0-5) which is expected from the primary
relationships in the different income groups of the sample
(Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi
kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1501)
It could be also concluded that the degree of solidarity
(with the exception of the support in finding an employment)
grows as population density decreases. Although it drops
dramatically in the large villages, the inhabitants of the villages
show again a high degree of solidarity. The five dichotomous
variables measured by the five questions of mechanical
solidarity were synthesised into a 5-level scale (support from
relatives, friends 0-5), so we were able to demonstrate the
extent of the dependence on solidarity in all income groups.
According to the data of the 5-level scale of mechanical
solidarity, the residents of the capital and the large villages
were the less interdependent, while the inhabitants of other
settlement types relied on the support of their acquaintances
more confidently. City life reduces the chance of support from
everyday relationships, and especially those people are affected
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who devaluate their own resources and do not trust their
capacity to reciprocate. Consequently, the resourceless
residents of cities hardly hope for any help from their primary
groups.
The low level of trust and mechanical solidarity is
caused by different factors in the large villages. Traditional
community ties have not vanished entirely in these settlements,
but commuting to work or to school hinders the sustaining of
relationships and the consistent practice of reciprocity. Thus,
residents of large villages, similarly to the isolated inhabitants
of cities, refuse the idea of interdependence, even if they could
actually ask for help. The population of the villages still
characterised by traditional relationship networks has more
confidence in the support of the primary groups, they ask and
offer help more willingly, or in other words, the degree of
mechanical solidarity reaches its highest point in the small
settlements.
The composite index of the degrees of the five areas of
mechanical solidarity drew a V-shaped figure in the age
stratification. The results of mechanical solidarity reached the
nadir in the 45-59 age group. A higher percentage of the eldest
than the elderly middle-aged respondents believed that
someone from their primary group would help them people,
possibly because of their increased level of dependence. In
contrast, the resourceful, competitive and mainly active
middle-aged tend to rely exclusively on their immediate
family, they do not ask and do not offer favours outside the
family circle. It was also obvious that the youngest expect and
receive the most support of their primary groups. At the same
time, this age group is the most capable of returning the
favours with time; this is why the youngest respondents were
the most confident of their capacity for long-term reciprocity.
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Networks of Patrons and Clients
In the present society that is simultaneously deficient in civil
and charitable organisations, and affected by the declining
economy, the disadvantaged can barely lean on the
institutionalised forms of organic solidarity. It is not unusual,
therefore, that they are compelled to ask help of the more
resourceful, more affluent in their direct environment. Because
of the hierarchic structure of society, the patrons themselves
fall back on the help of others occasionally. In this way, an
extensive network of favours develops in which a great part of
the society is involved with such a high degree of
interdependence that it prevents people from leading an
economically independent and autonomous civic life. The most
extreme form of patron-client relations is usury that
precipitates the destitute into modern debt slavery. The lack of
resources, after all, forces people to reconsider the importance
of their patrons’ (such as affluent relatives, friends,
acquaintances, etc.) support (Beluszky 2000).
The most beneficial relations are evidently those that
are built on long-term, even intergenerational reciprocity,
altruism and solidarity, in which the patron does not act as a
usurer and does not harm individual autonomy. Those
respondents who had affluent, influential or high-status
acquaintances assumed that these people would lend them
effective support or useful information in case of need
(Neuhauser 1958).
A fairly low percentage of the respondents was
associated somehow with powerful people in the national
media (8, 2%), in national politics (6, 6%) or in scientific life
(6, 2%). A higher proportion had connections with well-
known, influential entrepreneurs (13, 8%), and even higher
numbers had acquaintances in the local authority (14, 8%).
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Leading positions are mainly occupied by people who
are better qualified than the average. It is also a well-known
fact that groups of friends are usually homogeneous in terms of
educational attainment and financial situation of the members.
Our results indicated that the chance of having influential
connections is three times as high in the case of graduates as it
is in the case of the respondents with primary education.
Accordingly and also as a consequence of the strictly
hierarchical society, the percentage of respondents with
influential connections grew with the educational attainment.
The trend broke by the group of respondents with high school
diploma, since it mainly consisted of women. Women are less
likely to have influential connections, as they obtain high-
status positions less frequently than men.
Most of the respondents with influential connections
belonged to the 30-44 age group. The possible reason for the
age group differences is that people under 30 rarely occupy
important positions, while people in their late fifties are
gradually replaced by their younger colleagues in leadership,
and after their retirement, their social status and personal
prestige start to sink, and so does the number of their
influential acquaintances. Our data confirmed these
assumptions, since the proportion of respondents with powerful
connections proved to be the lowest in the age group of
respondents over sixty.
Power and prestige are normally concentrated in the
cities, and accordingly, residents of cities have the greatest, and
residents of villages the lowest chance to know powerful
people. The percentage of respondents with influential
connections clearly reflected the national hierarchy of the
settlement types and the regional inequalities in the distribution
of high-status jobs and in the division of labour.
In everyday life, having acquaintances in the local
authority is usually more important than knowing
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representatives in national politics. More than a half of the
sample had powerful local connections in their hometowns.
Our hypothesis is that influential local connections and the
information that is acquired through them very frequently
enhance the civic participation and local patriotism of
individuals. To the question whether they had any suggestions
how the circumstances in their settlements could be improved,
one third of the respondents answered positively. In our view,
the people who have influential connections are more active in
public life, or in other words, having acquaintances in the local
authority intensifies the individuals’ civic participation.3
The three dichotomous variables of the inclination for
local civic participation (influential connections + suggestions
for improvement + cooperation with others to improve
circumstances) were synthesised into the index of inclination
for local civic participation, and we found that it showed a
significantly positive and strong correlation with the index that
measured the influential acquaintances in the local authority.
We also found that almost all respondents who had suggestions
were willing to collaborate with others for improvement. The
strong correlation between the suggestion for improvement and
the civic participation reveals the most significant anomaly of
the local community cooperation and civic participation. One
third of the respondents had ideas for improvement, but
communities usually lack the organisers. If they were asked
and if there was someone who coordinated the execution of the
plans, almost all respondents would participate in the
realisation of their suggestions. Mostly the initiator of the
cooperation is missing, or there is no consensus about the most
                                                
3
 We used three dichotomous variables to measure the inclination for local
civic participation. (1) Do you know someone directly in the local authority
(1=yes, 0=no)? (2) Do you have any suggestions how to improve local
circumstances? (3) Would you cooperate with other in order to improve
your local environment?
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important local tasks within the community, and without an
active organiser-coordinator the population can be barely
mobilized.
The influential connections obviously cannot be
identified with the ancient patron-client model. The
relationships of the people, who have powerful connections,
with their ‘clients’ operate mainly with mutuality and long-
term reciprocity nowadays. The ‘real’ patrons are mostly
strangers, not relatives, who offer their mediation, altruistically
or for future compensation.
The Network of Ritual Interactions
Rituals are customs, behavioural patterns that provide a
significant cohesive power in the relationships and in the life of
the communities and institutions. Religions and nations
organise ritual events deliberately, but rituals work in the life
of small communities habitually and usually attached to an
occasion. Ritual manifestations are to preserve and strengthen
relationships, communities. In interpersonal relations, the
simplest forms of rituals are greetings. Members of
communities memorize each other’s personal events,
anniversaries, they know who and when they have to celebrate,
since they want to experience belongingness, and try to
reinforce the community ties with mutual attention, respect and
awareness (Collins 1987, Assman and Czaplicka 1995).
Greetings are more than courtesies; they express the
importance of the relationship and attachment, or the wish for
the sense of belonging. The majority of the sample reported
that the members of their communities, such as their relatives
and friends, had remembered their name days, birthdays,
individual or family success, achievements or other special
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occasions in the year preceding the survey. On average, the
respondents had received greetings from seven relationships.
Postcards are going out of fashion, but the elderly who
appreciate traditional forms of greetings still tend to use them.
Technology is nevertheless gaining ground in greetings:
primarily phone calls, text messages and less significantly e-
mails. In the social network of the survey participants,
greetings were general. Personal greetings were the most
frequent in county towns and the least frequent in the capital.
In small towns, people tend to make phone calls, while
residents of the capital opted for text messages and e-mails.
The differences of practice by age groups are relatively
insignificant in the case of phone calls and personal greetings.
Postcards were sent by the elderly, and the use of text messages
and e-mails clearly revealed the dynamics and path of the
modern technology’s expansion, as these two greeting forms
were more and more frequent with every ten-year decrease in
age. The youngest age group had received greetings from 6 or
7 people in text message or e-mail, but it was still a rarity in the
case of the respondents over sixty. It has to be added that the
eldest participants themselves rarely utilized modern
communication facilities.
Respondents with high school diploma constitute the
segment of the sample that is remembered by the most people
on special occasions. This means that this group had the widest
community networks both in face-to-face interactions and in
greetings. The discrepancies between age groups were the
slightest in the case of phone calls and personal greetings.
In order to demonstrate the extent of the interaction
ritual networks of the respondents, we synthesised the data of
the frequency of greetings into a scale. Considering the high
number of the received greetings, we surmised a wide network
of relationships, or at least the wish of respondents for
interconnectivity. On the synthesised scale the percentage of
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those who had not received greeting from anyone on any
occasions was distinctly low (2, 7%).
By adding up all communication forms, the average
number of received greetings was quite high in the sample:
twenty. In the amplitude of the ritual interaction network, the
most significant divergence was caused by the age differences.
The number of received greeting was the highest in the
youngest age group (28), over fifty it dropped dramatically
(18), and even reduced further in the age group over sixty
where it was less than the half of the results of the youngest.
The data indicated clearly that the network of ritual interactions
is normally wider than the network of everyday face-to-face
interactions.
The population size of the settlement had relatively
insignificant influence in this aspect. However, it was observed
that the average number of received greetings was lower in the
smaller than in the larger settlements, and this means the
reverse of the trend observed by the direct interactions. As far
as gender is concerned, women had more relations than men in
their networks of ritual interactions. The number of received
greetings confirmed that the respondents with high school
diploma had the most active network of relationships (26), a
slightly lower number was calculated by the graduates, and the
least qualified had the lowest results.
We are of course aware of the possibility that the
answers of the respondents might have represented their wishes
and not the reality. It is possible that they had not received
greetings from all their friends and relatives in every year.
They might have been remembered by one person in several
ways. Even if we consider the possible proportion of
exaggeration, the ritual interaction networks of the respondents
remain considerably wide.
People in the network of ritual interactions are not
necessarily members of the same community, like relatives,
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friends or neighbours; they are individually connected to the
respondents in the most cases, thus they do not share the same
sense of belonging, or solidarity or the same community
identity. These people do not constitute a community in the
traditional way of understanding. However, the number of
people in the ritual interaction network implies many aspects. It
indicates how willing individuals are to join communities, how
successful their integration is on the micro-or macro-communal
level, whether they feel motivated to be part of others’ lives
and to be accepted by others. In this way, ritual interactions
and their manifestations are important signifiers of community
practice.
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III. COMMUNITY IDENTITY
Micro-Communal Identity
Communities ‘of Primary Importance’
In our research definition, we considered identity essential to
the community. We presumed that there were at least two
identity levels: micro-communal (i.e. self-identification with
the immediate or direct communities) and macro-communal
(i.e. self-identification with a wider community).
In order to reveal micro-communal identity, we asked
the participants of the survey to classify communities as most
important, important or less important in regard to the
significance of the time spent together. For the overwhelming
majority, family was on the top of the scale, and it usually
maintains its role over the entire lifetime, but the proportion of
the respondents whose contentment rests solely on the family
was remarkably low in the sample. The answers implied the
respondents’ wish, need and appreciation of belonging to other
micro-communities as well.
The degree of self-identification with a certain
community was measured on a scale that signified the
appreciation of the time spent together. We examined the
respondents’ assessment of the time spent with the family, with
friends, with fellow club members or with the fellow members
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of a civic organisation by using a 5-level scale ranging from
‘no importance’ (1) to ‘primary importance’ (5). Family
occupied the fifth–the highest–place on the scale by the
distinctive majority of the sample (81, 4%). Every second
respondent put friends on the fifth scale (50, 0%) as well. A
remarkably lower proportion regarded fellow club members
(18%) as very important, and only 7, 6% of the respondents
thought the same about fellow members of civic organisations.
Every age group had a distinctive preference for the
family, but especially the respondents in their late fifties. The
scale clearly shows that family identity is strong and general in
the society. The time spent with friends loses its importance
with ageing. Civil communities are relatively devalued in every
age group, but their assessment is more positive in the age
group of the professionally active middle-aged, and becomes
the most positive in the sample segment of the respondents in
their early sixties who are close to retirement or already retired.
Finally, the majority of the eldest did not regard civic
communities as very important.
The significance of family identity decreases with
educational attainment, whereas the preference for friends,
hobbies and fellow club members shows a reverse trend. The
time spent with civic participation was the most highly
esteemed by the graduates.
We expected a cumulative trend between the forms of
community practice and the importance of time expenditure.
We discovered that family is the foundation of community
participation in most individuals’ lives, and other micro-
communities are built on the family. In our research, the
presence of double/multiple identities on the micro-communal
level was considered and recognised.
Accordingly, a scale was created (with additive index)
on which respondents who did not find any community very
important in regard to time expenditure (12%) constituted the
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nearest end. Participants whose preference was exclusive for
family followed (32, 2%), then the third column was
constituted by the answers of preference (both) for family and
friends (32, 5%), the fourth column represented those who
considered fellow club members very important (as well) in
regard to time expenditure (14, 8%), and in the last place we
indicated the proportion of those who found the time spent with
civic practice very important as well (7, 6%).
Figure 4:
Micro-communal identity demonstrated by the proportion of
respondents according to their preference for different communities ‘of
primary importance’ in regard to time expenditure (Renewing the
Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi
kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
The group with no preference for any micro-community
was heterogeneous in terms of educational attainment.
Respondents without community identity were found in similar
proportions on all three educational levels. Introverted
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personality, psychic or other health problems might be the
reasons for seclusion and self-isolation from community life.
The sample segment whose preference was exclusive for
family consisted mainly of respondents from the low-qualified
group. The family, friends and/or fellow club members double
identity was the most frequent in the middle group of educational
attainment, amongst the respondents with high school diploma.
The graduates were the most likely to consider civic participation
(very) important as well and to adopt multiple identities.
In the stratification of settlement types, the residents of
Budapest were the most isolated: every sixth respondent (16%)
thought that none of the mentioned communities was important.
Residents of county and small towns were likely to choose both
the family and friends (31%), and the time spent with fellow club
members was appreciated mostly by the residents of cities.
Respondents who chose both civic and family identities were
predominantly residents of the capital (8, 6%), whereas this
choice was the least likely in small villages (4, 7%).
Civic Identity on the Micro-level
The research was focused on the correlation of community
with civic participation; therefore a special attention was paid
to the proportion of respondents whose preference for micro-
communal identities included civic identity as well. As it has
been indicated above, the percentage of people who regarded
the time expenditure on civic participation as a very important
part of their lives was quite low in the sample (7, 6%).
However, we are aware of the fact that the need for civic
participation characterises those respondents as well who
described it as ‘important’. This triples the number of
participants who have some kind of secondary identity, and
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means that almost one fourth of the sample considered civil
community important/very important (23%). Presumably, one
fourth of the sample has or would have civic practice under the
appropriate conditions. Educational stratification revealed that
vocational qualification was a landmark in the positive
assessment of civic engagement: this was the point where the
proportion of respondents for whom civic participation was
important (too) started to rise dynamically, while under
vocational qualification the same percentage was considerably
low. In the upper strata of the educational attainment, civic
participation gained further importance: one third of the
respondents with 4-year college degree (35%) described it as
very important/important, and almost half of university
graduates (48%) did the same.
As it has been discussed earlier, vocational qualification
was a boundary in the community education of children as
well. This means that the secondary education, and the
corresponding income level, is the minimum which is
necessary for the development of sociability and civic practice.
Macro-Identity
Dominant Communities of Identity
In the last chapter, the micro-identity was examined which
means the self-identification with those immediate communities
that are built on the individuals’ primary relationships. The
macro-identity signifies the interiorized community cohesion
and a strong cultural bond, even if it does not always mean a
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source of contentment. In this case, the communal identity is not
attached to particular people, groups or smaller communities;
this type of identity is imprinted in the personality, preserves the
cultural origins and the emotional charge of the socialization
process. It manifests itself occasionally, even if respondents do
not usually interact with other members of the identifying
community. Micro-identity was observed with the respondents’
assessment of time expenditure which indicated the strength of
the bond, thus a hierarchy of immediate communities could be
established based on the respondents’ preferences. In this
chapter we attempt to unveil the features and degree of the
macro-identity which is deeply enrooted in the psyche through
cultural values and customs.
The analysis of community identity has attracted more
and more sociological attention in the last decades. N. J.
Smelser emphasized on a sociological conference in Bielefeld
in 1994: there is an ongoing revolution of solidarity and
identity, or more precisely the subnational solidarities based on
region, religion, race, ethnicity, language, gender or lifestyle
are strengthening at the expense of national solidarity. In our
survey, we asked the participants about their sub-and ultra-
national identities as well. We focused on the interactive
identity concept, and defined the macro-community as the
mental reflection of the interaction-based self-identification
with certain communities (Hall 2003).4
In our analysis of the macro-identities, we
predominantly aimed to identify the respondents’ origin-
identity or status-identity. We created a list of 10 macro-
communities, and the respondents were asked to choose three
options in order of their own preference, in order of
importance. We paid a special attention to the communities that
were put on the first three places. The sequential choice might
imply inner compulsion, since the individuals are integrated
                                                
4
 We applied Hall’s interactive identity concept.
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into more communities at the same time, they have various
identities simultaneously; social or individual circumstances
might change preferences temporarily and compel the
individual to abandon the identity which is normally
predominant over the longest period in life. We accepted the
concept of double identity, thus both the first and the second
choices were seen as identity indicators. Our primary aim was
to reveal the communities of the respondents’ self-
identification. Family was included in the list for
methodological reasons, but we did not define it as macro-
community.5
As primary and secondary choices of the respondents
(and allowing double identity) family was paramount (71, 2%),
occupational identity had the second greatest proportion (32,
1%), then identification with the hometown community
followed (30, 2%), national identity was the fourth (22, 1%)
and respondents selected local identity (of the living place) in a
significant proportion as well (21, 3%). Other options had
strikingly lower results.
Primary or secondary choices of community identities
in the entire sample:
Profession, occupation, work position 32, 1%
Nationality 22, 1%
Religion 8, 7%
Place of birth, hometown 30, 2%
Political party 2, 4%
Social status, class 7, 9%
Local, living place 21, 3%
Minority, ethnicity 3, 4%
EU citizenship 2, 4%
Role in the family 71, 2%
                                                
5
 Family was included in the list as a generally preferred community which
the respondents could opt for, if they did not identify themselves with any
of the macro-communities.
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If the identity variations are classified according to their
implied and analogous value-content, the birth place- local-
nationality triad represents the attachment to the home country,
and also the patriotic identity. The total percentage of those
respondents who identified themselves with one/two/three of
the ‘home country’ triad (73%) corresponded to the results of
the family as ‘home’ (71, 2%).
It is remarkable that the occupational identity had the
second highest result (32, 1%) in the ranking of preferred
macro-identities. The revaluation of work, profession and also
of the work community might be a consequence of the high
unemployment rates, and this is why occupational identity was
so highly estimated by the respondents. According to some
theorists, professional communities are replaced by consumer
identities nowadays, because identities are communities of
experience and rest on the preference for certain consumer
goods, thus consumption generates identity more frequently in
the consumer society (Hradil 1992). In contradiction, the flow
theory, for example, emphasizes the role of work as a source of
enduring contentment and describes work as a creative process
(Csíkszentmihályi 1997). This would explain the high
percentage of preference for the occupational identity in our
sample. Gerhard Schulze (2000) also criticizes the theories of
experience society, and most researchers of the subjective
quality of life have come to the conclusion that the
accumulation of consumer goods does not lead to lasting
happiness; it only results in the want of further possessions
(Diener 1984). In sum, the high percentage of occupational
identity implies a surprisingly rational and sensible preference,
and implies that occupational communities provide the most
people with primary identities even nowadays.
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Categories of Macro-identity
Our aim was to differentiate and classify (by using principal
component analysis) the predominantly preferred types of
identities. Out of the 10 macro-identities that were used in the
multivariate analysis, we distinguished 5 categories of macro-
identities. As it has been mentioned above, family was the most
preferred identity type. It was not indicated as a separate
differentiating factor in the model, since it could not be turned into
a group differentiator with such generally high results.6
Out of the 9 differentiating value-systems of community
identity (without the family) five factors were created, which
enabled us to arrange two thirds of the sample (62, 2%) in a
hierarchy. National identity factor had the highest proportion (13,
5%); identities attached to the living place had 13%, ideological
(religious-political) identity factor was the third with 12, 6%, the
fourth was the occupational (12%) and the last the international
(social status, ethnicity, EU-citizenship) identity (11, 2%) factors.
The preference for national identity correlated with
educational attainment so that a U-shaped graph could be produced,
i.e. national identity was the strongest by the least and the most
qualified respondents (Tamir 1993). As far as the local identity is
concerned, the percentages dropped with the increase of
educational attainment. The examination of regional identity was
not included in our research (Pfeil 2007). However, it could be
concluded that the lack of qualification and knowledge intensifies
the need for the sense of security, hence the emotional attachment
to the living place; in other words less educated people are bound to
                                                
6
 The examination of the respondents who preferred the basic variable of the
family as primary and secondary choice revealed that women were more
likely to opt for family than men, and also a higher proportion of the
inhabitants of the capital chose family than respondents from other
settlement types. In the age group stratification there were no distinctive
discrepancies.
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their homes. The proportion of the preference for occupational
identity rises in parallel to the educational attainment; and it reaches
the highest results in the sample segment of the graduates. The
respondents with high school diploma, whose majority were
women, diverged from the trend of occupational identity, as they
identified themselves with their job to a less significant degree than
skilled workers or graduates. (In our view, this phenomenon was
caused by the fact that devotion to the family/motherhood in case
of the women was more pronounced, but the option of family
covered these possibilities as well).
Figure 5:
The averages of the factor indexes of national, local and occupational
identity in relation to educational attainment
(Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi
kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
The ideological (political, religious) identity factor was
similarly related to the education level as we have presented in the
case of the national identity: it was a U-shaped graph with the
highest results in the least qualified group, the segment of the
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skilled workers and people with secondary education showed a
preference under the average, and the results grew again in the
group of graduates, but the proportions here did not reach the
results of the least qualified group. We assume that the self-
identification with an ideological identity is predominantly an
emotional affiliation by the least qualified respondents, whereas it
has intellectual reasons in the most qualified group.
The international identity factor which consisted of the
preference for social status, ethnicity or EU-citizenship showed
less significant discrepancies than the previous two factors in
relation to the educational attainment. Its proportion was the
lowest in the least qualified group; although it increased
slightly in the other groups, the proportion remained quite low.
Figure 6:
The averages of the indexes of ideological (political, religious) and
international (status, ethnic, EU) identity factors in relation to
educational attainment
(Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi
kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
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In relation to settlement size, national identity was
preferred mainly in Budapest, and the self-identification with
the local community characterised mostly the residents of small
villages. The ideological (political, religious) identity was in
the capital, the international identity was in the county towns
and small towns the most wide-spread.
As far as the age-groups are concerned, national
identity was adopted in the highest proportion in the 30-44 age
group, whereas self-identification both with the local or
ideological (political, religious) community was the strongest
in the eldest age group. The professionally active 45-59 age
group had the highest degree of occupational identity.
International identity was the strongest among the youngest
respondents, and for them national identity proved to be the
second most characteristic identity.
Community Practice
Building Relationships and the Synthesised Scale of
Community Practice
Personality has a great influence on community attitude and
practice: open-mindedness and extroverted character enhance
community ties, but seclusion and reserved personality might
accelerate isolation. Almost one fourth of the respondents
(22%) make new acquaintances frequently, but more than one
tenth never (13, 4%)
Individuals’ community networks diminish with age
due to decease of acquaintances, retirement and restriction in
mobility, or at least the number and regularity of direct
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interactions shrink. Data suggest that ageing hinders the
practice of making new acquaintances, as respondents over
sixty were six times less likely to build new relationships (6%)
than the active younger age groups. Educational attainment
also has an effect on this practice, as the graduates, who have
indeed more secondary relations than the average, made new
acquaintances twice as frequent as the respondents with
primary education.
The respondents who never make new acquaintances
clearly confirm our hypothesis, namely that the lack of
education is a disadvantage in building new relationships: one
fifth of people with maximum primary education reported that
they never broaden their community network, whereas this
practice characterised only 2, 8% of the graduates. Gender had
less influence on community building attitude than educational
attainment, still it was noticeable. Because of their wider
occupational community networks, men have usually more
chance to meet new people, but they have more secondary
relations as well. In relation to the settlement size, the data
showed that the residents of small towns have the most
favourable community building attitude, but less than one fifth
of the respondents from Budapest reported frequent community
building practice. This indicates a quite high degree of
atomization in the capital.
In addition to open-minded attitude, receiving guests,
participation in a group event, other social events and civic
engagement also increase the possibility of building new
relationships. Everyday community practice was synthesised
and measured by the aggregation of information contents of the
mentioned 5-level indexes (making new acquaintances +
receiving guests + participation in a large company + social
events + civic participation = scales from 0 to 5). A composite
index (‘commpract’ 0-5) was created for the respondents who
chose “frequently” in the mentioned activities of community
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life, and the results indicated that half of the sample
participated in at least one activity frequently.
It has to be noted that those respondents who marked
“rarely” in the activities of community life are sociable to some
extent as well, therefore a second index was created that
comprised these participants too. This second index showed
that two thirds of the sample participated in at least three out of
the five forms of community life. The broader index
(=commpract1) showed less significant divergences in the
sample than the first, the frequent community practice index
(commpract).
The frequent participation index revealed striking
differences in the sample that were connected to various
dimensions of life. Men were more active than women.
Community practice shows a falling trend in relation to age:
the youngest age group had the highest level of activity, but
results dropped sharply by the middle-aged group, and went
further down over the age of sixty. Although the habitual
participation decreased with age, occasional, evening
community practice was maintained by the majority of the
eldest age group.
Educational attainment also affected community
practice. A dramatic increase was observed between the least
qualified segment and the respondents with secondary
education, and results kept rising, but the discrepancy was less
definite between the respondents with secondary education and
the graduates. In sum, data confirmed that the attainment of
high school diploma result in remarkable qualitative
improvement of community practice and in more successful
social integration.
However, the results of the ‘frequent’ community
practice index and the ‘rare/occasional’ community practice
index diverged. Only half of the sample participated frequently
in at least one of the activities, but the more comprehensive
 80 
second index affirmed that apart from 1%, the respondents had
a more or less frequent community practice. Life conditions
might determine individual opportunities, and the level of
sociability varies as well, but it could be concluded that the
vast majority of the sample broaden/sustain their community
network at least occasionally.
Isolating Illness and Loneliness
As it has been emphasized earlier, the need and the importance of
the family are so general, and the self-identification with its
community is so basic for those who have a family that these
concepts constitute the foundation of other community identities.
The major part of the sample considered the time expenditure on
family very important. The family structures might have altered in
the last decades, but the family as the basic community still played
a primary role in the integration and identity of the respondents
(Mrs Pongrácz and Zsolt Spéder 2003).
The primary socialization generates differences in
individual community life beyond the family, and it also
determines the prospects and degree of social integration into wider
communities. Many researchers, especially psychologists and
behaviour analysts emphasized that loneliness can occur even
within a community or a family, if other members do not
encourage, or even hinder individual actions, aims and values. The
lack of supporting home environment might result in social
isolation as well. Undoubtedly, there are cases when individuals
fail to assimilate into the wider community despite the promising
family background, but this problem is examined by psychology
and psychiatry, it is beyond the scope of our research (E. Bagdy,
2005, Gy. Csepeli, 2006).
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Loneliness, isolation and atomization are characteristic
phenomena in consumer society. Every sixth respondent felt
loneliness frequently (16%) and every third rarely (34, 7%). 12, 5%
of the women were lonesome, whereas this percentage was 19% by
men (Castel, R. 1993).
Higher population density intensified isolation and
atomization: residents of cities were twice as lonesome as villagers
(the percentages were 22, 5% in the case of Budapest and 13% in
small settlements). The rootlessness of migrants in the cities
probably contributes to the higher rates of loneliness (Bourdieu, P.
1978, Beck, U. 2003). Loneliness was especially characteristic for
respondents with unfinished primary education (34%, this means
every third person in this category), and for the eldest (23%, one
fourth of the participants over sixty). However, half of the sample
never feels lonely; this result might imply the benefits of their
community network, and it can be seen as a promising sign for
future community building and civic participation.
There is no doubt that family is a source of contentment,
but it can also become a source of depression, discomfort, or
anxiety, and individuals who feel that they are underestimated
might experience loneliness within the family. The marital status,
cohabitation or romantic partnerships have nevertheless a positive
effect: respondents in permanent relationships felt loneliness less
than half as frequently as the average of the sample (9, 3%).
In relation to different dimensions of living conditions, data
showed that loneliness was the least common in the youngest age
group (18-29) and by the respondents in permanent relationships.
Not surprisingly, this means that young age and romantic
involvement protect individual the most efficiently from loneliness.
Moreover, 54% of the youngest and 57% of the permanently
engaged never feel loneliness.
Long-term illness might have an isolating effect as well; it
reduces community practice and prevents the development of
community ties and identity, but 84% of the sample (more than
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four fifths) reported no serious health problems which would
isolate them from community. But health and loneliness do depend
on each other: the vast majority of the respondents who considered
themselves healthy did not feel loneliness (92%), whereas this
proportion was only 3-5% in the case of the respondents with
minor or more serious illnesses. It has to be added that the
correlation of community practice with illness can become a
vicious circle: the health conditions of people who are isolated from
the community might aggravate as a consequence of the mental
burden of the loneliness.
Different living conditions influence the loneliness
generated by isolating illness as well. The proportion of severely ill
respondents was 5% in the sample, but it was 14% (one third) in
the age group over sixty. The combination of the lack of education
and illness seems to have an even more severe impact than ageing:
one fifth (19%) of the respondents with unfinished primary
education reported some kind of illness that isolated them from
community life. We suppose that the deterioration of health and its
negative social effects had accumulated in their case.
It is striking how ageing and the lack of education (hence
the lack of knowledge) accompanied by some kind of illness
escalates isolation. In some cases, it is not the society that
marginalizes the ignorant, ill or elderly people, but the reverse: it is
the person who devalues him/herself and voluntarily backs out of
community life. Both situations have the same outcome, namely
deficient relationship network.
One third of the respondents who experience loneliness
frequently (35%) struggled with some kind of illness. Minor health
problems are occasionally less tolerated by the direct environment
than ‘legitimized’ and recognised serious illnesses, or the
concealment of the symptoms and its psychological effects might
cause a more painful loneliness. Whether it is a serious, or a minor
health problem, the data proved that illness often deprives the
individual of the advantages of community life.
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IV. INFORMAL GROUPS OF FRIENDS
In course of sociological examination of the communities and
civic participation, much attention is paid to formal civic
communities, organisation and especially to political parties,
but it is rarely clarified that the conceptualization and
formation of opinions on public issues start in primary and
informal groups. The first community patterns and experiences,
the first impressions about politics, authority, mutual
responsibility and solidarity towards the members of
immediate communities are acquired in childhood in the family
of orientation, and even small children can learn of political
preferences from the utterances of their parents.
In adolescence, and later in adulthood, honest and
private conversations about the immediate or the wider
environment and about social issues in the informal gatherings
of close friends are the principal factors that contribute to the
development of own and others’ opinions, and not the
participation in youth or civil organisations or in political
parties. Friendly and private meetings are the venues of the
exchange of public information and expression of individual
convictions, thus they can be seen as the most direct
communities of democratic life, as the first steps in civic
participation.
Sociological analyses of democratic civic participation,
social connections and social capital have failed to recognise
the significance of the private and informal communities so far,
this is why we found it essential to investigate the actual role of
friendship in the development of sociability.
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It has to be emphasized that informal groups are not
primarily ‘schools’ for democracy. They perform various
functions in individual, as well as in community life. First and
foremost, these groups ensure successful social integration and
protect the individual from isolation through mutual support of
the members. Ethnic origins, financial background, skin colour,
cultural roots, age, etc. are objective, but very influential
features of individual life, and everybody tries to avoid
discrimination. This basic need is fulfilled, apart from family,
through informal groups, through friends, where the members
consistently ignore every possible reason for discrimination.
The happiness of the individuals depends entirely on the
happiness of the others, but the democratic nature of the group
is feigned, even if it is indeed characterised by social
homogeneity. If someone is admitted to the group, the
members acknowledge her/him as equal and offer their support
if needed (Simmel 1973).
The informal groups aim at social homogeneity with
underlying selective mechanisms, thus the chances of entering
the ‘community playground’ highly vary. Selection according
to social status is usually achieved in everyday community
practice of friends, since numerous signs of meta-
communication facilitate differentiation and prestige ranking
(Shils 1977, Sennett 2004).7
Weber’s theory about the social stratification is verified
by the community practice of informal groups, as the vast
majority of people favour members of their social class, this is
equally true for friendships (peer group) and for marriage
(marriage homogamy), moreover, for the preservation and
                                                
7
 According to Shils, people are able to distinguish between others of
different social status based on meta-communication (Shils 1977). This
means that individuals perceive social differences which they into account
while forming their social network. About the perception and acceptance of
strangers see Sennett 2004.
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sharing of economic opportunities. The cooperation with
members of different cultures or subcultures is merely formal,
institutional, organisational or communal. Interpersonal
communication with ‘others’ is characterized by a polite
distance. Strong ties, which would later stabilize the
relationship and create solidarity, rarely develop between
people of different (sub)cultures.
The selective process and the formation of socially
homogenous informal groups are simultaneously facilitated and
complicated by the fact that exclusion and seclusion work in a
bidirectional way between the different groups or classes
(Weber 1987, Parkin 1974). Although they do socialize
(because of natural curiosity, their multicultural tolerant value
system and/or equality ideal), people, no matter what their
social standing is, prefer not to mix with others from very
different cultural or social backgrounds.
As a consequence of the underlying selective processes,
the majority tend to choose friends from classes similar to their
own. However, social standing has various dimensions, and
joining a community does not require comparability in all of
the aspects, it is usually sufficient, if one corresponds. The
nouveau riche entrepreneur, for example, is commonly
accepted by the ‘elite’ despite of his incomplete education, or
the same can happen with a well-educated, well-bred, but poor
person.8
The group formation and its selective mechanism lead
to exclusion or admission which rarely offends the refused
                                                
8
 Mills (1960) explains that the equality of ranking is emphasized in elite
schools; this is why the uniform is obligatory. Everybody competes
him/herself, not others. Thus, an illusion of democracy is created. Later, the
‘old boys’ clubs have a great importance where the ex-students can
maintain their connections. It does not matter how successful someone
becomes, s/he is later admitted to elite clubs, since the school meant the
fulfilment of one community requirement. This theory is verified by the
example of the Budapest Opera Ball and its elite participants.
 86 
person’s sensibility or sense of justice, since homogeneity is in
everyone’s interest. It is undoubtedly more painful, if the most
disadvantaged cannot afford themselves to socialize and
befriend others, or at least occasionally spend some free time
with people from their own social stratum. These people
compensate for the lack of the objective preconditions of
inviting their informal groups to their homes by meeting their
friends in streets, on markets or places; they create a forum for
opinion exchange and with it the solidarity and social capital
that the community membership ensures.
Most individuals have friends, an informal circle; in
other words, a small community beyond the family where the
solidarity of members helps to deal with difficulties of life, and
offers an opportunity to exchange information, to discuss social
or personal questions, in other words it is a preliminary form of
civic engagement.
Our previous surveys demonstrated convincingly that
atomization in society has accelerated; close family has
become one separate unit of solidarity, as the traditional
communities gradually disappear due to the effects of
urbanization and individualization (Utasi 2002). The present
volume intends to prove that family is not the only informal
group in most people’s lives; groups of friends guarantee
solidarity and constitute the foundation of civic participation.
In addition, the wide-spread notion, namely that the society
crumbles due to the general individualisation, has to be revised
as well, since the informal groups are the basic units of social
cohesion, and people will always need other communities
beyond their families. We could rather say that institutional
individualization is accompanied by the individualization of
informal groups nowadays. The individual selects and creates
his/her own community, the choice is entirely free, but self-
restriction, concession and compromise are also necessary to
sustain the relationships in the long term.
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Why is it then that the macro-community does not
function, moreover, the ignorance precludes the democratic
public life and the free flow of information in the small local
communities? Presumably, financial scarcity and unregulated,
non-transparent economy generate distrust of strangers, of
people with different social standing or cultural origins. Under
these circumstances, community trust cannot emerge, cannot
be improved and consolidated, the individual need for civic
participation does not even reach the level of civil
organisations and associations. The role of informal groups is
becoming increasingly important in this situation, since the
members already possess the inclination for community life
which, in our view, can be a promising starting point for the
revival of democracy.
Research Definition of Informal Groups
One of the basic criteria of community is the solidarity, the
mutual help deriving from the trust and common identity of the
members. Regular meetings and ritual interactions strengthen
group cohesion, while the attendance of the members is a way
to express the collective identity. The successful and enjoyable
gatherings usually generate the spiritual experience of
belongingness (Hankiss 2004, Utasi 2009).9
Groups of friends and informal communities arise out
of repeated interactions of the communities in everyday life
(living place, workplace, neighbourhood, school) or accidental
encounters. Our research was based on the ego-network.
Although group of friends, circle of friends and personal
                                                
9
 We determined our research definition based on the criteria of
communities of Hankiss (2004)
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communities of friends are applied with identical meanings in
the present volume, we are aware of the fact that circles of
friends are frequently closer and more intimate networks of
relationships that the members enlarge with different
motivations occasionally.10
The personal communities or the circles of friends are
primary relationships, connections from life scenes
(neighbourhood, workplace, school, accidental encounter,
formal institutional relationship, etc.) selected from previous
collaborations for sympathy, interest, common aims, or merely
for tradition and habit, and which congeal into intimate
solidarity circles with time. These small communities are the
most direct forms of community life beyond the family on
which later community participation is built. The atmosphere is
private, the members feel free to talk about personal problems,
like happiness and sorrow, they celebrate each other’s success,
exchange information about questions they consider important
(personal, social). Our main research aim was to map the
networks of informal communities and groups of friends, so we
asked the participants whether they had a community, a circle
with whom they entertain, go out, do leisure activities, and
discuss their opinions.11
                                                
10
 On meetings of informal groups the prestige motivation strengthens, thus
the members invite ‘outsiders’ who they expect to be beneficial in the future
for the circle
11
 In our nationally representative survey (OTKA 2009, Community ties)
our research question was phrased as follows: People usually form circles of
friends, companions. People enjoy the time spent in these small groups, the
members discuss the latest news, have fun together, stop to talk with each
other and exchange opinions. Think about your small informal
communities. Do you have a circle as described above from your living
place, neighbourhood, workplace, from unexpected encounters, from your
school mates, online relationships, cultural activity or ethnic group,
religious group or church, hobby, card, sport or any other clubs, from a
repeated activity in the street, from a restaurant or pub, or from your distant
relatives?
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We presumed that there are personal communities
which are regarded by the members as ‘social playgrounds’
designed exclusively for amusement, for social ‘game’. In
these communities, the members ignore discrepancies in
individual financial standing, within the circle there is a
(pretended) equality, the members consider each other selfsame
in the common play (Simmel 1973).
Sociological examinations seldom focus on the
community life of friendships which are in fact ego-network-
based communities with members of homogeneous social
status. The reason for the deficiency is the fact that these
groups are hard to define scientifically; their boundaries cannot
be operationalized or described with exact parameters.
Scientists usually decide to give a definition valid for one
particular research, and this was our intention as well. In
sociological research, friend is a person who the respondent
considers as a friend. This principle might be extended to the
groups of friends, namely the personal community of friends
comprises all those relationships that the respondent specifies
as friendships. Personal communities of friends can be built on
interests and instrumental motivation, or on emotional
motivation, but both types have to include trust and mutual
solidarity of the members (B. Wellman 1992).
In traditional societies, the friendships of the majority,
except the elite, originate(d) in the local communities of the
living place. However, friendships emerge from previous
relationship network, communities, locations, life scenes,
different lifecycles or periods in modern industrial societies.
Thus, friendships are multi-local, sometimes multicultural or
even international. Technology, as a new way of sustaining
relationships is an advantage in contrast to traditional societies.
Cars, telephones and the Internet reduce the distance, so the
intensity of the relationships can be maintained, even if the
direct interactions between the individual and the members of
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his/her groups are casual. It is also characteristic for modern
societies due to accelerated lifestyle and considerable distances
that individuals have to split up their friendship time
expenditure between various groups, since it is impossible to
meet all members of all communities at the same time.
Individuals have usually various groups of friends, and
as a consequence of the multiplication of the informal
communities, the members of different friendship circles of the
same individual sometimes do not know each other at all. In
addition, the frequency of the individual’s interactions varies
from group to group. It is presumable though, that the
individual need for these small informal groups, which have
become the second most important providers of mechanical
solidarity after family, increases with the disappearance of
traditional communities. Informal groups of friends are, just
like the family, protection from atomization of the macro-
community and from the effects of urbanization.
As a starting point of the research, we examined the
ego-networks, the individual-centred relationship structures. It
has been mentioned earlier that friendships circles and personal
communities of friends are mostly identical, but friendships
circles are usually understood as more intensive and intimate
ties which are occasionally enriched with formal relationships.
Nevertheless, our survey aimed to collect data on the groups
which the respondents defined as their closest ties. Thus, the
ratio of formal-informal relationships depended on the decision
of the participants. In the nationally representative survey,
fifteen sources of relationships were listed which we had
deemed the most common forms of community and
cooperative interactions and which are usual scenes of making
friends. According to the data, one fifth (22, 5%) of the
respondents had no informal communities of friends at all,
another one fifth (22, 9%) had only one such group from one
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source, but every second respondent had friends recruited from
more than one (previous) sources (54, 7%).
The friendships which are available through the ego-
network can have either one source (for example only
occupational, neighbourly or school) or numerous sources.
However, it is highly probable that the versatility of the
personal community of friends and the quantity and quality of
information exchanged depend on the number of the
relationships’ sources.
The data of the representative survey of 2009 indicated
that almost four fifths of the sample (79, 4%) had at least one
community. This result proves convincingly that the second
most general personal community after family are the
friendship circles in the contemporary society.
Furthermore, the prevalence of communities beyond
family or friends is rather casual. The members of all political
parties and political organisations made up 1, 2% of the
sample, one fifth of the respondents (21, 7%) participated in
some kind of civil associations which is a significant contrast
to the four fifths proportion of friendships (OTKA 2009,
Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community
Ties/A közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia
megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051, own calculation).
International examinations have drawn attention to the
fact that the membership of civil organisations has been
shrinking in the last decades, even in the USA where civic
participation was very characteristic earlier (Putnam 1995). On
the one hand, Wuthnow (1994) put the emphasis on the
increasing importance of small communities which gravitate
towards each other by following a common objective.
According to Wuthnow, if individuals gather repeatedly in
small communities because of their common interests and
amusement, the regular meetings lead to the development of
the sense of community with time. People with similar taste
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and living conditions seek each other’s companionship usually
in order to experience the feeling of togetherness and care.
Wuthnow interpreted the cohesion of small communities as a
proof for people’s ability to form alliances of mutual support,
and denied the notion that contemporary society is
individualistic and predominantly self-centred (Wuthnow
1994).
In our analysis, we applied Wuthnow’s concept about
the small communities for the personal communities of friends,
and regarded friendships as social units of the (quite unequal)
re-distribution of social capital and solidarity. The fact that
some individuals are able to preserve more of communities,
their social-relational sources at the same time, while others
have to rely on friendships from one sole source, verifies the
inequality.
If we consider the age stratification of the sample, for
example, it is noticeable that the friendships of respondents
over sixty derived on average from half as many sources as the
friendships of the youngest age group did. Higher educational
attainment contributed obviously to the increase of sources as
well. However, friendship community practice of the high
school diploma group was analogous to that of the graduates,
since the participants in these two groups had personal
communities of friends deriving from more (previous) sources
in similar proportion.
The discrepancy between the number of friendship
sources in case of city and village residents was less
significant, but still similar to the differences between the
extremes of age and educational stratification. Although
residents of villages have fewer groups of friends, the
frequency of traditional family events compensates them for
the lack of other communities. Our earlier research showed that
family gatherings on weekends, birthdays, or name days are
highly esteemed occasions of community life and information
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exchange both in cities and in villages, but they are more
regular in the smaller settlements (Utasi 2008).
As far as the difference between genders is concerned,
results indicated that women had fewer friendship sources than
men; in other words, women’s community networks are more
closed, more reduced.
Friendship circles represent such value and social
capital that are highly beneficial to individual life. The social
capital obtained through community ties is transferable and
enriching; it can be converted into other types of capital. This
process is, of course, reversible: favourable living conditions
and affluence enable community life which produces social
capital (Wellman-Frank 2001).
The social sources, which the friendships are based on,
demonstrate the amplitude of the social-communal space
surrounding the individual; which tend to shrink with age, and
to expand with the rise in social status or increase in wealth.
The different social sources might fuse into one heterogeneous
community of friends, or remain disconnected and sustained
separately by the individual as different friendship circles.
According to the number and nature of the dominant
social sources, we differentiated four types of community
structure that were characteristic for friendship circles of the
sample segment who had friendship circles:12
a) The first group was constituted by more than one tenth
(13%) of the sample. These respondents had wide
friendship network from various sources (workplace,
school, accidental encounters, clubs, living place, etc.).
b) More than half of the respondents (51, 3%) developed
their friendships in their immediate environment and
everyday life (dominantly from the living place and to a
smaller extent from the workplace)
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 The categorisation was carried out with cluster analysis.
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c) Every fifth respondent in this sample segment sustained
their earlier friendships from their youth, especially
from school, and had no other sources (20, 4%)
d) The rest of the sample segment (one sixth, 14, 8%) had
friends from the closest social environment: form their
neighbourhoods and wider families
Research data also proved that the number of social sources
and the geographical scope from which the personal
communities of friends derive show a shrinking trend in
parallel to the decline of living conditions. The less qualified
the respondents are, the higher the possibility that their
friendships originate in the immediate environment, especially
in the neighbourhood or in the wider family. 90% of the
respondents with unfinished primary education, and almost the
same percentage of the respondents with primary education had
their friendships from such close sources.
Friendship circles which comprised relationships from
(previous) communities or collaborations were mostly
characteristic for graduates, and they were also the most likely
to preserve their school friendships. It is also striking that at
least quarter of the friendships was made up of educational
relationships above the high school diploma stratum. This
means that every form of education above the secondary level
generates and strengthens relationships that can evolve into
close friendships. We also assume that the years between 15
and 18 had been the most suitable period for the establishment
of strong ties in those respondents’ lives who had at least
secondary education, but the proportion of school friendships
usually decreases with time.
In relation to the age stratification, it could be
concluded that the youngest respondents had the most versatile
personal communities of friends. The cluster variable showed
that one fifth of the youngest age group (20%) had various
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sources in their friendship practice. However, it does not mean
that all of their friendship circles are heterogeneous in status,
but it does indicate that their lives are more varied, more
dynamic and involves more types of activities than the life of
the elderly.
The proportion of the respondents who were able to
sustain friendships from many former communities, institutions
and sources gradually drops with age. It was only 2, 5% in the
age group over sixty, in other words, it was ten times less than
the percentage in the youngest segment. This trend clearly
signifies the shrinking life space and community network of
the elderly which intensifies the social inequality between the
extremes of the age stratification.
With the exception of the youngest group, the living
place was the source of the majority of the respondents’
friendships. It was especially characteristic for the eldest who
still maintained personal communities of friends: four fifths of
this segment had their friendship(s) locally. In an optimistic
interpretation it means that the majority of the eldest are able to
preserve their interest in local community life and have the
opportunity for information exchange.
School is the major source of friendships evidently in
case of the youngest. However, ties between fellow students
normally loosen or even vanish with age, and consequently the
proportion of school friends falls in personal communities.
Every age stratum had similar percentage of friends
from neighbourhood or wider family, but these relationships
gain in importance mainly in the lifecycles when people spend
more time at home (such as with small children, or in
retirement) and hence revalue the neighbourhood solidarity.
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Status Homogeneity in Friendship Circles
Our research hypothesis about the socioeconomic status
homogeneity of friendship circles was based on Weber’s
homogeneity theory which also implies the internal cohesion of
different classes. The data of our survey confirmed Weber’s
concepts. According to the subjective self-classification of the
respondents, three fourths of the sample had friendship circles
where all the members belonged exclusively to the same
‘social class’ (75%). One fifth (20, 6%) considered their groups
heterogeneous where they had friends from their own and other
social classes as well.13
The percentages of respondents who had friends of
lower (0, 8%) or higher (3, 5%) social status are infinitesimal
in comparison to the two other results. Accordingly, people opt
for friends of higher social status (upwards), if they form
friendship circles exclusively of people who come from
different classes than their own. This ‘upward’ choice is aimed
at the obtainment of extra information or profit, or it creates the
illusion of rise in own social standing.
The degree of social homogeneity in friendship shows a
significant correlation with educational attainment. The mixed
status-composition has similar proportion in every educational
stratum, but the percentages of socially homogeneous
friendships are remarkably high on every level. In other words,
our survey affirmed that people in every class of social
hierarchy, which are most easily describable with educational
attainment, stick together, the effects of cohesion and exclusion
are significant. This fact points to a strictly hierarchical, caste-
like society.
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 In the questionnaire the respondents were asked about their “social status”
which we usually identified with the subjective status-classification.
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As far as age is concerned, there were only insignificant
differences in the social homogeneity of friendships. Three
fourths of every age group preferred friends whose social
standing was similar to their own. The voluntary separation of
generations, or age strata is also a well-known phenomenon,
and combined with the conformability of socioeconomic
factors, it leads to more complete group homogeneity;
moreover, it doubles the extent of social closure.
The status-composition of friendship circles showed the
most significant discrepancy in relation to the settlement types.
The proportion of ‘mixed social standing’ groups was very
high by the residents of Budapest (37, 45%), but the extent of
homogeneity increased in parallel to the shrinking of the
settlement size. More than four fifths of the respondents from
small villages had socially homogeneous friendships. It can be
assumed that the multicultural population of cities generate
varying value preferences, and a higher possibility for
friendships of people from different social classes, whereas the
residents of small villages are culturally homogeneous and tend
to adhere to traditional values more strictly.
It was also characteristic for the sample segment from
Budapest that they were more likely to choose ‘upward’, to
have friends from ‘rather higher social classes’ than the rest of
the respondents. 7, 7% of the participants from the capital
reported that they had communities consisting of friends with
higher social standing than their own, and this is the double of
the sample average. It has to be added that this result is still
very low compared to the percentage of the socially
homogeneous friendship groups. In sum, social status
homogeneity is dominant in every settlement type, but a small
degree of heterogeneity is detectable in the cities.
Human relationships remain strong and stable when the
participants reinforce them with frequent meetings, or
interpersonal interactions. If the members regularly seek each
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other’s company, it indicates that the network works well. The
habitual gatherings of personal communities enable the
members to talk about everyday problems and to have up-to-
date information about each other’s lives; moreover, these
meetings are opportunities to discuss social or public questions,
to assess the processes and events of immediate and wider
environment. There are nevertheless personal communities of
friends that meet occasionally, for example on celebrations, but
the functioning of these groups is rather formal. The majority
of the rare meetings are designed to demonstrate the
belongingness of the members who with their attendance
implicitly convince each other of their mutual solidarity. It is
not uncommon, however, that some members, two or three,
meet more frequently and the information they exchanged
passes to other members indirectly, by causing domino effect.
The survey showed convincingly that the vast majority
of the respondents had intensive and regular direct or indirect
interactions with their closest communities. Two thirds (63,
1%) of the sample segment who had personal communities
communicated with their friends daily or more times a week,
while 23, 4% had contact with their friends more times in a
month.14 The two percentages indicate that four fifths of the
respondents interacted frequently with their friends, and one
tenth (10, 4%) met or contacted their circles monthly. In other
words, our examination proved that those people who are
members of communities of friends had the need for intensive
social life, as well as the practice. Informal community life,
beyond the family, and intensive community interactions are
concomitants in the lives of the respondents who had
community ties, i.e. by three fourths of the entire sample. The
research indicated that the majority has the suitable
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 By the participants who had more than one friendship circles, the
questionnaire asked about their closest ties and consistently concentrated on
the group chosen by the respondents.
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environment for discussing personal and social questions
which might be a chance of the enhancement of civic
participation.
Our main research objective was to investigate the need
for community ties. We presumed that this need motivates
people to participate in social and public life more actively.
The data proved that three fourths of the society already have
the need for wider social life beyond family which might
contribute to the improvement of democratic participation in
local communities.
People without Friends
In contrast to the respondents with community practice and
friendship circles, almost one fourth of the sample did not have
personal communities of friends at all. This proportion
comprised both the respondents who did not have the need for
social life, and those who stayed away from communities
despite their affinity. In this sample segment, a remarkably
high proportion (67, 1%) considered exclusively the time
expenditure on family important. Furthermore, 13, 1% of the
respondents without friendship circles reported that nobody,
not even their families were important which was higher than
the average of the sample (10%). The two latter results indicate
that the need for wider community participation had not
developed by four fifths of the respondents without friendships
(80%), though some of them considered the time spent with
fellow club members important. This means that four fifths of
the people without friends live secluded in the family, because
it fulfils their need for social life; and those who prefer neither
friends nor family become isolated.
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The majority of the sample quarter without friends are
low-qualified (60%, under the level of the high school
diploma), one third live in small villages (30%), and they are
mostly elderly, everyone was over the age of 45. The
proportion of women slightly exceeds the number of men. In
sum, the cumulating social disadvantages are strongly
associated with the low degree of the need for social life and
community practice.
Impecuniosity is one of the social difficulties that
aggravate isolation decisively. A financial index of 18 assets15
revealed how significantly economic-financial situation
determines the refusal/deprivation of social/community life and
practice (friendship circles by asset corr. 212**).
Financial hardship prevents the majority even from
socializing with other people in similar socioeconomic status.
A fairly high proportion of the needy do not want to develop
community ties, because they cannot or are not willing to
undertake the social commitment additionally to their own
poverty that includes the ethical norm of mutual solidarity.
Meagre possessions or shortage cannot be further divided, so
social and community interdependence cannot be based on
poverty. The impecunious or destitute deal with difficulties in
the family, if they have a family, the solidarity extends only to
the relatives.
                                                
15
 Cable TV, colour TV, landline, mobile phone, dishwasher, automatic
washing machine, home cinema system or DVD player, PC, laptop, Internet
connection, digital camera, car, art object, vacation property, own
house/flat, another house/flat, land/agricultural property.
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Figure 7:
The averages of assets in relation to the number of friendship circles
(Z-score averages) (Renewing the Democracy through the Need for
Community Ties/A közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia
megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
The positive correlation of the index of assets with the variable
signifying the number of friendship circles affirms that the
respondents without friends lived in a financial situation worse
than the average. The survey revealed that those who had one
friendship circles had results below the average of the asset
index as well. However, the number of friendship circles grew
in parallel to the increase of asset accumulation.
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Scenes of Social Life of Personal Communities
The scenes, where personal communities of friends meet,
where they can have informal conversations or exchange
opinions in a private atmosphere, or do any other activities
preferred by the members, vary with the social classes.
Every second respondent with personal communities
met their group the most frequently in the home of one of the
members. Home is the most guarded private sphere from which
people tend to exclude strangers. It is noticeable that visitors
who are not included in the personal community (postman,
agents etc.) cannot enter the home; people confer with them in
the front door or in the hall. However, friends are usually let in
the most intimate parts of the home. The memory of the
respondents was selective concerning the scene of the
meetings: according to the answers, the occasions when the
respondents were the hosts were twice as frequent (37, 2%) as
their visits by another member of their groups (17, 4%). The
reason for the surprising difference is probably the fact that
receiving guests is more memorable, since it requires more
preparation and energy than the visits by someone else.
Furthermore, people tend to forget the less significant meetings
when they just stop by their friends for a chat; these occasions
are more forgettable than celebrations and feasting.
Almost quarter of the respondents met their friendship
circles in public places, such as in restaurants, pubs or cafés
(13, 8%) and/or in clubs (10, 4%). Going out was mainly
preferred by the single respondents and their friends.
The scenes of meetings, conversation and discussions
were for every sixth respondent (15%) a public space, such as
stairwells, markets, shops and squares, and this exceeds the
proportion of those who met in restaurants, pubs or cafés.
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The difference in the quality of the conversations in a
restaurant and in the streets, shops, on the market or on a bench
in front of the house is perceptible, but all scenes can ensure,
probably for different social classes, the usefulness and
enjoyment of the time, the opportunity for information
exchange and increase the need for community participation.
Living conditions limit the choice of meeting places
even by the people who already have the need for social life.
The most common scene of the meetings is someone’s home,
but the people who do not own a flat/house are compelled to
visit others, go out or convene in public spaces. Because of the
objective living conditions, meeting friends at home character-
ises mostly the friendship practice of the middle-aged. In
relation to settlement type, residents of the capital and small
villages are most likely to gather in a flat/house. The majority
of the residents in permanent relationships owned a house or a
flat, thus they met their friends at home more frequently than
the singles.
Restaurants and/or clubs are frequented by young adults
of higher social status (31, 4%), and by the residents of the
capital (33% of them), and in relation to educational
attainment, by the graduates (25% of them). Men are twice as
likely (32%) to go out as women (16, 7%), and the respondents
who live without financial difficulties meet their friends in
restaurants/clubs in a quite significant proportion (30% of
them). Presumably, people of higher social status and better
living conditions can afford to meet their friends in public
places of entertainment, this why restaurants, cafes, etc. Are
the meeting places in their friendship practice.
The community life of the public spaces, which was a
prominent feature of traditional societies, was preserved
through the street benches in front of the houses in small
villages. Although the benches keep disappearing, there are
still people who regard public spaces as scenes of deep
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discussions and entertaining social life. Conversations,
meetings in front of the house, on the market or after mass
were and are wide-spread forms of interaction especially in the
villages (17-22%), but they have an important role in the cities
as well (though in the capital only 2, 6%). The community life
on the outside corridors of apartment houses was commonly
described in literary works of art in the early 20th century, and
it is revived in a new form: in front of the block of flats, row
houses, suburban detached houses, in the streets, stairwells, on
the markets and on playgrounds of cities. These are usually
meeting spots for the elderly (20, 3% of the age group over
sixty), respondents outside the capital (17-22% of them) and
respondents with financial difficulties (20% of them).
Cohesive Activities and Value Preferences in
Friendships
Friendship circles comprise quite often people with apparently
contradictory value systems; in these cases the cohesive power
of the relationship is barely detectable. It is also hard to reveal
what factors besides solidarity can unite the people with similar
living conditions in personal communities, especially those
who seek each other’s company more or less frequently.
Common values, interests, aims, emotion and tradition deriving
from the common past are usually the most important cohesive
elements of relationships and mostly of friendships as well.
These motivation types occur simultaneously in most
interpersonal interactions, but one of them usually becomes
decisive (Weber 1987).
People who have more personal communities normally
differentiate between them according to the motivation factors.
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Friendships can rest on similar mindset and common value
preferences, or the interaction can be motivated by economic
interests and power. If the motivations diverge in different
friendship circles of the individual, it is not unusual that the
members of certain groups do not know each other and do not
meet, but the information flow is still possible.
In our questionnaire, presumed cohesive elements were
listed, and most of the respondents regarded the two answers of
‘common interests, common attractions’ and ‘common
mindset’ (together 78%) as the most important.16 The high
percentage implies the similarity of value preferences within
the personal communities. Corresponding values, as it has been
explained earlier, are the results of similar educational level
and cultural preferences which also produce status
homogeneity in the group.
The influence of common interests and attractions and
similar value preferences as cohesive powers in the friendships
intensifies with educational attainment: every second
respondent in the segment of the graduates selected the
answers ‘common interests’ and ‘common mindset’.
Improvement in educational attainment increases the
importance and frequency of intellectual conversations and
exchange of opinions for which common interests are
preconditions, while the instrumental cohesion recedes. In
relation to settlement types, common interests were particularly
important for residents of the capital, two thirds of them
explained the success of their friendships with this answer.
One fifth of the respondents (19, 4%) opted for the
memory of common past which is a traditional cohesive
element deriving from shared life situations, such as shared
                                                
16
 What ensures the cohesion of friendship in your view? (1) memory of
common past (2) common interests, common attractions (3) common
mindset (4) common aims, hobbies (5) support, collaboration, common
work.
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school, or living place, or neighbourhood. This answer was
particularly characteristic for low-qualified and elderly
respondents.
Decades ago, the majority of friendships developed
from common workplace and colleagueship in Hungary (Utasi
1990).17 The strengthening of personal ties was incidental to
common work and extra hours. Due to financial difficulties,
most people were compelled to take second jobs, and
friendships were concomitant of collaboration, since the work
helped to bridge the income gap and the participants got to
know each other. Trust emerged from the cooperation and the
community of co-workers gradually became a personal
community of friends.
In the contemporary market economy, only a small
proportion of respondents (4, 2%) thought that functional
elements, like common work and support, ensure group
cohesion. Friendship circles provide common amusement,
enjoyment, idleness, possibility for the exchange of views;
common work has lost its expediency and function as
instrumental motivation, whereas similarity in values and
interests has gain in significance.
The list of activities performed by the friendship circles
contributed to the full comprehension of the answers about the
cohesive elements. Out of the ten social activity types
(frequent, rare, almost never), the majority of the respondents
(63%) marked the ‘discussion of personal questions’ as
frequent. This confirms the primacy of common interests and
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 The activities were following: (1) discussion of personal questions (2)
conversation about local issues (3) conversation about politics (4)
conversation about national, international and global questions (5)
celebration, feasting and tippling at home (6) celebration, eating, drinking in
restaurants and cafes (7) common excursion, visiting a sport event (8)
visiting cultural events (9) common work (10) else
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shared value preferences which was reported by a similar
proportion of the sample.
The option of ‘celebrations, feasting and tippling’ was
marked as frequent by 28, 3% of the sample.
In contrast to the ranking of the cohesive elements,
common work had a surprisingly high proportion of choices as
a frequent activity (19, 6%). Moreover, work was one of the
most frequently selected options (47, 3%) on the ‘negative
extreme’ (almost never), and ‘celebrations, feasting and
tippling’ had a slightly less proportion as an activity almost
never done (44, 4%). This means that celebration and work was
preferred as frequent activities in a great part of the sample, but
the proportion of those who almost never do these activities
with their friends was similarly high. The apparent
contradiction can be solved by considering that these two
activities occur in contrasting proportions among the social
activities of people from different social classes.
Celebration and amusement in restaurants or cafes as
frequent activities were characteristic for the graduates (31,
4%), whereas only 8% of the respondents with primary
education selected the same option. Correspondingly, two
thirds (63%) of the primary education segment almost never
celebrate or go out to restaurant or cafes. Age had a significant
influence on activities as well: only a quarter of the youngest
age group selected ‘almost never’ in case of the restaurant and
café celebrations, while two thirds of the eldest gave the same
answer. Amusement in restaurants and cafes is predominantly
characteristic for individuals with advantaged living
conditions.
In sum, the young, the people with high level of
education or/and with high social status (primarily graduates)
particularly prefer common amusement and celebrations in
restaurants and cafes as social activities, whereas the eldest and
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low-qualified people with low social status almost never do the
same activities.
Common work as social activity on the two extremes
shows a similar trend, but the correlation is more complex. In
the segment with primary education, working together is not a
common activity anymore, although it used to be in the period
of second jobs. In our survey it was marked as frequent activity
by only 9% of this group.
It is a peculiar change that common work was frequent
by a significant proportion of the graduates (44, 4%). This
means that common work as social activity shifted from the
lowest to the highest stratum in the social hierarchy. Is it
possible that the (mostly) young intellectuals cooperate in the
smaller, domestic tasks because of the high rates of services?
Are individuals compelled by the modern society to work in
community and adopt the ‘do-it-yourself’ mentality?
(Gershuny 1978). Common work was especially popular by the
resourceful young respondents, but two thirds of the eldest
almost never combine work and social life.
Discussions about Public Life
in the Personal Communities
According to our research hypothesis, social, public and
political questions are discussed in the personal communities
more or less regularly. Informal groups are particularly apt
scenes for opinion exchange about public issues; therefore they
can become the foundations of the need for public life. The
conversations in friendship circles might direct the attention of
the members to public questions, and generate the willingness
to work for the local community or for the macro-society.
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In order to verify our hypothesis, we examined the
frequency of the discussions about public issues in the
friendship practice of the respondents. The data showed that
the respondents had frequent conversations with their friends
about (1) local questions (31%) (2) politics (16%) and/or (3)
national, international and global issues (21, 7%). These
percentages indicate an intensive attention to public life. The
exact intensity of the discussion of public questions was
determined with an index calculated by the synthesis of the
frequency scale of the three public topics. In this way, we were
able to measure the proportion of the friendship circles in
which discussion about public issues are quite regular. In a
wider perspective, it gives us information about the number of
personal communities of friends by whom the attention to
public life has already developed.
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Table 1:
The frequency of characteristic activities in the personal communities
of friends (Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community
Ties/A közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának
esélye, 2009, N=1051, the sample segment of the respondents with
friendship circles, N=815)
Activity Frequently(%)
Rarely
(%)
Almost
never (%)
Discussion of personal
questions 63, 0 31, 7 5, 2
Conversation about
local issues 31, 4 46, 8 21, 8
Conversation about
politics 16, 1 47, 3 36, 7
Conversation about
national, international
and global questions
21, 7 50, 6 27, 7
Celebration, feasting
and tippling at home 28, 3 48, 2 23, 5
Celebration, eating,
drinking in restaurants
and cafes
18, 0 37, 6 44, 4
Common excursion,
visiting a sport event 15, 8 44, 7 39, 5
Visiting cultural
events 16, 6 40, 7 42, 7
Common work 19, 5 33, 3 47, 2
From the synthesising scale of the three public-life related
options, we had to conclude that public issues are not
frequently discussed in friendship circles: only every third
respondent reported (32, 6%) that public life issues are the
topics of conversation.
The primary goal of friendship gatherings is
unquestionably not the discussion of public life-related topics,
but leisure, amusement and the enjoyment of the time together.
Thus, public issues are not ‘scheduled’, not ‘frequently’
discussed on the meetings of friends. Results do not show
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significant discrepancies, not even in relation to educational
stratification. When the question was rephrased and the
emphasis was put on the presence of discussion of social and
political issues of the locality, the country or the world in the
friendship practice, and not on the strict frequency, it became
evident that these topics occurred almost never only by one
third of the sample segment. In other words, two thirds of the
friendship circles did talk about public life-related questions
more or less regularly (frequently and/or rarely).
The data also revealed that the public life-related
discussions mean community practice in the friendship circles
of those respondents who reported that they ‘are not interested
and involved in politics’ and do not participate in any civil or
political organisation.
One fourth of the respondents who claimed to have no
interest in politics do get involved in politics indeed, or at least
they discuss public life with their friends. Naturally, the
respondents with a political attention engage in public life-
related discussions in their friendship practice more regularly.
Surprisingly, one third of the respondents with an
increased interest in politics reported that they almost never
discuss important social or even work-related questions with
their friends. We presume that informal groups are rather
community ‘playgrounds’ for the respondents with political
attention where they seek primarily leisure and amusement. For
these people solving public issues is presumably part of
everyday life, social-political debates are included in their
work. They want to have fun with their friends, thus they
abstain from public topics.
The comparison of the data of different age groups
revealed that social-public questions are discussed the most
frequently by respondents of the age group 30-44 and the least
frequently by the eldest. The correlation of the settlement type
and the frequency of the public life-related talks produced a V-
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shaped graph: public issues are the most debated in the
friendship practice of the residents of Budapest and small
villages. The inhabitants of the small settlements, who are in
more direct relationship with the members of public authority,
have more and more transparent information about the
decisions; discuss public topics more regularly than the
residents of larger settlements. However, it is true that they
focus on local problems; local public life is of primary
importance. This proves that the need for democratic civic
participation emerges from the attention to local problems.
Social Game and Amusement
On the symbolic social playground of friendship practice the
most common activities are the following: (1) common
amusement, feasting, celebration, tippling at home, (2) the
same in a public facility, in a restaurant, in a café. Furthermore,
(3) common excursion, sport, board game, and (4) common
visit of a cultural event are also quite wide-spread.
Out of the four mentioned forms of amusement at least
one is frequent by one third of the sample (34, 5%). Two thirds
of the sample (67, 4%) did some of the activities with a smaller
intensity (frequent and/or rarely).
From the information content of the four questions in
connection with amusement, a synthesising index (entertain.
0,12) was created, and it revealed a higher proportion of men
than women in the ‘frequently’ category. The difference was
insignificant in regard to educational attainment; the low-
qualified respondents entertain almost as intensively as the
graduates. A similar trend was discovered in relation to the
settlement type. The reason for the corresponding data is
probably the primary objective of social life. People usually
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seek each other’s company because of the joy of being
together, and for this, some kind of amusement, leisure is a
precondition.
The most obvious discrepancy of amusement practice
was found between the age groups. The data of the youngest
and the eldest age groups diverged the most strikingly, but the
value of the distribution was the highest by the most active
middle-aged (45-59). The middle generation or ‘sandwich
generation’ is the most occupied, they have the most burdens
not only in the family, but in the society as well.
For the vast majority of the respondents, social life is
joy and pleasure. The proportion of those who find social
gatherings uncomfortable was insignificant. The respondents
with an ambivalent opinion, namely those who enjoyed social
events only partially, were studied as a separate group. In the
capital, the proportion of the ambivalent was particularly high
(22%). In the county towns, the group of the ‘sour-faced’ of
social life was half as large as in the capital, and the numbers
dropped in parallel to the settlement size (6, 5%). People who
enjoy the time with their informal community moderately
‘undertake’ social events probably because of an interest, or
because they see it as a commitment. It is a question though,
why the proportion of the ambivalent was so high in the
capital. Based on the data of our survey, this question could not
be completely answered. The possible reason is the wider range
of choices of activity types. Many possibilities for
entertainment might confuse sociable people. In addition, the
friendship circles of city residents are more complex, more
polarised, people enter the groups from various former circles.
The residents of the capital have more friendship circles on
average than the residents of the smaller settlements.
Furthermore, personal communities emerge from various
motivations with members of heterogeneous social status more
frequently in cities, and it is hard to reach a consensus. The
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heterogeneity can occasionally hinder the maintenance of
unity.
Solidarity in Personal Communities
Solidarity is the dominant criterion of the development and
sustaining of every community and the source of cohesion. The
mutual support expected from ‘the circles’ and solidarity
emerge naturally, as long-term reciprocity and trust work
between people of mainly the same or similar status easily and
effectively. Help within the community strengthens trust as an
‘invested social capital’, and trust intensifies community
cohesion. Research data concerning everyday support,
reciprocity and long-term reciprocity have indicated clearly
that trust and confidence in the solidarity of other members are
particularly strong in the personal communities, almost as
strong as within the close family.
According to our research results, the vast majority of
the personal communities’ members believed that they can rely
on their personal communities, or at least someone from them,
in case of everyday difficulties. More than four fifths reported
that one of their friends would do the shopping for them, if
they were not able to leave the house due to illness; or they
could entrust the keys to one of their friends, if they would not
be able to wait for the technician at home. Four fifths reported
that one of their friends would lend them money, if they needed
a smaller sum; and a similar proportion would ask advice in
case of a problem from a/the member(s) of their personal
communities. More than four fifths of the respondents believed
that one of their friends would support and understand them in
case of emotional crisis.
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The scales of everyday solidarity of personal
communities were synthesised in a 5-level index. It was
noticeable that the respondents expect or hope less support
with age. However, the averages of the age groups indicate that
even most of the eldest trust their friends in at least two options
out of five.
As a consequence of the status homogeneity of the
informal groups, the more resourceful the respondents were, or
the higher income they had, the more types of support they
could expect. The quintiles that were created out of the
synthesising wealth indexes revealed how dramatically the
expectation of everyday support dropped in the segment whose
income was below the average. People with particularly low
income do not have supplies; thus they are compelled to ‘sell’
their free time in order to earn enough money to cover daily
expenses. Due to their financial difficulties, the indigent feel
unable to support the members of their own personal
communities, but they do not expect any kind of help either. In
finding a solution to their problems, they exclusively lean on
their close families.
Chance of Transforming Virtual Friendships into Real-life
Relationships
Every second respondent in the sample (49, 7%) uses the
Internet. More and more relationships are built in the virtual
space, and some of them can be converted into real-life
friendships. One third of the Internet users (35, 5%) joined a
real group with the help of their online contacts. However,
three fourths of the respondents who entered a new friendship
circle through their virtual activity had already had real-life
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friends. This indicates that the Internet mainly enriches the
social resources of those who are able to build relationships in
the real life as well. People unable to socialize face-to-face will
not be able to develop personal ties online either. Though, the
Internet is still an opportunity to ameliorate the already existing
communities with new members, new opinions. In addition, the
Internet contributes to the sustaining and strengthening of
personal ties. It is also anticipated that the Internet would gain
ground in discussions and polls about public issues, but our
survey did not examine this question in details.
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V. ORGANISED CIVIL COMMUNITIES
Members of Organised Communities
In the personal communities, there are no fixed rules, no
maximum number of members, written principles that would
govern the function of the group. These parameters distinguish
decisively informal groups from organised civil communities
(Weber 1982, Kuti 1999). Civil organisations can be motivated
by traditional ties, but the development of civilisation resulted
in the organisation of an increased number of communities that
realised civic cooperation, followed similar values and fulfilled
common interests under the transformed circumstances of
large-scale industry and labour division. In our research, these
communities are referred to as ‘organised’, ‘organic’ or ‘civil’,
and the terms are used as synonyms.
According to comparative international surveys, only
a quarter of the Hungarian population is member in some
kind of civil organisations or associations, whereas this
proportion is considerably higher in the more developed
countries. The latest international examinations have also
emphasized that the proportion of civil organisations have
dropped as an ‘incidental’ consequence of industrialization,
globalisation, individualization and atomization, even in
those countries where civic engagement was quite wide-
spread earlier (Putnam 2002).
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Despite the fragmentation of society, the need for
community life still exists, and it is expressed through mass
gatherings, festivals and mass manifestations which have taken
place in increased numbers in the last decades. However, these
masses cannot be regarded as communities, since they do not
possess the essentials: solidarity, identity and organisation. The
mass gatherings are frequently ad hoc manifestations, the
number and social status of the participants are not determined,
the members do not always know each other, and thus mutual
trust cannot emerge. According to our hypothesis, the
proportion of organised communities has fallen, whereas the
number of mass movements and anonymous virtual
communities is growing, but both types lack solidarity and
common identity.
In our interpretation, communities are formalized,
organised or civil, if they function according to written rules, at
least one part of the members meet with a certain regularity
and work for the realisation of a common goal and/or value, or
share the same interests (Weber 1987). The nationally
representative survey of 2009 revealed that three fourths of the
respondents did not participate in any kind of formalized
community, and merely one fourth of the sample was involved
in civic participation (27, 3%).
In order to receive detailed information about the
composition and proportion of civil communities, 26 variations
were listed in our questionnaire.18 The respondents who were
members of several communities at the same time named the
most preferred one, thus communities could be ranked
according to their prevalence. Most respondents of the sample
segment had joined a sport association (18%) and religious
community (16%), but the proportion of members of
environmental or animal protection organisations was also
                                                
18
 17% of the respondents who are involved in civic participation belong to
more than one community simultaneously.
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significant (12%). Charity organisations had much fewer
members (8%). 5% of the sample segment participated in a
parent-teacher associations, but this kind of engagement lasts
obviously for only a few years.
The variables signifying the 26 variations of formalized
community membership were combined to a synthesising
linear scale of formalized civic engagement.19 It revealed the
proportion of the respondents who participated in formalized
communities, what their social status and living conditions
were and which part of the sample was not engaged in civic
participation.
The respondents of the middle and the upper quintiles
of income stratification were the most likely to participate in
civil communities. Because of their high social standing,
people of the upper quintile are usually expected to play an
active role, or at least to become honorary members of
formalized communities. People of high social classes
normally realise that their voluntary participation in civil
groups increases their prestige, and at the same time, the
organisation can benefit from the mediation and social capital
of high-status members.
Civil organisation had remarkably small number of
members in the large villages. Civic participation reached its
nadir not in the least developed villages, but surprisingly in the
large villages where the population has partially adopted the
urban value system. In these settlements the formalized
communities that were built on traditional motivation and
traditional relationship network have mainly disappeared, but
                                                
19
 FORMCOM=environmental protection, animal protection, protection of
human rights, women’s organisation, Roma organisation, homosexual rights
association, peace movement, health protection, elder protection, help for
disadvantaged, other charity organisations, religious, cultural-artistic,
occupational, trade union, political, scientific, local, youth organisation,
sport club, parent-teacher association, other hobby club, preservation of
traditional customs, agricultural or other cooperation.
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civil communities failed to develop. This peculiar and
community-deficient situation is reflected by the data.
As far as the age stratification is concerned, civic
participation was less characteristic for the youngest age group.
Respondents of the age group 30-44 were the most engaged
age group, and the proportion of membership was the lowest in
the age group over sixty. The deficiency in civic engagement
of the youngest respondents might be the consequence of the
lack of organised institutional socialization in childhood which
we have discussed earlier. In addition, romantic relationships,
PCs and virtual communities can also distract the youth from
organised communities.
The proportion of civil community members correlates
positively with the educational attainment; the graduates,
whose prestige is noticeably increased by participation in civil
communities, have at least one membership per capita. It is
obvious though, that the average comprises both respondents of
multiple membership and respondents without any
membership.
Dominant Cohesive Values of Civil Communities
In the questionnaire 26 types of civil communities20 with
separate goals, activity or value system were listed. Our aim
was to determine the values which motivated the respondents
the most frequently to devote time to organised activities. Five
categories were created from the community types with similar
objectives. The protective (12%) and hobby (13%)
                                                
20
 As it has been indicated earlier, the sample segment included respondents
with multiple memberships, thus the proportion of the participation in the
five categories showed a higher percentage (39%) than the proportion of the
respondents involved in civic communities (29, 8%).
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communities had the highest proportion of members in the
sample. Charity, religious and age related protective
organisations had significantly fewer members than the
previous two (8%-8%). The social-geographical composition
of the communities confirmed that the preference for similar
goals and activities mobilize people of similar social
background.
The protective communities comprised respondents
mainly from resourceful social classes, possibly with the best
chance to fulfil their interests: graduates, and mostly from the
45-59 age group which is the professionally most active and
successful life period. The proportion was the lowest in the
youngest and eldest age groups, probably because the
respondents of these sample segments are not yet or not any
more in a social position where the community cooperation
would effectively contribute to the achievement of their goals.
Furthermore, protective communities had the most members
from county towns, and the least from large villages.
In contrast to the previous category, hobby groups
(12%) consisted of mainly younger members (of the age 18-
44), and their proportion increased with the educational
attainment. The correlation between the proportion of hobby
group members and the settlement type produced a U-shaped
graph: these communities were the most popular in the capital
and in the small villages. Hobby circles are usually preferred
by the people with advantaged living conditions, since they can
afford it. However, the high proportion in the small villages
indicates that traditional cultural circles did not cease to
function, especially in those settlements where a conscientious
leader or cultural manager encourages the preservation of
tradition.
The membership proportions of religious communities
correlated with educational attainment, as well as with the
settlement so that it produced U-shaped graphs: respondents
 122 
with highest and lowest educational attainment, and residents
of the capital and small villages were the most likely to join
these groups. The proportion of membership dropped to the
lowest value in the large villages. From the age groups, mainly
the respondents over sixty joined religious communities despite
the fact that institutional socialization was characterised by an
anti-religious attitude in their childhood. However, the
religious values gain in importance with age.
In charity and solidarity communities (8%), the
presence of the youngest was the most dominant, whereas the
eldest showed the least interest. Members were mostly
residents of the capital, and least likely residents of large
villages. In relation to educational attainment, the proportion
was the highest in the high school diploma segment, then in the
graduate segment. Based on the result, we can conclude that
the higher the educational attainment was, the more likely the
participation in charity organisation became.
Age group or generational communities (8%) were also
mainly constituted by the respondents with high school
diploma, while the professionally most active age group (age of
45-59) tended to abstain. The residents of the county towns
were the most, and the residents of large villages the least
engaged in age group communities.
Determining the Engaging Aims of Organised Civil
Communities
As it has been mentioned earlier, only quarter of the sample
was involved in some kind of civil community. We have also
discussed the five goal-categories that predominantly
motivated the respondents to join the organisations.
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It was assumed that the level of civic participation
could be increased; more respondents would participate, if they
were asked, or they could pursue an aim which is particularly
compelling for them. In order to prove this hypothesis, we
determined the proportion of those respondents who already
possess the need, or demand for civic engagement, and under
the appropriate circumstances they would be willing to work
for the community.
The respondents were asked to name the objectives or
activities for which they would enter an organisation,
association or community. To verify the demand for civic
participation, fifteen possible motivations were listed which
were believed to mobilize a higher proportion of the
respondents.21 The questions addressed all respondents; those
who were already members, and those who had not found their
motivation or had not been asked yet. Respondents had the
possibility to choose multiple options.
The alternatives that were apparently the most engaging
for organised community cooperation out of the 15-item list
were classified into 6 subcategories based on their similar
content:
a) Common pleasure, amusement (49, 3%): predominantly
respondents of the lower and the upper extremes of the
income groups would engage in organised community life
for this reason, and the proportion was the lowest in the
middle income segment. Common pleasure was the least
popular by the residents of the large villages, while in the
age stratification its preference dropped with age. In
relation to educational attainment, the numbers of choices
                                                
21
 Helping the disadvantaged, protection of the environment/animals, moral
commitment, useful leisure time, entertainment, religion, improvement of
environment, social-political change, to socialize, financial benefits,
patriotism, social acknowledgement, expectations of the direct environment,
else.
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grew gradually from the low-qualified to the most
qualified.
b) Protection of the environment and animals (39, 5%): the
proportion increased with educational attainment, but this
cause gradually lost its importance with age. As far as the
income stratification is concerned, the most respondents
who considered this category as an engaging community
aim came from the middle income group.
c) Helping the poor, the disadvantaged with community
charity (37, 7%): this aim would prompt community
cooperation surprisingly not in the higher social classes, but
most possibly in the lowest quintile of income segments
where people themselves are close to poverty. The
respondents of the highest quintile were on the second
place in this case. Respondents in ‘relative’ wealth were
most likely to opt for guarding their financial standing
instead of supporting the disadvantaged. By settlement
types, residents of county and smaller towns and by age the
professionally active (45-59 age group) would engage in
cooperation for charity cause in the highest proportions. In
the educational stratification the proportions show a
slightly increasing trend upwards.
d) Interests of the living place, the country (35, 3%): the
proportion of preference increases with educational
attainment in this case, and it reaches its peak by the
respondents with diploma from secondary vocational
school and by the graduates. The proportion of respondents
willing to work for patriotic interests gives a cone-shaped
figure by the income groups: the middle groups would
engage the most and the two extremes in the income
categories the least probably. From the settlement types,
residents of county towns constituted the highest, while
residents of the capital the lowest proportions.
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e) Commitment, prestige (34, 2%): these two would motivate
predominantly the respondents with high social status who
believe that community involvement is a social expectation
because of their standing. Thus, the improvement of
educational attainment which usually implies the social
advancement caused an increase in the proportion of the
respondents who would undertake community work under
inner compulsion. However, the proportion dropped in
parallel to the age.
f) Political-social change (23, 0%): the preference for this
category increased with educational attainment, though it
dropped by the respondents with high school diploma (who
were mainly women), and the proportion reached its peak
by the graduates. The age groups did not reveal significant
discrepancies, but the proportion was slightly lower in the
30-44 age group and higher than the sample average in the
age group over sixty. Respondents of the two extreme
income quintiles and residents of the county towns were the
most likely to opt for this aim-category.
Data revealed that every category would be appealing for more
than one third of the respondents–under appropriate
circumstances. The results verify our hypothesis, since a
significantly higher proportion of people would participate in
community life, if their possibilities were not limited by their
social conditions. It has to be noted that the social-political
change was the category that would mobilize the less
respondents out of the six options, though our survey was
carried out in 2009, in the year before the parliamentary
elections.
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Homogeneity of Social Status in Organised Civil
Communities
As it has been described earlier, the personal communities were
characterised by a high level of status homogeneity (75%). The
development of informal groups from members of
corresponding social standing was regarded as a natural
phenomenon, since it is a well-known fact that the building of
relationships normally follows social stratification (Weber
1987, Bukodi 2002).
Our data showed that the proportion of members of
similar social status is also high in the organised communities
(52%) and combined with the groups of mixed social standing
(40, 2%), which include naturally people of similar and
different status simultaneously, the level of homogeneity is
almost as significant as it is in the personal communities. From
the age group communities the groups of the younger
respondents (at the age of 18-29) were the most homogeneous,
while the groups of the respondents of the age 45-59 the most
heterogeneous. The strict social separation was more
characteristic for the youngest than for the older age groups
according to the data; and the reason for this difference is
probably the high level of inequality in the socialization
process and in the quality of living conditions of the members
of the younger generations which is less significant in case of
the older age groups. The organised communities were the
most homogeneous in the small towns from the settlement
types, and in the segment of vocational high school diploma.
The interaction between the members of the organised
communities is regular. Two thirds (62, 7%) of the sample
segment of the respondents involved in civic participation (27,
3%) reported that they meet their communities, or at least some
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of the members several times monthly. If we add the
respondents who meet their communities at least monthly to
the previous two thirds, the results show that four fifths of the
civically engaged sample segment (82%) socialize on a regular
basis. Although only one fourth of the entire sample is
involved in civic participation, this small part participates very
actively.
As a consequence of the status homogeneity in
organised communities, people with similar interests and
values interact who possibly knew each other from earlier,
therefore the development of trust is presumable. The
formalized cooperation and regular meetings might become the
starting point for future friendships. It is also common that
friendship circles establish organisations, or members of
communities invite their friends to participate. These theories
are confirmed by the fact that four fifths (82%) of the civically
engaged sample segment had or had had friends from their civil
communities.
The status homogeneity of civil communities and the
social composition of the personal communities verify that
community life is selective in the present-day society, because
different classes live socially segregated from each other and
status groups with their own separate identities set definite
boundaries. The survey proved that the social separation is
maintained and possibly intensified both by the personal, and
the formalized communities. Social boundaries presumably
inhibit the engagement of wider public in civic participation,
and the democratisation of society.
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Solidarity in Civil Communities
Besides common identity, solidarity is a crucial criterion of
community life. Solidarity is often the cohesive common aim
in the civil communities, if the groups are organised to offer
some kind of support; in this case we rarely consider the
mutual help of the community members between each other
(Utasi 2002, Janky 2005).
The cohesion of the formalized communities usually
strengthens, if the members help each other to solve everyday
problems, if they show solidarity towards each other. The
majority of the civil community members believe that their
communities or at least some of the fellow members would
support them in trouble. 70% reported that a fellow member
would do the shopping for them in case of illness, and 61%
thought that they could entrust the house keys to someone from
their communities, if they had to leave home urgently. 57%
reported that they would receive a small loan, 77% could ask
advice and 67% would be emotionally supported.
Although every second respondent in the civically
engaged sample segment trusted their fellow members, one
fifth (21%) did not expect help in any of the five options. If the
money lending situation is excluded, as it is often not the
question of will in the period of economic crisis, the data show
that two thirds of the civically engaged sample segment feel
secure in their communities, and they believe that they can rely
on the mechanical solidarity provided by the fellow members.
The general and mutual trust within the organised
communities affirms that these organisations are not only the
networks of cooperation and pursuit of common values and
interests, but they are sources of informal relationships,
friendships. In addition, solidarity generated by the mutual trust
also results in the improvement of social capital. This process
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is facilitated by the homogeneous composition of organised
communities, as the majority of civil groups consist of
members of similar social status who cooperate more easily.
People without the Need for Formal Community Life
The questions which were intended to study the need for
formal community life also revealed that more than one fourth
of the sample (29, 8%) would not be motivated by any of the
listed aims to cooperate with others and to get involved in civic
life, the improvement of their life conditions would not change
their attitudes either. The majority of this segment do not
possess the need for wider community participation, or their
possibilities are limited due to their age or lack of education.
More than the half of this sample segment is low-qualified,
with unfinished primary school (56%), more than two thirds
(40, 5%) were over the age of sixty, 43% came from large
villages and 41% of these respondents belonged to the lowest
quintile of income stratification.
In other words, the respondents who refused or did not
need civic participation were disadvantaged in several
dimensions of life. Due to their deficient living conditions, the
need for organised community life does not develop as a part
of the hierarchy of needs, or even if it does, people in this
segment consider their situation such a hindrance that
precludes their useful and joyful community participation. In
sum, they either do not want to participate at all, or suppress
the inclination, since they regard themselves as peripheral
members of the society, or outsiders.
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Determinant Living Conditions of the Integration
in Different Communities
The patterns of childhood socialization set the ground for
personal and formal relationships, and also for the need and
inclination for community participation. The changing of the
living conditions in adulthood has a further influence on the
need for community life which normally extends with age. The
three most significant determinants of community relations are
childhood community practice, educational attainment and
age.22
Different forms of community ties (membership in
organisations, inclination for the same membership, personal
relationships) were regarded as dependent variables and we
tried to specify (with linear regression) how these three
determinant living conditions affected the development of
different types of communities. The statistics of linear
regression models in which the dichotomous formats of the
indexes of different community relationships were used as
dependent variables revealed that every community practice
type was determined by different living conditional factors.
Although the majority of the respondents belonged to wider
communities beyond the family, the variation in the
significance order of the living conditions indicates that the
respondents’ attachment to certain communities vary because
of the different living conditional factors that dominate their
community integration.
                                                
22
 The indexes of all living condition variables were dichotomized. The
correlation of the living condition variables with the indexes of different
forms of community relations was examined: childhood community practice
(chilcommdicho 1= 0=) formalized community membership
(formcommdicho 1= member, 0=not), personal communities ()
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According to the statistics of linear regression,
formalized community membership is determined firstly by (1)
educational attainment and secondly by (2) childhood
community practice. The effects of other variables are
insufficient on their own.
To reveal the inclination for organised community
participation, we used the answer to the question “Would you
join any civil communities?” as a dependent variable. It could
be concluded that this need is predominantly influenced by (1)
childhood community practice, and secondly by (2) age, or to
be more specific, by youth. The inclination for attachment to
organised communities which is prompted by childhood
community practice is maintained to varying extent throughout
a lifetime.
The primary determinant of personal, friendly
relationships is (1) age which proves the common assumption
that intensive friendship practice is basically related to young
age. On the second place was the (2) financial security shaped
by the educational attainment. The role of other living
condition variables (according to the data of the regression
model) is much less significant.
Communities Order of dominant living conditional factors
Inclination/need for
formalized community
= (1) childhood community practice + (2) age
Membership in formalized
communities
= (1) educational attainment + (2) childhood
community practice
Personal community practice = (1) age + (2) educational attainment
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VI. ONLINE AND OFFLINE COMMUNITIES
Our researched was primarily focused on the real-life
communities. We assumed that active and well-functioning
communities can revive and renew public life and civic
engagement. The interaction between communities and public
life would later lead to the renewal of democratic participation.
We did not intend to study virtual communities in details, since
we believe that online groups do not possess all the most
significant criteria of real communities (Vályi 2004). However,
we did study the proportion of online communities in the
sample, their connections to real-life communities and we
aimed to identify the differences and similarities between the
two community forms.
Common objective, common interests are typical
motivational factors for the organisations of both online and
offline communities, but the previous has no past, therefore
tradition cannot be a motivation in this case. Former
relationships (relatives, fellow students, neighbour, fellow
villager) are frequent starting points for real-life groups.
Traditional motivation and the long time span of the
connection provide the strongest trust which stabilizes the
cooperation the most effectively.
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Borders of Online and Offline Communities:
Difference between Anonymous and Personal
The online or virtual community consists of individuals who met
through communication in virtual space and maintain the
relationship via the Internet. The most popular social networks (e.
g. iwiw, Facebook, netlog, etc.) are available after registration
without any further difficulties, since they are not closed
communities. In this way, the real identities of the users remain
hidden; they interact anonymously. In contrast, the majority of
real communities have fixed boundaries; the admittance has
preconditions, such as acquaintance with the members, oral or
written reference, there are usually membership fees and fixed
rules. As a consequence, the members of real organisations are
available in person, identifiable, refractory persons can be
expelled, so they cannot do harm for the community.
The members of real communities meet and communicate
directly, they see the signs of meta-communication, so they get to
know and understand each other, whereas the members of online
communities communicate virtually and they show as much from
their real self to the community as they want. In this way, it is
impossible to obtain complete knowledge of fellow members and
the people whose activity is harmful for the community remain
hidden (Suler 2004).
In the offline communities that rest on direct relationships
the members engage their entire personality, since they have to
reveal different sides of their real selves sooner or later during the
face-to-face interactions, but the members of the online
communities show that part and as much of their personality as
they consider beneficial. If the role they play and the reality do
not correspond, the divergence is not as easily discovered as in
offline communities.
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Partial and Complete Identity
Common identity is an essential criterion of real communities.
In real-life communities the members, or at least some of them,
know each other directly. The members undertake the
continuous membership voluntarily, they identify themselves
with the community; the complete collective identity is a
precondition of the functioning of real communities. If the
collective identity vanishes, the community ceases to function.
As far as the online communities are concerned, the collective
identity can be only partial identity, since the members do not
display their real selves entirely.
As the members enter virtual communities
anonymously, they might pose as people of different status or
age than the real, even in more communities simultaneously. In
this case, the repeated virtual ‘role change’ is inevitable which
might confuse the self-image of the active participants of
online communities, and this can even cause personality
disorder. It is nevertheless not the fault of Internet technology;
it is rather the consequence of deficiency in ethical norms, or of
grotesque adaptation to social expectations. Despite these facts,
the online communities function with partial or virtually
multiplied identities, and the members with shifted identities
might play for a long time, as the chance of exposure is slight
(Újhelyi 2011).
If the members of the online communities are not
identifiable, the rules of the community are not fixed precisely
and anyone can join with a simple registration, homogeneity
cannot be achieved and trust cannot evolve into solidarity, thus
complete common identity of the members cannot develop. In
this case, the common objectives do not provide cohesion and
mutual trust does not work effectively between the members
(Power and Kirwan 2012).
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Partial and Complete Solidarity
Another important criterion of communities is solidarity. The
availability and contact details of the members of real
communities are known, the support is supplemented with
reciprocity; the altruistic solidarity is though less frequent. The
solidarity-response is to be expected, and if someone fails to
repay, the community excludes the careless member.
Solidarity sometimes develops within the relationship
network of cyberspace communities as well, but regular
support, reciprocity and especially long-term reciprocity are
impeded by the distance and the lack of the members’ real
personal details.
Offline communities can provide the members with
solidarity in more dimensions than online communities. The
transactions of solidarity with material and immaterial sources
are expected in the offline communities. Everyday mechanical
solidarity gives a strong cohesion to real communities where
solidarity is usually practised by people of identical social
status on a long-term basis. In contrast, the chance of the
utilization of material and work factors in the solidarity process
is extremely low in online communities, instead, intangibles,
such as emotional support and information exchange are used.
One of the most significant advantages of online communities
is this particular kind of solidarity; the altruistic information
exchange which does not depend on reciprocity. In real
communities the information circulates in time and space more
difficultly, and sometimes exclusivity prevents the free flow of
information, as details are reserved for the ‘inner circle’.
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Internet Usage in the Research Sample
Undoubtedly, there are communities in the virtual space that
function similarly to real communities, because they possess
almost all the criteria. Our research focused on the empirical
facts that indicate transferability between real and online
relationships, when the virtual relationship is transformed into
a real-life connection, or the reverse, when real communities
utilize the virtual space to sustain and strengthen their
connections. The latter possibility is strongly associated with
the part of our research which studies the role of virtual space
in the revival of public life.
Almost half of the respondents (47, 3%) used the
Internet. The proportion of Internet users grew dynamically in
the younger age groups. Approximately one tenth of the eldest
age group (13, 5% of the respondents over sixty) were Internet
users, while the same proportion increased to four fifths in the
youngest age group (83% of the 18-29 age group). From the
eldest to the youngest the increase was 20% per age group, and
this means that the generational difference is a dominant
distributing factor in case of the online communities.
Consequently, the majority of the eldest abstain from virtual
communities (Dombi and Faragó 2006).
The educational attainment correlates with the Internet
usage similarly: four fifths of the graduates do, but merely one
third of the respondents without high school diploma do not
use the Internet.
Four fifths of the Internet users, irrespective of their age
or educational attainment, communicate virtually. The data
revealed that primarily the respondents with high school
diploma and under the age of 40 used the worldwide web, so
they become members of the online communities the most
easily. It has been pointed out that the proportion of offline
relationships of younger age groups was also higher than that
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of elder age groups. We have described earlier as well that the
medium of ritual greetings through the Internet is the highest in
case of the younger generation; postcards are used by the
elderly and in a decreasing number. More than half of the
youngest (58% of the 18-29 age group) had received greetings
via the Internet, whereas the proportion is only 6% in the eldest
age group (respondents over 61). In relation to educational
attainment, respondents with high school diploma had the
highest numbers of virtual greetings.
Public Life on the Internet
The activity of online public life is still limited. The data
showed that only a quarter of the Internet users (26%) had ever
expressed their opinions about a public life-related question in
blogs or forums, and only 8% did it frequently. The proportion
of the respondents who participated in demonstrations or
events that were organised through the Internet or the
information spread online was very low indeed (3, 8%). It
seems that the manifestations that mobilize masses, especially
in the capital, affect only a low proportion of the population
and a low proportion of the Internet users as well. Respondents
with high school diploma were the most, and the graduates the
least likely to join these events.
Although the role of the Internet is insignificant
nowadays, later it can become a very important medium for
opinion exchange in connection with public issues (Szabó and
Mihályffy 2009). For referendums on local and national
questions it will be surely applied in the near future. One sixth
of the Internet users (17, 1%) had already voted through the
Internet about a social or public question (Papp 2011).
Particularly the youth had used this possibility, as one fifth of
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this segment had utilized the Internet to express their opinions
on public topics. Surprisingly, the Internet users of the eldest
age group had the second highest proportion after the youngest
in this case, this means that the eldest are more willing to treat
the Internet as a public forum, and probably they have more
time to do so, than the professionally most active middle-aged.
The data also confirmed that the lowest level of opinion
expression on public issues was secondary education. At least
one fifth of the Internet users with high school diploma had
voted or filled in a questionnaire online, while the proportion
was only one tenth in the case of the respondents without
secondary diploma.
Online Communities
Two thirds of the Internet users are members of some kind of
social network (such as iwiw, Facebook, etc.). This high
proportion affirms that the restrictions are quite loose; anyone
can be accepted in the preferred online community. At the
same time, members of online communities are open-minded,
not too cautious, since two thirds of the Internet users had
already acquired a relationship that had been transformed from
virtual into personal through the Internet. The most adaptable
were the respondents with high school diploma in this case as
well. The Internet users who had already transformed a
relationship from virtual into personal believed that the
connection had become ‘strong’ or ‘rather strong’.
Furthermore, the responses confirmed that one third
(36%) of the Internet users had already joined a real-life
community through online relationships. Educational
attainment had a significant influence: only one fifth of the
segment with unfinished primary education, but more than the
 139 
half of the graduates had found real communities through the
Internet.
One third of the Internet community members (35, 9%)
were members of a civil community as well. The
overwhelming majority (96%) of them used to be members of
children’s communities earlier, and most of them (93%) had
friendship circles at the time of the survey. Moreover, two
thirds of the Internet community members belonged to the two
upper quintiles of income stratification, the same proportion
had at least high school diploma and more than four fifths
(82%) were considerably young, maximum in their forties. The
distribution of online community members was surprisingly
equal in relation to settlement type, since 45% of them lived in
the capital and county towns. This indicates that the level of
urbanization does not cause significant discrepancies in the
geographical dispersion of cyberspace-users.
The survey proved that the members of online
communities are simultaneously members of personal and/or
formal communities, so the Internet is for them a medium to
multiply, sustain or intensify real-life community networks.
This means that the members of online communities are
included in our research as sociable individuals, and if the
positive attitude towards public life and civic participation is
characteristic for them, they would be active both in real life
and cyberspace.
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VII. COMMUNITY LIFE AND PUBLIC LIFE
Community Life
Research Definition of Community Life and its Living
Conditional Determinants
Community life comprises all community ties beyond the
family, and the need or inclination for belonging to
communities other than the family. The definition of
community life is interpreted as a form of communal existence
(Lukács 1985). According to our hypothesis, community life is
more than the fact whether the individual is involved in a
community or not; it signifies the need and inclination for
integration into communities. Thus, the communal existence
incorporates community participation, community practice and
community ties, and the need and wish for spending time with
others.
The index of community life is a synthesised, numerical
measure of different community connections and the need for
formalized community life23 in which organised community
                                                
23
 In order to get more information about the living conditional
determinants, we created a synthesised linear index of community life that
encompassed the different types (formal, informal) of community
relationships and the need for community (both the need for formal and
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membership, the index of personal ties, and the informational
content of common amusement, meetings, and need for
organised community participation were included.
In this way, the measure of community life showed the
numerical value of the need and inclination for community
participation besides all community relations. It is especially
important for our research, since our hypothesis presumed that
not only the existing community ties, but also the need for
community life increases the chance of public participation and
of the development of positive attitude towards public life.
Thus, the inclination for community life and the community
practice are preconditions of communal existence, and might
contribute to the renewal of everyday democratic life.
However, earlier research conclusions have indicated
that different social classes have divergent prospects for
community participation. Our intention was to determine what
living conditions intensify community life and which cause
isolation or exclusion, or depress sociability and social
activity.24
The connection between the indexes of community life
and relevant living conditions were examined by using simple
linear correlation, and the income scale presented the highest
correlation (corr. 263**), the second was the childhood
community practice (corr. 247**) and the third was the
educational attainment of the father (corr. 240**). In other
words, the cultural patterns of origin and the actual well-being
of the respondents had a decisive effect on their community
life. Own educational attainment (corr. 196**) and age (corr.
                                                                                                       
informal communities). Its components were: membership in organised
communities + inclination/need for joining a community + personal
communities + the intensity or frequency of socialization, entertainment.
Scale values: 0-52.
24
 The synthesised index of community life (scale values = 0-25) was
dichotomized (0= 17%; 1= 83%), and the effects of different living
conditional factors were examined by using binary logistic regression.
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185**) also had a significant influence on community life.
Presumably, the effect of own educational attainment is
predictable by studying the educational attainment of the
mother/father and the childhood community practice as well.
Furthermore, the high values of positive correlation indicated
that the community life of the better qualified and the younger
(the more resourceful) respondents is more favourable in
comparison with the elderly and low-qualified.
Although the simple linear correlation highlights the
relationship between community life and different living
conditions, it can reveal neither the difference between certain
categories of the indexes of living conditions, nor the causality
between community life and living conditional determinants. It
shows, nevertheless, that positive primary and secondary
socialization in the childhood and advantaged socioeconomic
situation in adulthood ensure the highest chance of intensive
community life. In this aspect the influence of age is
insignificant; ergo the beneficial effects of the living
conditional factors mentioned above endure over a lifetime. In
fact, community life means the accumulation of lasting
advantages.
If the correlation between the index of community life
(of its dichotomous format) and the indexes of different living
conditional factors is examined (by using binary logistic
regression), the different categories of living condition
variables produce significant discrepancies. From age groups,
for example, the youngest had the highest chance of the most
intensive community life, and this chance considerably
decreased in the next age group. But the trend was not linear,
the young middle-aged and not the eldest had the lowest
values, as they are usually occupied with work and their small
children, so their community ties loosen. However, only the
youngest age group had significantly and generally intensive
community life, whereas other living conditions enabled or
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restricted community participation in the older age groups to a
highly varying extent.
The settlement size noticeably influenced the intensity
of community life. In contrast to the residents of small villages,
the respondents from large villages were less likely to
socialize, or they did not feel the need for community life.
Residents of the capital and county towns lived the most
intensive community life. In other words, the residents of
settlements with considerable population were socially more
active and showed the strongest need for community
participation.
In relation to sex, the data showed smaller differences,
but men had slightly more favourable community life than
women. Neither of the variable categories was strikingly
significant in this case, as other living conditional factors had
more decisive influence by both genders.
In educational stratification, the community life of
respondents with secondary education was less energetic than
that of the graduates, and it barely exceeded the activity of the
respondents with primary education. However, the inequalities
within the educational groups suggested that educational
attainment was not decisive alone, only combined with the
additional influence of other living conditions. Still,
educational attainment caused less significant discrepancies
between the groups than age.
The examination of the role of childhood community
practice as the foundation of community life revealed that the
high number of formal and informal relationships in childhood
predicts intensive community life in adulthood; moreover,
active childhood community participation enhances the chance
of future community life, increases individuals’ inclination and
their activity, and in this case we were able to determine
significance in the categories.
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The correlation of the 5-level income scale with the
intensity of community life suggested that respondents of the
middle income category had remarkably deficient, or
insufficient community life, the results were barely higher than
in the lowest income quintile. Supposedly, the middle income
group stays out because of their temperance and the intention
to find the golden mean, whereas the lowest income group is
deprived of intensive community life due to their financial
difficulties, since community practice is often time-consuming
and/or expensive. Statistical significance between the income
scale and the index of community life was discovered only in
the extremes: in the highest and lowest income quintiles.
Correspondingly, the community relationships of the affluent
accumulate and expand which intensifies the need for
community as well, but the poverty of the lowest quintile might
result in the deficiency or even the lack of community life.
Public Life
Attitude towards Public Life and the Indicators of Public Life
Both sociology and politology provide various definitions of
public life. The differences between the variants are not
analysed in this book, our intention was to find a research
definition. The term is freed from its connotations of party
politics and studied as an everyday practice. In our
interpretation, public life comprises all manifestations and all
activities when the individual acts in the interests of an
immediate or wider community, and his/her function is
important for that community. People in public life are willing
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to take action on behalf of others in their direct environments,
of their communities. Our initial concept was that the civil
society consists of citizens who are interested in public issues
(Hoskins 2006, Kalocsai 2012, Széll 2012), and anyone can
participate in public life (Ferguson 1996). As it has been
emphasized earlier, work for fellow citizens or for the public
interest is important/very important only for a small number of
people. It was also concluded that the pursuit of public interest
requires financial security and at least secondary education, but
a significant proportion of the society do not possess these two
living conditional factors.
Consequently, the interest in public issues and public
action cannot be expected from the entire society. It is also
assumable that only a small proportion of the people in public
life undertakes this ‘service’ because of altruistic motivation,
and favours others’ interests generously. The majority of
people in public life work for self-realisation; try to serve the
right moral cause, or long for acknowledgement related to their
status (Sennett 1998).
Our survey was primarily designed to find the
respondents who were willing to cooperate for the public
interest. The questions were apt for studying the attitude
towards public life; our survey did not verify whether the
respondents realised the actions or not. Two supposed types of
attitude towards public life were differentiated with the help of
the indicators: we classified the respondents’ attitude altruistic,
if they (1) help others, even if it means hindrance for them, or
(2) usually subordinate their own interests to the interests of
others.
As it has been mentioned earlier, we believe that public
action is usually not motivated by altruism and self-sacrifice,
but by inner ethical inclination to help others and/or by external
expectations. These two can have various sources, such as the
confidence in the high level of own competence, the sense of
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responsibility for the members of the community, or the
‘unselfishly selfish’ desire for recognition and appreciation of
the community. Respondents impelled by such motivation are
(3) ready to speak up for the interests of others in case of
problems, or (4) ready to take steps to help others. Both
possible answers imply the self-presentation as mediator to
gain the community’s approval in an ‘altruistically egocentric’
way (Sennett 1998, Sellye 1988).
The four scales described above were combined in to a
synthesised linear scale of individual attitude towards public
life (publif4= 0-16). We intended to map the tendency for
public participation in different social classes of the sample
with this composite scale. In addition, we were able to answer
the research question whether the intensive and regular
community participation and positive attitude towards public
life correlate.
The synthesised scale of attitude and the composite
index of community index showed a significant and strong
linear correlation. In comparison with the other living
conditional factors, the degree of correlation between these two
indexes (Publif4 + Community life) was higher (corr. 237**).
The results proved our hypothesis, namely community relations
and public life (or attitude in this case) are strongly connected,
while other living conditions have a less decisive influence on
the attitude towards public life. Less significant, but a positive
correlation was discovered between the composite index of
attitude and educational attainment (corr. 118**), and also
between attitude and childhood community practice (corr.
177**). Accordingly, it is obvious that attitude towards public
life is determined by community life, educational attainment
and childhood community practice.
The average of the synthesised scale of attitude was
higher in the female than in the male sample segment. In
relation to settlement types, residents of the capital showed low
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average, but residents of large villages had even lower results.
From the age groups, the youngest (18-29) were on the first
and older middle-aged (45-52) on the second place. The
average of attitude scale grew with educational attainment.
Altruistic and Prestige-oriented Attitude towards Public Life
In order to get a more detailed picture about the social trend
and distribution of the linear index of attitude towards public
life, the altruistic and prestige-oriented attitude-variants were
examined separately as well. In other words, the effects of
different living conditions both on the altruistic and prestige-
oriented approach were studied in details.
Altruistic attitude had lower averages in relation to all
living conditions than prestige-oriented attitude did. This
means that lower proportion of the society is willing to
participate in public life for altruistic reasons, and self-
realisation and self-representation are more common sources of
motivation as far as the intervention in the interest of others is
concerned.
The lowest levels of both attitudes were discovered in
the capital and in the county towns. It is striking though that
the discrepancy between the averages of prestige-oriented and
altruistic attitudes was the most significant in the county towns,
possibly because the number of high-status people, who are
‘externally controlled’ and aspire to meet the community’s
expectations, was the highest in the public lives of these
settlements (Riesman 1983).
The averages of prestige-oriented public participation
increased with educational attainment which is closely
associated with social status, and the average reached a
prominently high value in the group of the graduates. In the
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group of the respondents with primary education, the averages
of the two attitude types were almost the same, but the average
of the prestige-oriented attitude started to rise dramatically
above the primary education level, while the value of the
altruistic attitude stagnated. Thus, altruistic public participation
did not show significant differences in the age groups, but its
average was slightly higher by the graduates.
Figure 8:
The averages of the scales (0-8) of altruistic and prestige-oriented
attitudes towards public life in relation to educational attainment
(Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi
kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
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The trends of altruistic and prestige-oriented attitudes diverged
in case of the age groups as well. The average of the altruistic
attitude was very slow in the younger age groups, but it started
to rise dynamically by the age of 45 and stagnated in the elder
age groups. Contradictorily, the average of the prestige-
oriented attitude reached its highest level in the youngest age
group (18-29) where altruistic public participation had its
nadir, so the two averages showed the most prominent
discrepancy by the youngest respondents. However, the
composite measure of the two attitude types was the highest in
the younger age groups. Above the middle-aged stratum, the
two averages started to gravitate towards each other, and they
reached similar values in the eldest group.
Figure 9:
The averages of the scales (0-8) of altruistic and prestige-oriented
attitudes towards public life in relation to age
(Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi
kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
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Women showed stronger tendency towards public
participation, since they had higher averages of both attitude types
than men. It has to be added, though, that the prestige-oriented
attitude was more characteristic for the entire sample and for both
sexes.
The coefficients of the two attitude types with the indexes
of childhood community practice and adult community life had a
strong correlation, and grew in parallel to the latter index. The
correlation between the index of community life and the index of
prestige-motivated attitude was significantly stronger (corr. 282**)
than the correlation between the index of community life and
altruistic attitude (corr. 133**). Correspondingly, the social life of
the individuals and the intensity of their community relationships
have less influence on the altruistic attitude than on the prestige-
oriented attitude. Moreover, the prestige-oriented attitude
significantly and strongly correlated with childhood community
practice (corr. 239**), whereas the altruistic attitude did not depend
on the childhood socialization.
In sum, the altruistic attitude towards public life was
connected neither to high status nor to self-confidence, the intensity
of community life outside the family and friendship circle did not
influence it either; it was shaped by the ethical norms of everyday
solidarity, helpfulness and sacrifice rather than by the wish for
positive feedback and appreciation of the community.
Public and Political Manifestations
against the Abuse of Authority
Civic-political participation comprises the activities and the
actions taken in the interests of the public. The survey data
enabled us to measure only the willingness of the respondents
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to participate and to determine the activities that were regarded
as acceptable by the sample. Thus, civic practice consisted of
the actions that the respondents would accept and undertake in
case of the abuse of authority.
Our questions concerning the civic practice studied the
inclination of the respondents to participate in different types
of public manifestations against the authority, such as (1) sign
a petition, (2) join a permitted protest or (3) participate in an
unannounced demonstration.25
All of the three indexes of civic practice correlated with
the index of community life positively. The number of the
respondents who would participate in an unannounced
demonstration was the lowest from the three options, and this
index correlated the least significantly with community life
(community life by petition corr. 248**, community life by
permitted protest corr. 269** and community life by
unannounced demonstration corr. 127**).
It was also remarkable that the two dimensions of
public life, namely the civic practice (designed to measure the
willingness to take steps against the abuse of the local or
national authorities) and the attitude towards public life
(numerical data of activities and interceding in the interest of
others, of a community in everyday life) showed insignificant
correlation (civic practice by attitude corr. 026). In other
words, the readiness to act against the misuse of political
power and prosocial behaviour in the immediate community
are rarely concomitant.
                                                
25
 All three questions collected answers concerning ‘corrupt leaders of local
government’, ‘corrupt politician in national politics’, ‘negative
discrimination in the workplace’, ‘extremity of salaries’, ‘negative
discrimination against the living place’ and ‘negative discrimination against
the country’. 38, 2% of the respondents would not sign a petition, 75, 1%
would not join a permitted protest and 93, 3% would not participate in an
announced demonstration.
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The data indicated that the intensive community life is
not a precondition of the radicalism of remonstrating
manifestations. This assumption is verified by the results of the
participation in an announced demonstration which is evidently
the most radical form of opposition to the authority. The
willingness to join illegal demonstrations correlated
predominantly with the two other options of protesting, namely
with the permitted protest (corr. 450**) and with the petition-
signing (corr. 202**), but it had a much less strong connection
with the index of community life (corr. 127**).
The relatively weak correlation between civic practice
and community life proved that the civic practice that would
imply radicalism is mostly rejected by the sociable respondents
with wide relationship network, but it is accepted by the
politically attentive and committed individuals. Community
life primarily enhances the moderate, everyday civic
engagement aiming at social improvement in the existing legal
framework, but it rarely encourages extremist actions which
are rather the practice of individual revolutionists.
The Averages of the Attitudes towards Public Life
and Civic Practice in the Hierarchy of Community Life
As it has been concluded earlier, the different communities that
are comprised by community life are determined by different
living conditions. We presumed that public life is influenced by
living conditions on different levels of community life as well.
The index of community life (calculated with cluster analysis)
was divided into five categories, five levels of community life and
we attempted to identify the averages and describe the trends of
civic practice and attitude towards public life on each level.
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With the help of the 5-level index we were able to rank
the respondents according to the quality of community
relations and the degree of the need for community, from the
category of isolated people with low level of need and weak
community ties to that of sociable people with intensive
community life. The averages of civic practice grew in parallel
to the hierarchic categories of community life (excellent = 7,
1%, good = 12, 2%, medium = 22, 8%, weak = 30, 8% and
isolated = 27, 1%). However, not only the average of civic
practice grew with community life, but its distribution as well.
Our results showed that both the average and the distribution of
the index of civic practice were remarkably high in the top
category of community life in which the respondents were
characterised by high level of need and intensive ties. In this
way, there is a huge difference between the two types of
sociable respondents who would undertake remonstrative
manifestations and those who would not. The respondents with
wide social network who engage in civic participation do it
much more frequently and intensively than the average, but the
other part of highly sociable respondents do not get involved in
public manifestations at all.
The averages of the index of civic practice are very high
both on the ‘excellent’ and ‘good’ levels of community life, but
respondents in the ‘good’ category were slightly more active in
civic practice. The proportion of civically engaged respondents
fell with the decrease of the quantity of relationships and the
need for community life. At the levels below ‘medium’ quality
of community life (weak + isolated), which comprised more
than half of the sample (58%), all three indexes of civic
practice dropped below the average.
The index of the attitudes towards public life increased
with the quality of community life as well, but the distribution
of the index was the opposite of the trend discovered in case of
the scale of civic practice: the index of attitude had the lowest
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value on the lowest level of community life. The possible
reason for this phenomenon is the social-demographic
determination of two attitude-types (altruistic and/or prestige-
oriented). The socially isolated are mostly characterised by
altruistic attitude, if indeed they have the energy to care about
public life, whereas people with advantaged living conditions
and wide community network adopt prestige-oriented attitude
motivated by the desire for self-realisation. From the two
attitude-scales, the scale of the altruistic attitude showed the
slightest discrepancy between the highest and lowest levels of
community life. This conclusion reasserts that the proportion of
altruistic attitude is much less significant than the proportion of
prestige-oriented attitude in the society.
Figure 11:
The averages (Z-scores) of the indexes of the altruistic and prestige-
oriented attitude and the civic practice on the 5-level scale of
community life (Renewing the Democracy through the Need for
Community Ties/A közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia
megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
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The Averages of Synthesised Index of Public Life
on the Hierarchic Levels of Community Life
The projection of the community life on the linear scale of the
synthesised public life (attitudes towards public life + civic
practice) revealed that the linear index of public life had a
higher value on the first levels of community life (excellent +
good + medium= 42%) than the average of the sample, but it
fell below the average on the lower levels (weak + isolated =
58%). In other words, the tendency for civic participation
decreases with the decline of the quality of community life.
Accordingly, civic participation is the privilege of those who
have community ties, need for community life and some kind
of attitude towards public life.
Figure 12:
The averages (Z-scores) of synthesised index of public life on the 5
hierarchic levels of community life (Renewing the Democracy through
the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a
demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
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According to the analysis of the relationship between the
synthesised linear index of public life, community life and the
living conditional determinants, the indexes of civic practice
and community life correlated the most significantly
(compcivpract by community life corr. 322**). The composite
index of civic practice and the childhood community practice
had a strong relationship as well (civic practice by childhood
community practice corr. 192**). However, the educational
attainment had a less significant, but still positive correlation
effect (civic practice by eduatt corr. 140**). The results of the
civic participation and the indexes of other living conditions
were insignificant compared to the previous ones (by income
corr. 094**, by age corr. -041 and by educational attainment of
the father corr. 0.49). In other words, civic practice and
community life depended on each other the most strongly in
the model.
Although the correlation analysis verified the strong
connection between civic practice and community life, the
linear correlation does not specify the causality between the
variables. It is obvious though that the effects of living
conditions are complex. For example, the childhood
community practice, which heavily influences the civic
practice in adult life, is shaped by the need for community life
within the family, the educational attainment of the parents,
etc. Childhood socialization affects personal relationships, as
well as the formalized community ties in adulthood, thus it
might draw attention to public life. The process of effects and
counter-effects is very complicated in this case. But the strong
correlation between public life and community life was evident
based on the data. It is presumable at the same time that
community relationships react with and enhance everyday civic
participation. In other words, community life and public life
are mostly interdependent, and reciprocally intensify or abate
each other.
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VIII. SOCIAL PARTICIPATION
Inequalities of Social and Community Participation
In the last chapter, our hypothesis about the interdependence
between community life and civic participation was described.
It is assumed that this strong relationship sets the ground for
the resolution of social problems which is usually achieved
through social participation (Pateman 1975). Social
participation is the cooperation and involvement of community
members in the management of public issues, in the
preparation and execution of decisions.
In the multi-party political system and indirect
democracy, individual participation is realised through
representatives, even on the local level. The underlying danger
of the system is the fact that the majority of the people are not
continuously informed about their community’s problems, thus
they do not feel competent to express their opinions, become
ignorant with time, and apart from the elections they stay away
from public life. Our research aimed to determine what
proportion of the sample participated in the resolution of the
problems of a closer or wider community, in everyday public
life, and what proportion was able to influence the decisions
concerning the entire society.
The efficiency and success of individual civic
participation depends on the communities where cooperation
and information exchange take place. It was assumed that the
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individual social participation can be described by the scale
created with the synthesis of the indexes of community life,
attitude towards public life and civic practice. With the help of
this scale, it would become possible to identify the proportion
of the population who are prepared to renew the democracy
and to understand the social-demographic features of this
proportion. We would be also able to describe the living
conditional factors which intensify the community and civic
participation, or in other words, the democratic participation.
The factor (principal component analysis) comprising
the indexes of community life and civic participation was
applied as the scale of social participation.26 The scale was
divided into five levels with cluster analysis. Only 3, 6% of the
sample reached the highest level (intensive and outstanding
social participation), and this means that only a fragment of the
respondents lived frequent and intensive community life and
participated in public life actively at the same time.
Contradictorily, the ‘passive’ category which was characterised
by isolation from community and from public life comprised
10, 5% of the respondents.
                                                
26
 The principal component analysis created by the synthesis of the indexes
of community life and civic practice produced a scale that encompassed the
information content of the community relations, civic practice and attitude
of the respondents. The single factor generated in this way (its own value =
1, 33) arranged two thirds of the sample (66, 8%) into a hierarchy. Then, the
continuous factor variable was divided into five categories with cluster
analysis, because it facilitated the description of the social and community
life, and their correlation with the living conditional determinants.
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Figure 13:
The distribution of the sample on the 5-level scale of social
participation (Renewing the Democracy through the Need for
Community Ties/A közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia
megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
One fifth (21%) of the sample occupied the two top
levels (outstanding + good) of the index of social participation.
These two levels collected the respondents who participated in
community and social life the most actively. According to the
participation index, every fifth respondent is a socially and
communally active citizen. (Earlier a similar proportion of the
respondents reported that they considered public life important
besides their strong community ties).
The upper fifth of the sample would be able to shape,
improve and renew the democratic framework of the society
with their active social participation. The two living
conditional factors that determined the composition of the two
top categories (according to the linear regression analysis) were
the childhood community practice and the educational
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attainment of the respondents.27 Thus, adult social participation
is established in childhood, and its intensity increases with
educational attainment. Consequently, people, whose
childhood socialization process was based on strong
community ties, and later reached higher educational level than
the average, have better chance to influence their social
environment through their active civic practice and inclination
for social participation.
One third of the sample (31, 5%) had medium level of
social participation which means that these respondents were
occasionally willing to take part in the public life of their
communities.
Almost the half of the sample was distributed on the
two lowest levels of the scale (weak + passive = 47, 5%). The
members of these two groups did not benefit from the
possibilities of socialization in wider communities, and the
highest educational level was primary school here. From these
respondents, social activity, community participation and
collaboration for common aims cannot be expected, since they
do not possess the necessary preconditions: community ties,
financial security and the level of education which would
facilitate the comprehension of information about public issues.
The data suggest that only the upper fifth of the society
is capable to form the social circumstances of their community
with active civic participation. One third gets involved
occasionally, and every second respondent lacks the need and
inclination for community life and consequently abstain from
it. The latter half of the society mostly has no choice but to
endure the public decisions which are decisively influenced by
the civic participation of the upper fifth. Due to the deficiencies
in their social network, their attitude, financial situation and
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 Explanatory variables included in the analysis were the educational
attainment, the childhood community practice, the settlement type, the age
and the educational attainment of the father.
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education, half of the society does not play any role in social
development, and relinquishes their right to interfere.
The relationship between the index of social
participation and different living conditions revealed the social
and demographic inequalities. Every respondent in the top
category of participation index was socialized in childhood
communities, without exception. In relation to the own and the
father’s educational attainment, it was obvious that the
respondents with at least secondary level of education were
more likely to participate actively. The examination of the
settlement types showed that the outstanding participation
category consisted mainly of residents of the county towns.
Furthermore, the proportion of the affluent respondents in the
most active one fifth was remarkable, and the chance of
participation decreased with the level of income. The youngest
respondents were characterised by the most positive civic
practice and attitude, while the members of the age group over
sixty barely took part in public life.
Macro-communal Identity on the Highest Levels
of Social Participation
Based on the distribution of the index of social participation, it
seems highly probable that the community identity of the upper
fifth is crucial to the future of the society, as this fragment of
the population has a strong influence on the decisions about
social issues. In the third chapter, five types of macro-
communal identities were differentiated (the prevalence of
double identity was accepted): national, local, ideological
(political-religious), occupational and international (class,
ethnic, EU).
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In our research, we attempted to answer the question
which macro-identity was mainly adopted by the two upper
categories of social participation (outstanding + good), since
these people have a decisive part in the formation of local,
national or European regional social circumstances.
Figure 14:
The averages of factor variables of national, ideological and
occupational identity on the different levels of social participation
(Renewing the Democracy through the Need for Community Ties/A
közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009,
N=1051)
The small proportion of respondents on the outstanding
level of participation (3, 6%) showed a strong preference for
occupational and ideological (political-religious) identities, but
the national identity was slightly stronger than the sample
average in this group as well. The respondents on the second
level of participation (17, 4%) predominantly opted for
occupational identity.
 163 
The ideological and the national identities produced U-
shaped graphs on the five levels of participation. This means that
these two types had significant values of preference in the two
extreme levels (outstanding and passive), whereas the values
remained under the average in the other categories of
participation.
Local identity had low values in the two upper levels of
participation, but it was noticeably preferred by the respondents
on the ‘passive’ level. The discrepancy in the preference for local
identity in the socially most active, affluent and in the
resourceless classes was striking. The low values of local identity
on the upper level of social participation indicate that the citizens
with the most intensive social participation ‘devalue’ local
community relationships, they ‘skip’ the local level, and focus
their attention on the interests of wider social groups.
Additionally, their activity is motivated by their wish for prestige
and status-attitude deriving from the occupational identity.
Figure 15:
The averages of the factor variables of local and international identities
on the levels of social participation (Renewing the Democracy through
the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a
demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
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In sum, the attachment of the two upper categories of
the participation scale, the fifth of the society which controls
the community and public life, to the macro-community is
predominantly determined by their occupational identities.
Thus, it is probable that their actions in public life are
motivated by occupational prestige and status representation. In
the highest category, the ideological identity was significant as
well, which points to the political ambition of this group. The
self-identification of the top category with the home
communities was ambivalent: although they felt devoted to
their country, they did not show affection for their ‘closer
home’, for their local communities. In contrast with the top
category, the respondents on the lowest participation level had
remarkably strong national and local identities simultaneously.
The preference for different identities in the
participation groups reflects the discrepancies in their living
conditions. This can be easily demonstrated by the example of
the respondents on the passive level of participation, as their
disadvantaged situation, their lack of social and geographical
mobility tie them to their home, living place, country and
nation, and the definite framework of their lives strengthens
their local identity. The self-identification with the local
community is supplemented with ‘faith’ in the passive
category, or in other words with affiliation to transcendental
and/or political-ideological groups.
The connection of identity preference with the factor
index of social participation verifies that predominantly the
resourceful groups of the society possess the measures
necessary to the development of need and inclination for social
participation and to its practice. The renewal of democratic
public life rests on the citizens who are socially advantaged,
who were integrated into communities from their childhood,
when they acquired positive attitude towards public life which
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later increased their inclination for participation and their
ambition to form the society. The more resourceless a social
group is, the more exposed its members become to the political
games and tactics of the affluent (Utasi 1997).
Due to their disadvantaged situation, the members of
the lower social classes retreat from community life, and
relinquish their possibility of social participation. There are
always individual exceptions, lonely freedom fighters from
different social backgrounds, but the real leaders of public life
emerge from advantaged communities and social circumstance.
According to our results, the influence of childhood
community practice, at least secondary education and financial
security are the favourable living conditions that ensure leading
positions in social life.28
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 The living conditional determinants of participation were analysed with
linear regression. The 5-level index of civic participation was dichotomised;
the respondents on the 1-3 levels were regarded as active, and the
respondents on the 4-5 levels as passive in civic participation. According to
the model, the primary determinant of participation was (1) childhood
community practice, the second was the (2) educational attainment and the
third most important the (3) income.
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Figure 16:
The average of the factor index of the linear civic participation in
relation to educational attainment (Renewing the Democracy through
the Need for Community Ties/A közösségi kapcsolatok igénye a
demokrácia megújításának esélye, 2009, N=1051)
 167 
IX. LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL PUBLIC
LIFE: SEVEN VILLAGES OF THREE COUNTRIES
Local Community Structures
The cooperation of neighbours in the village communities that
were based on family economy was usual, but it has become
less and less indispensable with the evolution of market
economy and mass production. The socioeconomic changes
resulted in the disintegration of interpersonal relationships; the
previous scene of mutual help and long-term reciprocity,
namely the local community lost its importance.29 People in
wide or even in the immediate neighbourhoods barely know
each other, the number of strong ties decreases in the
relationship networks and consequently the interpersonal trust
diminishes as well (Wellman and Wortley, 1990, Utasi 2001).
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 The cities of post-industrial societies, and the Western ‘welfare’ and
Eastern ‘Socialist’ economies emerging from modernisation created the
illusion that all services would be affordable and purchasable in the system
of institutionalised organic solidarity, full employment and regular income,
and this would release the individual from the compulsion and duty of
everyday solidarity and reciprocity. But the removal of interpersonal ties
resulted in the loss of supporting relationships, thus the individualisation led
to atomization.
 168 
The decline of strong, primary relationships impedes the
collaboration of the individual and the community.30
It was presumed though, that the neighbourhood
relationships still have a significant role in the majority of
small villages, therefore, people tend to trust each other more
than the residents of larger towns and cities. The economic
cooperation, however, is limited nowadays to the family and
relatives.31 In the last decades, the inequalities increased by the
economic competition have aggravated the shrink age of
solidarity network and trust even in the villages (Utasi 2008).
Although the cooperation of neighbours has become
loose due to the structural changes of economy after the
political transition, the local communities have maintained
their functionality. According to our research definition, the
village community comprises the identity of the residents, their
mutual solidarity, the common values shaped by similar living
conditions and the preservation of customs and traditions
(Weber 1987, Tönnies 1983, Hankiss 2004, Utasi 2009). It was
presumed that most of the listed parameters still exist in the
neighbourhood communities of small villages.32
The relationships are evidently weaker than decades
ago; still the villagers have more opportunities to build strong
                                                
30
 The competition of modernisation and the voracious lifestyle of consumer
society do not leave time the people to build strong relationships and get to
know each other closely. The time shortage does not favour the
development of trust, so mistrust poisons the most direct circles of the
individual; prejudice intensifies, partnerships, families, closer and wider
communities fell apart.
31
 Manifestations of everyday solidarity and mutual help is limited to the
family and relatives, because only these ties ensure long-term reciprocity
over generations consequently to the loss of mutual trust in interpersonal
relationships.
32
 It has to be emphasised that these relationship networks are typical only
for small villages. In the large villages where the small communities and
relationships disintegrated more rapidly due to the effects of modernisation,
urbanisation and the lack of civil organisations.
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personal ties based on tradition and trust than the residents of
settlement with large population do. Consequently, villagers
might have a better chance of getting involved in the local
public life so as to influence the decision-making process of the
local authorities. The immediate nature of relationships in the
village neighbourhoods might revive the inclination for civic
participation and for democratic improvement.
According to our hypothesis, village communities are
constituted by various relationship circles. These are partly
traditional circles formed by similar origin, goals and values,
and partly formalized civil communities created in reaction to
the civilization process. Our research is focused on these small
groups with different functions which are encompassed by the
local communities.
Two categories of small communities were differentiated.
Our attempt was to determine the conditions of entering informal
and/or formal small communities and their prevalence in the
villages (Weber 1987).
Furthermore, we examined how the small groups with
different motivations coalesce into the local community of the
village, and how they influence local public life. In the era of
globalisation and internationally centralised economic-political
power, local communities are of primary importance, since
they can become the counterpoints to the centres by
articulating local interests, sustaining local value preferences,
traditions and local public life as well.
Local public life is, in our understanding, the attention
and activities of the population of a settlement that are aimed at
common resolution of actual social, local or political problems
of the living place. Dominant fields and elements of local
public life or local democracy are, for example, the common
work for the improvement of local circumstances, opinion
exchange, and political activity. Local community and public
relationships do not necessarily lead to civic participation and
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activity, since these require consciousness and the ability to
understand information. However, the majority of the
resourceless population lack both. In the examination of the
relationship network of democracy and democratic public life,
our starting point was Dahl’s theory who emphasized that
citizens should effectively participate in collective decisions,
receive adequate information, improve their knowledge and
know the agenda of social issues. As we have indicated in the
preface, Barber’s view of the preconditions of democracy,
namely civic participation, civil dialogue, civil actions and
active citizens who have community ties, correspond to our
research concepts (Dahl 1989, Barber 2004, Utasi 2009).
The results of a nationally representative survey, as it
has been discussed earlier, revealed the living conditional
determinants of civic participation and the need for it:
education, financial security and socialization through
childhood communities.
Accordingly, public life was expected to be intensive in
the villages where the majority of the population live in
advantaged social circumstances and have an average or high
level of education. Indigence and the lack of education limit
the needs to the acquisition of primary goods, and this impedes
the flow and the comprehension of social-political information
and the pursuit of interests. In addition to the adequate living
conditions, emotional attachment to the village is an important
factor, since people who intend to live their lives within the
same community presumably want more influence on the
public life.
The geographical situation and regional economic
position in the country, employability and labour market affect
the public and community life of the villages as well. Our
sample consisted of villages that are in the vicinity of cities,
with a population previously engaged in collective farming and
not exceeding 2500 people. Out of the seven villages that were
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studied in the survey, three were located in Hungary, and four
were in two other countries, but these villages had Hungarian
majority population as well. In Hungary we examined Ruzsa,
near Szeged, Petőfiszállás, near Kiskunfélegyháza and
Ramocsaháza, a village from the most disadvantaged region
and county (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg) of the country. The
villages outside of Hungary were Hajdújárás in Vojvodina,
near to Szeged and Subotica (Serbia), Bácsgyulafalva (Serbia),
a remote and closed village, Agyagfalva and Bögöz in
Transylvania near Odorheiu Secuiesc (Romania).
The geographical location of the villages and the fact
that they belonged to three different countries enabled us to
compare the public and community lives of Hungarian
population within and outside of the borders, to examine the
same aspects in advanced and less advanced regions and to
reveal the economic strategies of different communities.33
Economic Strategies in the Villages
The majority population of the seven villages in the sample
used to make their living from collective farming before the
political transition. Even today, the families of every second
respondent (58%) did supplementary farming, and many of
them sold their products on the market. Agricultural activity
was characteristic for three fourths of the families in the
villages far from the Hungarian border. In Hajdújárás, near
Szeged and Subotica, the proportion of farmers was relatively
                                                
33
 We balanced the sample with the population (N=845). The houses were
selected with random sampling with the help of topographical maps
received from the local authorities. In the households with more than one
people we interviewed those whose birthday was the closest to the time of
the survey.
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low, but the number of those who sold their products on the
market was the highest here and in Bácsgyulafalva
(Vojvodina).
The proportion of farmers was the lowest in Ruzsa
(near Szeged) which is probably the consequence of the
proximity of the urban labour market, the impacts of
urbanization and the low quality of the soil. However, the
residents who were actually engaged in agriculture tended to
sell their products which again points to the possibilities
offered by the city.
The villagers in the sample were strongly attached to
their living places: three fourths of the respondents had not even
considered living elsewhere. Only a few percentages planned to
move away, or reported the wish for leaving the village.
Although the examination of the income sources and
the economic activities showed a high proportion of inactive
residents (retired + unemployed = 57%), it did not mean that
only the ‘formally’ employable people worked, as farming and
in some villages tourism were of great importance. In other
words, the villagers tried to exploit multiple sources of income,
and the ‘real unemployed’ were only the people incapacitated
by age or illness.
The average age of the village populations (aged 50-55
years) and the high proportion of the younger generations
suggests either strong attachment and favourable
circumstances, or the opposite, factors that impede change and
mobility. The number of young residents was the highest in
Ramocsaháza and Bögöz. Ramocsaháza, in the Nyírség region,
had a peculiar social composition. There was a high proportion
of young, Roma residents who barely find employment in the
economically disadvantaged region, not even with commuting;
therefore they are compelled to get along with the scarce
possibilities locally. Employment and unemployment rates also
indicated the lack of possibilities: the former was the lowest
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and the latter the highest in Ramocsaháza among the studied
Hungarian villages. Moreover, Bögöz and Ramocsaháza had
polarized social structures, as the age distribution was the most
imbalanced in these two villages: despite having the highest
proportion of young respondents in the sample, the number of
the retired elder was also remarkably high. The reason for this
phenomenon is probably the strong preservation of the
traditional forms of extended family.
Our data revealed that the villagers of the sample
sustained and continuously reinforced their relationships.
Besides the people in their households, the respondents
communicated regularly with six relatives on average. It has to
be added that approximately half of the relatives with whom
the respondents interacted weekly lived in their villages, but
modern-day technology enables people to overcome distance,
thus the participants kept in contact with the reported number
of relatives personally, and/or through telephone and e-mail.
The information exchange between the respondents and their
relatives about their lives, neighbourhoods, etc. is continuous,
and they can help each other in case of need (Molnár 2003).
Despite the strong attachment to the villages, people
who are not restricted in their mobility leave their living places
permanently or temporarily impelled by socio-economic and
financial difficulties, or by the effects of civilization process
and consumerism. The proportion of the respondents’ relatives
who were living abroad in the time of the survey informed us
about the extent of migration.
The four villages outside of Hungary had the highest
number of migrants currently living abroad. In Bácsgyulafalva,
four fifths of the respondents had relatives (at least one)
abroad, in Bögöz and Hajdújárás the proportion was two thirds,
and in Agyagfalva more than half of the participants reported
the same. Presumably, the living conditions in these ethnic
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villages led to an economic strategy which involved migration
as the final solution for a great part of the population.
In the case of the three villages in Hungary, it became
obvious that the proportion of migrants depended on the
economic and regional situation of the village and on the
quality of the living that the region can offer. In Ruzsa, for
example, which is a village near to a city with considerably
good employment oppotunities, only a quarter of the
participants had relatives abroad, while the proportion was one
third in the economically most disadvantaged village, in
Ramocsaháza. The majority of the migrants had left the village
(and the country) motivated by economic factors in hope for a
better living temporarily or permanently.
Obviously, the more livelihood opportunities the village
provides, the stronger the pull factors are. But the isolated
geographical situation, in and outside of Hungary, aggravates
the economic difficulties, compels people to abandon their
communities and seek employment abroad. The village
community strives to keep the relationship with the migrants.
The cohesion and persistent power of the village communities
are reflected by the frequency of interaction: one tenth of
respondents who have relatives abroad communicate daily and
one fourth at least weekly with the migrants. The in-depth
interviews revealed that the majority of the migrants return
home for village days, fairs, other events or celebrations in the
village. The most preferred destination of the migration, both
for study and work reasons, was Hungary. The possible
explanations for the high percentages of immigration from the
Hungarian majority villages outside of the border to Hungary
are the strong linguistic and cultural ties, as well as the lack of
knowledge of other languages. The second most likely target is
Germany, with even more potentials.
The significant discrepancy in the proportions of people
migrating from the Hungarian villages and the Hungarian
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ethnic villages suggest that the four villages in Serbia and
Romania are in a more disadvantaged economic situation than
the other three settlements of the sample. The employment
opportunities abroad detract the mobile workforce even from
the cohesive village community. It is a well-known
sociological fact, however, that predominantly the active,
qualified and young people endeavour the work abroad, thus
migration deprive the local communities of some of their most
resourceful and valuable members.
According to our previous results, financial security is
the precondition of the individuals’ intensive attention to
common issues and of the active participation in the
community life which could later evolve into civic practice.
However, deprivation confines individual activity to the
acquisition of primary goods, and impedes the development of
higher needs, such as the need for public participation (Maslow
1954, Allardt 1993, Utasi 1984).
The income scale was determined by the hierarchic index
of assets of the families.34 The average amount of the assets per
family was the highest in Agyagfalva where the distribution of
the index was relatively low, in other words, the financial
inequalities were less significant here than in the other villages
of the sample. Agyagfalva has a long and effective tradition of
family farming involving several generations, and this practice
guarantees the decent wealth of the residents. The second village
on the income scale is Petőfiszállás, but the distribution is higher
which indicates more significant economic inequalities.
According to the income scale, the most disadvantaged village in
the sample was Ramocsaháza, moreover, the index distribution
                                                
34
 The list assets included: Cable TV, colour TV, landline, mobile phone,
dishwasher, automatic washing machine, home cinema system or DVD
player, PC, laptop, Internet connection, digital camera, car, art object,
vacation property, own house/flat, another house/flat, land/agricultural
property.
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here was the highest in the whole sample, ergo deprivation is
combined with huge inequality.
If our hypothesis is correct, and the low level of
education and the financial difficulties prevent the
improvement of public participation, then Ramocsaháza has the
civically most disinterested population. As far as educational
attainment of the residents is concerned, Ramocsaháza has the
lowest proportion of graduates (4, 4%, the sample average = 9,
6%). In other words, Ramocsaháza was the most afflicted by
the two impeding factors of public life in the sample.
Village Community and Trust
Previous examinations have proved that the interpersonal trust
is diminishing in the modern consumer societies as a
consequence of urbanization, industrial development and
individualization; workplaces are in a constant state of flux,
and the living places are repeatedly changed, people always
have to adapt to new co-workers and neighbours which hinders
the emergence of trust in relationships. In contrast with the
dynamic population of cities who have less primary and more
secondary relationships, the village communities are able to
reinforce their connections with face-to-face interactions daily,
and this favours the development of close and reliable ties
(Fukuyama 2000, Utasi 2005).
The averages of the composite trust index that was
aggregated from the four trust-related variables showed
insignificant discrepancies in the sample of the village
communities.35 The averages of the trust index were the highest
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 Indicators of trust: a) there are only a few people one can trust entirely
(very true = 4, not at all true = 0). b) it usually is not necessary to doubt
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in Bögöz and Agyagfalva, possibly because the tradition of
cooperation between families, neighbours and communities has
been strongly preserved in the interdependent Transylvanian
villages; and in the isolated Bácsgyulafalva (Vojvodina) where
the members of the community protect their ethnicity in this
way. The outstanding averages of these three villages reflect
the traditional value preferences and the stronger cohesion of
the village communities as well.
Figure 21:
The averages of the trust index in the villages of the sample (Z-scores)
In contrast with the three previous examples, the
averages of trust index were low in the Hungarian villages. The
reasons for the results are presumably the values of civilization
and market economy that play a greater role in people’s lives
here due to the proximity of cities. In addition, many
inhabitants regard the settlement as accommodation, but not as
a living place, as they find employment in the cities and do not
                                                                                                       
other’s benevolence. c) if I am not careful enough, people will take
advantage of my benevolence. d) The best is if everyone relies exclusively
on her/himself and not on others.
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feel attached to their neighbours. The village community
disintegrates more easily and its members do not trust each
other. The residents of Ramocsaháza also reported low degrees
of trust, but the explanation in this case is not the atomizing
effect of advantaged economic situation, but the deprivation
and economic inequality within the community. The residents’
strong desire for leaving and their lack of identity also confirm
this theory.
In sum, not only the prosperity and advanced level of
urbanization reduce interpersonal trust in the modern-day consumer
society, but deprivation and social inequalities as well.36 Financial
difficulties, if combined with extreme social discrepancies
precipitate the loss of trust and local disintegration to a similar
extent as the effects of urbanisation and consumerism do in the
more advantaged settlements and regions. Advertisements and
commercials induce people to long for unachievable goals, but
most of the consumer goods are unaffordable in the resourceless
regions, consequently the people search for a scapegoat and start to
distrust the more successful members of the community first (Beck
1999, Lorenz 2002).
The trust scale revealed, nevertheless, that the degree of
trust was comparable in all villages of the sample (11, 5-12, 8),
but the distribution of the trust index was everywhere
significant as well (2, 1-2, 9). In other words, the discrepancy
in trust is more significant between the social classes of the
villages than it is between the different villages. Market
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 The rapid disintegration of traditional communities and individualization
are the interests of resourceful individuals and social classes. Traditional
trust-based communities are evidently afflicted by the inequalities resulting
from the achievement-oriented economic competition. However, it is not
only the relatively wealthy rural society that suffers from the social
disparities of consumer society and the loss of trust. Consumer habits and
impacts of modernisation invade even the most underdeveloped small
villages through the means of modern technology, and encumber economic
difficulties with distrust and intensifying social imbalance.
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economy and civilization affects all villages to some extent and
erodes interpersonal relationships and their trust content. As
aggrandizement and acquisition of consumer goods vary
individually, the loss of trust impairs every social class in the
villages differently. The average of the trust index was the
lowest among the respondents under the age of 35 with at least
high school diploma, since they are the most resourceful
members of the village communities. Because of their social
advantages, they do not have to rely on others, thus community
ties are mainly burden for them which intensifies their distrust.
Solidarity in the Village Community
In the definition of local community, solidarity of the members
was identified as a crucial parameter. According to the data of our
survey, only a negligible percentage of the respondents (3, 5%)
did not benefit from the mutual support-network in the wider
community (outside of the family) of the sample villages. The
overwhelming majority helped someone with work, money or
emotional support and/or received help with the listed options.37
With the exception of a small number of people, the respondents
were integrated into the solidarity network of the villages which
reasserted our definition: village is a community where solidarity
as the indicator of cohesion works functionally. However, several
differences, or variants of solidarity were discovered in the
villages of the sample. Solidarity functions in small circles for
which village community is a framework (Fararo and Doreian
1998, Utasi 2002).
                                                
37
 (1) helped with the housework or shopping, or received help (2) lent or
loaned money (3) consoled someone or gave emotional support, or was
given such kind of support. We used 4-level scales (0-4), and the values of
the integrated solidarity index ranged from 0 to 24.
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It was also noticeable that the composite value of the
given help was higher than that of the received support. The
reason for the discrepancy is possibly a certain kind of
cognitive bias that overestimates the offered help, and devalues
the received one. The solidarity transfer was significantly
intensive in Bácsgyulafalva, Bögöz and Ramocsaháza in regard
to work and material support (money) as well. These villages
lie either far away from the Hungarian border in Transylvania
and Vojvodina, or in the disadvantaged region of Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg County. The high degree of solidarity realised
with material contribution is the consequence of the
recognition of interdependence and social compulsion in these
three villages.
The values of emotional support were less unsteady in
the sample. It was striking though, that the residents of the
most urbanised Ruzsa and Petőfiszállás were the less likely to
receive and/or offer this kind of solidarity. The relatively
favourable living conditions, which are obtained with work
usually in different settlements, alienate people from each other
and gradually empty the relationships; therefore the chance and
transfer of emotional support are reduced in these villages.
The standardised solidarity index synthesised from the
three measured aspects of solidarity (work, money and
emotional support) revealed that the degree of solidarity
transfer realised outside of the family was below the average in
Ruzsa, Petőfiszállás and Agyagfalva, above the average and the
highest in Ramocsaháza, Bácsgyulafalva and in Bögöz, and the
value corresponded to the average in Hajdújárás.
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Figure 22:
The averages of composite solidarity index in the sample villages
The trend of the composite index of solidarity indicates that the
simultaneous prevalence of strong interdependence and
traditional values intensify mechanical solidarity, particularly
the exchange of both work and material values. In contrast,
prosperity and the relative wealth of residents, which makes
consumer goods and services affordable, reduce solidarity.
This alone would not disintegrate the community, as the
community cohesion could function in other dimensions, even
if the workforce and material goods are available through
commercial transactions. The negative effects of the advancing
civilization on the community are verified by the fact that both
material and emotional manifestations of solidarity fade with
the increase of personal affluence, as it is clearly illustrated by
the examples of Ruzsa and Petőfiszállás. The proximity to the
city precipitates individualization, loosens the reliable
relationships between neighbours and reduces the probability
of emotional support.
Evidently, the resourceful and employable young
respondents were the most capable of material reciprocity
within the solidarity network. The 26-35 age group showed
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outstanding results, and there were no striking differences
under the age of fifty, but over fifty the material potential and
vitality decreases with age, and so does the quantity of goods
and intangibles that would be exchangeable in the system of
mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1986, Utasi 2002).
In the sample villages, the young were engaged in
mechanical solidarity to a varying extent.38 It is usually an
excuse, if the major part of the young generation commutes to
work; in this case the expectations of the community are
lowered. If the members of the young generations do not find
employment, not even in the nearby settlements, and they are
compelled to stay at home, they become the most active
contributors to the mechanical solidarity network. The young
inhabitants of Ruzsa, near Szeged, between the age of 18 and
25 were the less likely to participate in social transactions,
either because they study, or because they commute to work, so
their time expenditure on local community ties and work
exchange is heavily limited. The youngest age group of
Ramocsaháza, which was the most disadvantaged village of the
sample in regard to employment and economic situation,
showed the highest level of willingness to perform activities of
mechanical solidarity. The residents of Ramocsaháza under the
age of 25 were twice as likely to help with work and/or money
as the respondents of Ruzsa of the same age. In this small
village of the Nyírség, the proportion of the Roma ethnicity is
relatively high, and the median age was quite low. Despite the
high number of young active inhabitants, the chances of
finding an employment are unfavourable in the region, thus the
youngest intensively engage in the solidarity network in order
to improve their personal circumstances.
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 Following Durkheim’s notions, we differentiated between the mechanical
solidarity of the communities and the institutionally organised organic
solidarity of the modern societies (Durkheim 1986, Utasi 2002).
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Material Transactions and the Cohesion of the Village
Community
By limiting the examination to the material transactions within
the solidarity network, the villages could be classified into
three categories in relation to the material help index (work +
financial). Material transactions were the most frequent in
Bácsgyulafalva, Bögöz and Ramocsaháza; moderately frequent
in Agyagfalva and Hajdújárás; rare in Petőfiszállás, and barely
occurred in Ruzsa.
We presumed that the high levels of income, the
beneficial effect of the nearby city, such as higher chances of
employment and better salaries, reduce the necessity for the
material help of neighbours, but the population of the
disadvantaged villages have to cooperate so as to create better
living conditions.
However, the relationship between the income scale and
the material transactions did not confirm our hypothesis
completely. In the villages with economic situation above the
average, more precisely in Petőfiszállás, Ruzsa, Agyagfalva
and Hajdújárás, the degree of material solidarity was indeed
below the average. In these four villages, the relative wealth of
the community reduces the frequency of material transactions
outside the family, as the residents do not need to rely on
others. The reasons for the lower degree of mechanical
solidarity were presumably the proximity of cities, wider
labour market and intensive farming based on family
cooperation.
The data of the respondents from Ramocsaháza
corresponded to our hypothesis, since the disadvantaged
financial situation and the low chances of employment were
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offset by the intensive practice of solidarity, by traditional
material help. Members of the village community alleviate the
economic deprivation with local cooperation, social
transactions and long-term reciprocity.
The data of Bácsgyulafalva contradicted to our
presumption, as the intensive practice of mechanical solidarity
co-occurred with advantaged economic conditions. The
ethnically isolated situation of the village and the recognition
of interdependence presumably enhance the cooperation
between households and sparks transactions in the solidarity
network. In this village, mutual support is not the result of
economic compulsion, but cultural tradition of community life
and self-defence deriving from the minority group status.
Figure 23:
The averages of the indexes of income and material solidarity (work +
financial) in the different sample villages (Z-scores)
The data indicated that material solidarity is motivated
by varying factors in different villages. It was either the
economic interdependence of the residents, or the collective
traditional value system, or the isolated ethnic-cultural
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existence that intensified solidarity. The discrepancy in the
motivations of solidarity is clearly illustrated by the two
Transylvanian villages, Agyagfalva and Bögöz, since they are
only a few kilometres far away from each other, yet the former
had considerably low, while the latter considerably high
averages in material solidarity practised outside of the family
circle. In Agyagfalva, a great number of the inhabitants were
engaged in rural tourism as a profitable form of family
business, thus the help of others and the long-term reciprocity
within the community were not vital to them. The village
community is conventionally exclusive and secluded; people
normally refuse the idea of asking favours and incurring
‘debts’, so they try to find solutions with the help of the
immediate family. Similarly to Agyagfalva, Bögöz is a
Hungarian ethnic village, but it has a strong middle class, and
the traditional family collaboration is less significant, thus the
inhabitants have to rely on the support of the community, of
their neighbours in order to preserve their well-being.
In other words, the research revealed varying degrees
and motivations of solidarity in the different villages. In some
places, economic pressure is strong, while in others, closed
family circles are able to replace solidarity with the purchase of
services as a result of their wealth. Lastly, we found villages
where the younger generation is absent from the community in
daytime due to their commuting lifestyle, which escalates
individualization and consequently people opt for the
institutionalised organic solidarity instead of traditional forms
of cooperation.
The opinion of the respondents on the cohesion of their
village communities was not consistent with the data of
solidarity. Because of the discrepancies in individual and class
conditions, people perceive community cohesion differently.
Although material and emotional support were not
characteristic for their living place, the residents of Ruzsa and
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Petőfiszállás reported the strongest community cohesion and
collective identity. As it has been mentioned, both villages
showed low degree of solidarity and high proportions of
commuters. In Bácsgyulafalva, Bögöz and Ramocsaháza
community cohesion was devalued by the respondents, despite
the fact that the everyday cooperation and solidarity
transactions were the most regular in these three villages.
Presumably, if solidarity is designed to offset drawbacks and
supplement properties, and it is a compulsion, rather than a
choice, the collaboration generates numerous conflicts. In
addition, predominantly people of similar social situation
support each other mutually, and this breaks the unity of the
village community and weakens collective identity. It is a well-
known fact that everyday solidarity functions with long-term
reciprocity which requires strong trust. But trust emerges in
homogeneous groups the most easily; this is why social
homogeneity facilitates the practice of solidarity. As a
consequence, many inhabitants are excluded from the solidarity
practice in the villages where socioeconomic inequality is
severe; either because they are not able to contribute to the
trust network with their resources, or because they are
resourceful enough to succeed without the help of others. The
respondents who were unsatisfied with the cohesion of the
villages are possibly the ‘omitted’, those members of the
community who are less successful socially, therefore they find
the degree and the frequency of community cooperation
inadequate.
In the two most urbanised villages, in the proximity of
cities (Ruzsa and Petőfiszállás), local cooperation mostly
signifies common decoration and improvement of the
settlement, like flower planting, and not the solidarity between
individuals or households. The interdependence is less
significant, since the residents do not need others’ help;
consequently they do not get to know each other, but avoid
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conflicts. Thus, residents of these villages perceive a positive
image of the community cohesion.
Small Communities in the Village
As it has been emphasized previously, the village community
comprises numerous groups, small communities. In our
research on the function of these small local groups, two types
were distinguished: firstly the informal or personal circles
formed individually; and secondly the organised civil groups,
established formally, with a leader and regulations. The
informal groups most possibly exist inside the traditional
communities as well, while the formalized civil groups occur
only in the more modernised villages (Weber 1987).
Informal Communities
Meeting Places
The villagers meet the members of their groups intentionally or
accidentally, more or less regularly, on different ‘forums’.
Occasionally, greater groups of the village community find
amusement in the same place (cafes, pubs, balls), enjoy
artworks, sports, spiritualty (cinema, theatre, sport event,
church) or shopping and fashion (market).39 These events are
opportunities to exchange information about the community
issues. Obviously, people who attend these places with
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 Occasionally goes to cafes (46%), pubs (24%), restaurants (38%), balls
(37%), sport match (30%), movie (12%), theatre (32%), church (785),
market (80%), shopping plaza (78%).
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different goals do not constitute a community, since most of
the criteria of the community definition are not fulfilled, but
the simultaneous presence of many enables the villagers to
build new relationships and sustain the old ones, to enhance
trust and make enquiries.40
Visiting these meeting places requires vitality, mobility
and money, thus the financial situation and the age can both
increase or decrease the frequency of amusement. In our
questionnaire, we listed ten types of meeting places, and then we
created a scale of the amusement habits in the villages (0, 10).
The average of the scale was considerably high in the sample: 5,
4 out of ten. In the villages that were situated in the proximity of
a city, the inhabitants adopted the urban amusement patterns, so
they were the most likely to attend the listed places (residents of
Hajdújárás and Ruzsa). However, the proportion dropped with
population density, the residents of Ramocsaháza and
Agyagfalva were the least active in going out.
Informal Circles of Entertainment
A considerably high proportion of the respondents meet their
private circles regularly and do common activities with their
friends for amusement (playing cards, visiting wine cellars or a
friend’s house): almost three fourths more times annually, and
one third weekly or fortnightly. Private circles do not
presuppose intimacy: solidarity and trust are not necessarily
preconditions, as the motivation is sometimes purely
instrumental, namely the enjoyment of leisure activities.
Nevertheless, the habit of attending these informal meetings
indicates clearly that the participants do not live an isolated
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 Pubs and sport events are traditional masculine meeting places,
information exchange over a cup of coffee, a jar of beer, or during a match
is typical for men, whereas they usually don not attend the programmes
organised in the local community centres.
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lifestyle, but they are integrated into the structure of the village
community which comprises relationship circles of different
aims or values. The time spent together, the common play and
amusement allow the participants to discuss local ‘gossip’, but
it also facilitates the information flow about local problems, or
public issues (Simmel 1973).41
The data revealed significant discrepancies in the
proportion of respondents who attend private gatherings or any
other events of amusement. Half of the inhabitants of the
relatively deprived Ramocsaháza did not participate in
informal meetings at all, presumably because the
socioeconomic disadvantages restrict their possibilities. The
proportion was low in Petőfiszállás as well; here the
commuting lifestyle exhausts many villagers. In contrast with
the two previous villages, the inhabitants of Bácsgyulafalva
and Hajdújárás, in Serbia, frequently took the opportunity of
common leisure activities, and in our understanding, this is an
attempt to continuously reinforce the sense of ethnic cohesion
in these two isolated villages.
The time and money expenditure on amusement vary
with age as well. The young studying or working commuters
have in theory less time for leisure, but the respondents in their
twenties were the most likely to go out, two thirds of them
reported more occasions monthly.
The difference in the amusement habits of the villages
was significant in relation to age as well. The residents of
Petőfiszállás had the most divergent practice: only one tenth of
the elderly participates in certain forms of amusement once or
twice monthly.
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 According to Simmel, the essence of informal groups is sociability, and
association itself. Instrumental motivation is never expressed explicitly,
informal groups mean pleasant diversion for socially homogeneous
individuals, but the time spent together is never impractical, it serves for
building relationships and collecting information.
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Almost one fifth of the sample stayed away from the
listed forms of entertainment, they exclude the stress-relieving,
enjoyable meetings, such as friendly discussions, visiting a
friend’s house or a wine cellar, tippling, playing cards and
common meals from their lifestyles, despite the fact that these
activities promote information flow and social integration, and
foster the sense of community in the village.
Friendship Circles and Personal Groups in the Village
Friendly discussions, tippling and games do not require close
relationship and intimacy between the participants, thus frank or
confidential conversations occur in these meeting casually. In
contrast, trust, homogenous social status and prestige, similar
socioeconomic situation and solidarity are essential in friendship
circles (Simmel 1973, Welmann 1992, Utasi 2011). The
common activities mentioned above are opportunities for
socializing, but lack some of the indispensable parameters of the
community, whereas friendship circles fulfil all criteria. The
friendship circles might overlap the informal groups of
amusement, but the two are not always identical. The friendship
circles of the respondents are closer, more intimate, socially
more homogeneous, equality and mutual support is expected
among the members who do not necessarily live in the same
village. Public transport, personal vehicles and commuting
lifestyle enable people to build strong ties outside of the village.
However, the data indicated that the respondents predominantly
kept in regular contact with fellow villagers or with migrants
from their home settlement.
Two thirds of the respondents had friendship circles with
whom they met regularly to discuss important events or
celebrate special occasions.42 The proportions of the participants
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 According to the data of the nationally representative survey of 2009,
25% of the respondents did not have any friends.
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who had friends were higher in the Hungarian ethnic villages
outside of Hungary (75-85%) than in the sample villages in
Hungary (52-62%). The comparison of these results with the
data of the nationally representative survey of 2009 reveals that
the average of the respondents with friendship circles in the
Hungarian sample (77, 5%) equals the average of our sample
villages outside of Hungary. In other words, the friendship
proportions of the Hungarian villages are exceeded both by the
Hungarian national average and by the Hungarian ethnic villages
(Utasi 2011).
The discrepancy in the results confirms that the
traditional social bonds have disintegrated more rapidly and
atomization is aggravated in the communities of Hungarian
villages. The reason for this phenomenon is presumably the lack
of trust that impedes the evolution of informal relationships into
friendships. In contrast to the Hungarian villages, the Hungarian
ethnic blocks still preserve their traditional value system and
culture as a result of a protective social reflex, and close
friendship circles emerge naturally. Social changes have eroded
the interpersonal relationships in Hungarian villages more
efficiently than in the interdependent, traditionally cohesive and
persistent ethnic communities. In Hungary, traditional ties have
dissolved more dynamically in every settlement type because of
the relatively advantaged economy. The urban environment is
nevertheless more favourable for friendship circles than villages
where new forms of personal and civil communities have failed
to develop due to the disadvantaged living conditions.
Consequently, the friendship practice of the young
respondents who live in villages in the proximity of a city is
highly deficient. In these villages, the proportion of those who
do not have any friendship circles is high, even in the socially
active 18-25 age group. For example, in Ruzsa and Petőfiszállás,
two thirds/one fourth of the young inhabitants and half/two
thirds of the elder did not belong to friendship circles. Many of
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the young residents of these villages spend their weekdays in the
city, at work or in school. Contradictorily, the contentment with
community cooperation and cohesion was the most general in
Ruzsa and Petőfiszállás. Presumably, the commuting lifestyle
results in a particular and ambivalent form of attachment, since
the commuters cannot identify themselves with their work
community. As a consequence, they revalue their village
community, but they are still unable to integrate into the local
groups or organise friendship circles due to their daily routine.
Despite the lack of friends, the majority of them had never
considered leaving the village permanently, but it is also true
that many of them would not have the necessary financial
background either.
Two thirds of the sample visit informal meeting places
and public places of entertainment. In the four sample villages
outside of Hungary, the respondents were more likely to spend
time with their informal groups than the residents of the
Hungarian villages. The respondents from the most
disadvantaged regions met their friendship circles the least
regularly. In total, one third of the sample did not attend
informal events of friendship circles, and this usually implies
isolation from the village community.
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Formal Small Communities
Organisations, Associations and Clubs
The intensity and quality of formalized social life of villages
heavily depend on ambitions, philanthropy and patriotism of
local intellectuals, school or library staff and the mayor. The
village community life is usually organised by high-prestige
local leaders. If the prominent personalities of the village
consider the improvement of the community life as their
calling and undertake the management of local civic groups,
the inhabitants can benefit from various possibilities of civic
participation. But if the village lacks the generous organiser,
intellectuals or school, the local community life is dreary.
According to our data, social aspirations of the members of the
local authority influence the villages’ community life as well.
Mayors who appreciate local cohesion encourage civil
communities and assist them to fund their activities. In our
questionnaire, we listed sixteen forms of civil circles,
associations and organisations in order to determine the
proportion of the village inhabitants who participated in
organised formal communities.43
Religious communities attracted an outstanding number
of villagers. In fact, this category does not denote civil
communities, rather the individual weekly or monthly visits to
traditional religious events and liturgical ceremonies. However,
the respondents’ subjective choices revealed that religious
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 Local government (5, 4%), town watch (3, 1%), farmers’ association (2,
8%), agricultural cooperation (3, 2%), firefighter (3, 6%), housewives’ club
(3, 2%), sports club (4, 2%), cultural association (6, 6%), ethnic
organisation (2, 6%), tradition preservation (6, 9%), pensioners’ club (7,
2%), religious organisation (45, 4%), youth organisation (1, 2%), hunting
(2, 5%), local (5, 3%), other local patriotic (2, 5%).
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communities had higher proportion (45%) than any other
options (Putnam 1995, 2000, Csizmadia 2002).
In the two Transylvanian villages, Bögöz and
Agyagfalva, almost four fifths of the population belonged to
the Reformed Church, and only one fourth/one fifth of the
inhabitants were Catholic. Ramocsaháza had approximately as
many Catholics as Calvinists. The majority of the other
villages’ population were registered as Catholics. In every
village, the proportion of those who did not belong to any
religion was remarkably low (1, 3%), and the proportion of
those who refused to report their religion was even more
insignificant. If we generalized from the number of people who
are converted to some kind of religion, we would conclude that
secularization did not prevail in Hungarian villages. The
answers reflected slight variation in the denominations, since
only some inhabitants of Bögöz reported a third denomination
(Baptist 3, 2%) besides the two dominant religions.
Religion in modern villages preserves traditions and
provides an institutionalised framework of spiritual life, but it
has also become a significant sphere of social life, as it unites
the greatest part of the community.44 The villagers, apart from
one fifth of them, still attend church more or less regularly.
However, only one third of the sample went frequently (at least
once or twice monthly), and the proportion of those who
attended church weekly corresponded to the national results
(16%) (Tomka 2006).
The low degree of self-identification with the religious
community was reflected in the proportion of the respondents
who believed that they ‘followed the teachings of the religion’,
as it was only one fourth of the sample average. This
proportion dropped to the half of the sample average in Ruzsa
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 According to Tomka (2006), faith joins people and creates communities.
Many philosophers and researchers argue that the real importance of
religion is not the faith, but its uniting, socializing and cohesive effects.
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(14, 3%) possibly due to the secularizing effects of the nearby
city. The overwhelming majority of the village inhabitants,
similarly to the urban population, were ‘religious in their own
ways’ (65%).
The traditional religious affiliation was the most
strongly preserved in the Hungarian ethnic villages far from the
border (Bögöz, Agyagfalva, and Bácsgyulafalva); but the
proportion of those who followed the church teachings was just
slightly higher than the sample average. In other words,
religion in these villages is the reinforcement of cultural and
communal cohesion, an institutionalised community.
The other forms of organised communities targeted
different classes, and consequently almost one third of the
sample (32, 7%) belonged to organisations or associations
besides the religious affiliation. It has to be added though, that
the communities separately attracted only small proportions of
the respondents. By adding the proportion of the religiously
affiliated respondents to the previous one third, the results
revealed that more than half of the villagers (59%) were
members of at least one formal community.
If the religious affiliation is included, the data indicate
that the residents of the isolated Hungarian ethnic villages far
from the Hungarian border (62-70% of Agyagfalva, Bögöz and
Bácsgyulafalva) were the most likely to join any of the listed
formal communities. The respondents of Ramocsaháza, which
is situated in the disadvantaged region of Eastern Hungary,
were the least likely, but even here every second villager had
formal community ties.
If the religious membership is excluded, and only other
civil communities are considered, the most modernised Ruzsa
and Petőfiszállás show the highest proportions. These two
villages are in the proximity of cities which improves the civil
attitude of the residents, additionally, the local leaders ensure
 196 
various opportunities for community participation with their
intensive organisational work.
Bácsgyulafalva had a similarly high proportion. In
contrast to the previous two villages, the inhabitants of
Bácsgyulafalva were not influenced by the urban values; it is
the preservation of ethnic and cultural traditions that improves
the social life, and it is also a reaction to the auto-segregation
of the considerable Serb community who moved to the village
after the Yugoslav Wars. This means that the organised
cooperation of the community is predominantly intensified by
the ethnic isolation in Bácsgyulafalva.
Ritual Events of the Village Community
The local leaders of the villages deliberately strengthen the
community cohesion with events where every villagers and
migrants are invited and awaited. These are mostly ritual events
organised by the local government, school, and/or community
centre annually. If the organisers have patriotic feelings, the event
mobilizes great masses and every age group, and usually becomes
successful and memorable.
The most general forms of ritual events in the sample
villages are the village days that are usually frequented by
migrants, descendants of earlier inhabitants and the residents of
neighbouring villages as well. The parish feasts organised on the
name day of the patron saint of the local church had similar
function earlier. The village days were introduced in the anti-
religious Communist era with the intention to replace parish
feasts, but fortunately both are organised nowadays, and this
increases the number of ritual cohesive events in the village
communities (Boissevain 1992, Rappaport 1999).
There are annual events in the village that are associated
with certain lifecycles or age groups. The organisation of school
events, for example, concerns predominantly the parents, but
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grandparents, other relatives, friends and neighbours also attend
the programme. In order to examine the participation in ritual
events, we asked the respondents whether anyone from their
families had visited any of the ten listed events of the village
community.45 In the most families at least one family member had
attended the village day (69, 7%) and the parish feast (55, 4%),
then Christmas celebration (42, 3%) nursery school/primary
school events (40, 6%) and weddings (36%) were the most
popular, but members of every fifth family had visited the other
events as well. The numbers of the young and the middle-aged
attenders were similar on the village events and celebrations, and
the proportion was just slightly lower in the eldest age group.
The highest proportion of respondents who went to village
events was found in Hajdújárás (Vojvodina) and distribution was
the lowest here as well, and this means that this sample segment
had the slightest inequalities in attendance of the inhabitants. In
this relatively wealthy ethnic village, the events that entertain all
inhabitants are of primary importance, and the efficiency of the
organisers is remarkable as well. The respondents of
Ramocsaháza (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County) were the least
likely to participate, as there are less opportunities to strengthen
the community cohesion through ritual events in this village.
On average, the families of the respondents (at least one
member) visited more than three organised events out of the ten
listed options in the year preceding the survey. These occasions
invigorate the collective identity, the sense of belongingness in the
villages, and indeed, the majority of the respondents had been
engaged. It was only one family out of ten where nobody had
attended the village events. In sum, the local leaders recognize the
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 The percentages of family participation: parish feast (54%), carnival ball
(19%), May Day (19%), Christmas (42, 3%), New Year’s Eve party (12,
4%), events organised for the elderly (21, 5%), village day (69, 7%),
wedding (36%), nursery school/primary school event (40, 6%), any other
event in the village (21%).
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importance of these events, so the villages succeed to organise
events that preserve or even improve community cohesion.
The Synthesised Index of Community Life
To calculate the proportion of the respondents with informal
and/or formal relationships in the sample villages, we considered
all the circles and meeting places where community ties develop
and strengthen. All the connections to small communities and
their sources were synthesised into a scale. This scale was
designed to symbolize the degree of attachment to small
communities. The negative values of the scale showed the
proportion of the village population who lived an isolated life and
who prospectively would not develop the need for social and
public participation (Castel 1993, Ferge 2000).
We presumed that the collection of information
concerning civic attention and public engagement would enable
us to prove our initial hypothesis, namely that the intensive
community life, irrespective of its genesis and original purpose
(informal, traditional or formalized civil community initiations),
leads to the individual need for social and public participation
which enhances the inhabitants’ actual engagement in the
democratic public life of the villages.
The information contents of all variables signifying the
attachment to small communities were merged to a composite
community index (informal communities + formalized
communities + village rituals + private gatherings + going out).46
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 The components of COMPCOM index: INFORMCOM (informal
communities), FORMCOM (formalized communities), VILLRIT (ritual
events that mobilize the whole population of the village), INDIVAM
(individual occasions of going out, or amusement)
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Ramocsaháza had the lowest value of the composite
community index, whereas the inhabitants of Hajdújárás were the
most strongly attached to the community. As it has been discussed
earlier, both the individual living conditions and the regional
economic situation were the most disadvantaged in Ramocsaháza,
and this obviously disintegrates the inhabitants’ community ties.
Figure 24:
The averages of synthesised community index in the sample villages
(Z-scores)
The averages of the community index were definitely lower in
the Hungarian villages than in the Hungarian ethnic villages in
Romania or Serbia. In other words, the synthesis of everyday
community relationships revealed more intensive community
life in the Hungarian villages outside of Hungary. The
difference confirms that the Hungarian ethnic minority in
Transylvania and Vojvodina tries to preserve its cultural unity
with more frequent community engagement.
The composite community index was lower than the
average in all of the three Hungarian villages. In these villages,
the disintegration of traditional ties is more escalated than in
the villages outside of Hungary, but the civil development is
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delayed and contradictory, the modernisation of these villages
is asymmetric, thus new forms of civic cooperation fail to
emerge. This anomalous situation undermines local community
life. The lack of community cooperation is the most acute in
Ramocsaháza where the number of personal communities was
strikingly low, and the organisation of community meetings
was hindered by the economic situation of the region.
The composite community index correlated with the
income scale (corr. 360**) and the educational attainment scale
(corr. 244**) positively, but moderately. This indicates that
community life is less intensive in the village where the
population had lower educational attainment and was in less
advantaged financial situation than the average. The connection
between the composite community index and the age was even
stronger (corr. -414**), and its negative sign refers to the active
community participation of the younger generations, in other
words, the younger inhabitants were more intensively involved
in community life than the elder despite the fact that many of
them commute to work or school, or despite their
socioeconomic disadvantages.
Public Engagement and Civic Attention
In our research, we intended to find the answer for the question
whether (and how) the intensity of community relations
influences local political and civic attention, public
engagement and local democratic participation. It was
presumed that the intensive community life and dense
relationship networks increase the inhabitants’ civic and
political activity and the democratic involvement in the
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village.47 Social life was expected to be more vivid in the
village communities than in the urban setting because of the
frequency of direct interactions and the enhanced human
interconnection. Additionally, trust and solidarity might be
more general outside the family than in the cities where the
number of secondary relationships increases to the detriment of
primary relationships and atomization is aggravated.
However, the socioeconomic drawbacks of the villages,
namely lower level of modernisation, lower educational
attainment and deprivation, might confute the theory of public
participation, as these conditions limit the social needs of the
majority to the minimum, and this evidently inhibits the
emergence of political and civic attention and activity.
In our view, ambitious leadership and effective local
authorities might offset the negative effects of the villages’
disadvantages. High-prestige local leaders and intellectuals
presumably play a significant role in the improvement of
community life, as their organisational work and initiatives
intensify civic activity, social engagement and consequently
democratic self-government.
Political Attention
One third of the sample (31%) reported that they were ‘not at
all interested’ and/or ‘not interested’ in local public life and
local politics. A slightly higher proportion was ‘interested’
and/or ‘very interested’ (38%). As a consequence, the scale of
political and public attention was tripartite. The same scale of
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 The density of the relationship network depends on the number of ties
that connect the individual to other members of the community (Angelusz
and Tardos 1998).
 202 
the national sample had a very similar structure with three
approximately equal segments.
The respondents from Agyagfalva and Hajdújárás were
the most attentive to local politics and public life, but the
distribution was strikingly high in both villages, and this
indicates a high degree of polarization within the community.
However, it could be concluded that the civic and political
attention in the Hungarian villages outside of Hungary is
generally higher than it is in the village communities of
Hungary.
The inhabitants of Hajdújárás were the most interested
in national politics, but the distribution was significant again
which reassured the inner polarization. The Vojvodinan village
community, or at least a great part of the population paid close
attention both to local and national politics. It has to be added
though, that the high results might have been influenced by the
preparations for the general elections that coincided with our
survey. It is nevertheless remarkable that the results of the
villages in and outside of Hungary were less divergent in the
case of the national politics than they were in the case of the
local public issues.
Public Dialogue and Activity
The degree of information exchange through face-to-face
conversations about everyday local problems and issues (with
the neighbours, in the shop, or on any other public place, by
visiting the local authorities) was similar in every sample
village. The inhabitants of the isolated Bácsgyulafalva
(Vojvodina) were the most likely, and the respondents from
Ruzsa were the least likely to discuss the ordinary difficulties.
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The conversations about local politics and local public
life were less regular everywhere. Although Ramocsaháza
showed the highest results in in this case, the distribution, as
the indicator of social disparities, was again significant. The
discussions about local politics and public life were the least
frequent, or engaged the smallest number of inhabitants in
Ruzsa.
The proportions of respondents who were willing to
participate in public manifestations, namely signing a petition,
joining a permitted protest or an unannounced demonstration,
in order to improve local circumstances were similar in all
villages. It was only Ramocsaháza where a significantly lower
number of people would undertake such actions. On average,
the inhabitants of the disadvantaged villages were the least
active, whereas the respondents from the most modernized
village, from Ruzsa were the most willing to engage in public
manifestations. The most mobilizing spheres of local political
life are the local elections. Four fifths of the respondents had
voted, but barely one fifth had attended the nomination meeting
before the elections. The reason for the low attendance is partly
the fact that the inhabitants of the village know the nominees
personally and they can ask their questions on other occasions,
and partly the low level of the need for formalized public
participation. The data of the different villages diverged in this
case as well. Our research did not intend to examine in details
why the villagers opted against public participation, but the in-
depth interviews confirmed that local politics engage only a
small segment of the village population. Direct participation in
local public life and civic activity would be indeed very
important, since only this can protect the local community from
the arbitrary and antidemocratic decisions of the local
government. István Bibó, the prominent jurist and political
theorist emphasized: no representative democracy could
replace the universal democracy of the community or the
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principal requirement of modern politics that every adult
person is entitled, authorized and obliged to have and express
his/her opinion on the most important issues of community life.
If the appropriate forum for the dialogue was not provided, an
elitist oligarchy would take over the national politics, and the
masses would be considered as a politically insensible,
disturbing element (Bibó 1990).
The most essential questions of local politics are the
elections of the representatives, the mayor and the members of
the National Assembly. On its actual level, the need for public
participation in the villages is insufficient; the majority lacks
the education that would ensure the self-confident expression
of opinion and the practice of self-government. We accept
Bibó’s notion, namely that public participation is not only the
right of individuals, but it would be an obligation. However,
information is an indispensable precondition of public
participation. As it has been demonstrated, the major part of the
inhabitants had extensive community networks in the villages,
so our research interest was to determine the proportion of the
respondents who are able to acquire and process public
information, and by this, become competent to decide on the
most important issues of local and national politics.
Synthesised Index of Public Life
In order to illustrate the differences between the sample
villages, we synthesised the variables deriving from the
questions about public participation into a linear index of
public and political attention and activity. The components of
the index were: (1) participation in the last nomination
meeting, (2) the level of interest in local and/or national
politics and social life, (3) the frequency of discussions about
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local public and political issues, and (4) the proportions of
respondents willing to sign a petition, or join a permitted or
unannounced demonstration.
The linear scale of public life (0-33) which comprised
all the different variables of civic practice and public activity
indicated that the inhabitants of Petőfiszállás were the most
attentive and active, and the respondents from Ramocsaháza
were least interested in public and political issues.
Figure 25:
The averages of the synthesised index of public life in the sample
villages (Z-scores)
The composite index of public life unites the variables,
arranges a hierarchy and demonstrates the discrepancy between
the averages of the villages, but it does not illustrate the
differences that derive from social inequalities. In other words,
the average of the linear index obscures the disparity in the
civic practice of different social classes, and does not provide
information about the uneven level of public participation of
separate social groups. This is a crucial point of the
examination, since the value distributions of the indexes
indicated varying levels of inequalities in different villages, so
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the intensity of involvement and the areas of participation
might differ by each social group. In addition, the high
averages might be the results of the dominance of a closed,
highly active group of inhabitants in public life, whereas the
majority are unable to utter their opinions.
The complexity of the question induced us to create an
index for public life that was apt for the demonstration of the
characteristics of the different social groups’ public
participation in the villages. All the variables of public life
were included and three groups were distinguished with cluster
analysis:48
Formalized public life (1. cluster) (27, 7%) (= individually engaged in
politics)
Informal public life (2. cluster) (31%) (= engaged in politics with a group)
Isolated from public life (3. cluster) (41, 3%) (= not engaged in politics)
According to the cluster index of public life, almost half of the
population in Ruzsa and Agyagfalva were isolated from public
life (48, 5%-45, 8%). In Agyagfalva, the major part of the
inhabitants was involved in family farming which lifestyle has
a strict schedule not leaving time for public participation. In
Ruzsa, many young people commute, and their daily absence
prevent them from obtaining the latest information and
engaging in public discourse. The proportion of inhabitants
who stayed away from public life was slightly higher than the
sample average in Ramocsaháza (44%). Here the residents’
socioeconomic situation was more disadvantaged and their
educational level was lower than in other the villages, and this
clearly deprived a great part of the population of the interest in
public issues.
                                                
48
 The included variables were (1) interest in local and national politics, (2)
conversation about public life with fellow villagers, (3) willingness to
participate in protests, petition signing, and (4) opinion exchange on the
actual problems of the village.
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The analysis of the effects of different living
conditional factors on public participation revealed that the
members of the first group (formalized public participation,
individually engaged in politics) were predominantly the
youngest male respondents with relative financial security and
at least a high school diploma. These villagers usually seclude
themselves from the rest of the community, do not participate
in discussions about political issues, but they would be willing
to take individual and ‘official’ actions (petition signing,
protests). This group comprises the autonomous residents with
the most advantaged living conditions whose public and
political commitment reflects their individual values and
interests, whereas they refuse to associate with the rest of the
village community, and to share or discuss their opinions with
the people in their environment. The members of this group
cannot become the intellectual citizens who stimulate local
democratic participation (Bibó 1990).
The respondents in the second cluster had a similar
level of interest in public and political life as the members of
the first group. In opposition to the individually engaged
respondents, the people in the second cluster communicate
their views, discuss and form their opinion through
conversations with the fellow villagers, but they would barely
or not participate in organised public manifestations (petition,
protests). Respondents in this group were in more favourable
financial situation than the sample average, and they were
chiefly middle-aged or older men with esteemed professions,
and with vocational qualification or university degree. These
respondents are the most successful in influencing the local
public life; they are the fuglemen of local politics.
The third cluster consists of the respondents isolated
from public life who were financially more disadvantaged than
the sample average, mainly women from the youngest or the
eldest age group with primary or lower educational level. In
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other words, the last group comprises the most deprived
inhabitants of the villages who encounter livelihood issues on a
daily basis, for them even the acquisition of basic necessities is
difficult, therefore their need for public participation could not
develop. Moreover, the examination of the cluster members in
relation to educational attainment revealed not only the
strikingly high proportion of villagers with primary or lower
educational in the isolated group, but also the even distribution
of graduates in the three clusters. This means that almost one
third of the graduates were isolated from public life, one third
of them ‘skipped’ the local level and engaged individually in
formalized public life, and only one third of them joined their
compatriots and participated in local democracy.
Social Participation – The Interaction between
Communities and Public Life
In order to answer our research question, namely whether the
level of human interconnection influenced the level of public
engagement (and if yes, how decisively), we examined the
relationship between the linear scale of community life and the
linear scale of public life. The correlation between the
standardized index of community life and the standardized
index of public life (both in Z-scores) verified our hypothesis,
as it was positive and considerably strong (corr. 302**). The
connection between the two linear indexes confirmed the
interaction of the values of public participation with the
average level of human interconnection in the villages.
According to the correlation, public life is more intensive in the
villages where the inhabitants have stronger community
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relations. We presumed that the index of community life would
parallel the index of public life in every case, namely the public
life would be intensive in all villages with strong community
ties and vice versa.
Figure 26:
The synthesised indexes of community life and public life in the sample
villages (Z-scores)
However, the trends of the two indexes were indeed
opposite in Petőfiszállás, Ruzsa and Bácsgyulafalva. The
composite index of public life had values above the average in
Ruzsa and Petőfiszállás, and it was especially high in the latter,
but the values of the index of community life were below the
average in both cases. These villages did not correspond to the
research hypothesis, as the need for public participation was
high despite the lack of community ties. The data and the
circumstances suggest that the divergence of the two indexes
results from the ambivalent value preferences and living
conditions caused by the contradictory social and regional
situation of these villages and their transitional standing
between the rural and urban development. In other words, the
reasons for the anomaly are the villages’ proximity to a city
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and the high proportion of commuting inhabitants. Despite the
local difficulties in the village, the favourable opportunities
offered by the nearby city lead to a contradiction of the weak
attachment to the village community and the intensive civic
practice. Although the educational attainment of the inhabitants
is above the average, and this increases their need for public
and political participation, they cannot or do not want to
expend time on public discourse that would promote local
public life. The respondents from these villages barely
belonged to small communities in their home settlements, were
not involved in the local solidarity network of the households;
they tended to formulate their opinions on politics and public
life individually, as outsiders, yet they reported a quite positive
impression of the community cohesion in their villages.
The trends of the indexes of community life and public
life were opposite in Bácsgyulafalva as well, but in the other
way: the index of community life was above and the index of
community life below the average. The intensive cultural and
community life and the strong community cohesion in this case
derived from the isolated geographical location and the inner
ethnic division because of the resettlement of Serbs in the
village.
In the other villages of the sample, the indexes of the
community life and the public life were parallel. The values of
both indexes were far below the sample average in
Ramocsaháza. The deficient community life and the lack of
public participation were the consequences of the
disadvantaged regional economy, and the deprived living
conditions. The inhabitants of Ramocsaháza had considerably
low educational attainment: the proportion of residents with at
least high school diploma was the half and the proportion of
the graduates was third of the sample average. The everyday
difficulties impede community life and inhibit the
improvement of political attention and the need for public
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participation. Self-identification with the community was
insufficient; the attachment of the inhabitants to the village was
weak: one fifth of the respondents from Ramocsaháza planned
to move away in the future.
Social Participation, Community Cohesion
and Isolation in the Villages
The pursuit of local interests will be the most successful and
the operation of the local democracy will be the most efficient
in the villages where community network is dense, and a high
proportion of the population pays attention to social issues and
develops the need for community participation. Strong
attachment to the home village and self-identification with its
community are indispensable preconditions as well. The
synthesis of the dimensions of community relationships and
civic attention and public participation signified in our research
the level of social participation. In case of the villages, social
participation also reveals the degree of local community
cohesion.49
The index of social participation was calculated from all
variables of community life and public participation, and 5
categories were created with cluster analysis. The social
participation index enabled us to classify the respondents into a
hierarchy from ‘outstandingly active’ to ‘isolated’ levels.50
                                                
49
 The variables of solidarity, protesting, conversation about local issues,
exchange of political opinions, civic attention, attachment to formalized
civil organisations, attendance to village events, informal community ties
and attendance to the nomination meeting were all included.
50
 The hierarchy of the categories was set up according to the level of
community attachment and public participation.
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Three categories of the 5-level scale of the community
cohesion (social participation) collected the socially integrated,
active population of the villages with slightly varying levels of
participation.51 These three groups encompassed two thirds of
the sample (64, 7%).
The isolated group comprised one third of the
respondents, but this sample segment was not united. The fifth
category on the negative end of the clustered index (one fifth of
the respondents, 20, 4%) was not integrated in the village
community, was not interested in social issues and did not
participate in public life either. Besides the bidimensionally
isolated group, a partially isolated group was identified as well:
it consisted of the respondents who were not attached to the
community and stayed away from community life, who
showed a high level of social and political attention and
individual public participation (15%). As it has been
mentioned, the isolated and the partially isolated groups made
up one third of the sample (35, 4%).
The proportions of the two isolated groups were above
the average in Ruzsa and Petőfiszállás (44%-48%), and it was
the lowest in the ethnic village in the proximity of two cities, in
Hajdújárás (29%). Petőfiszállás and Ruzsa are the two villages
mostly affected by modern urban civilization, and consequently
the individualization is accelerated, traditional ties disappear
rapidly, and this why the community integration and cohesion
are difficultly re-created and sustained. The inhabitants who
commute to work in the city have much higher level of need
for social and public participation than those who stay in the
village. In sum, the impacts of modern consumer society have
eroded the local community cohesion more rapidly in the
Hungarian villages in the proximity of a city than in the
Hungarian ethnic villages outside of Hungary.
                                                
51
 The included active groups: 1. Group = community and social initiators
(17, 8%), 2. group = active (26, 9%), 3. group = moderately active (20, 0%).
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In the ethnic Hungarian villages, primarily in
Hajdújárás and Bácsgyulafalva, the minority status, the ethnic
cultural tradition and the self-seclusion have contributed to the
more effective preservation of the community’s unity and the
cohesion, hence the lower proportion of isolated inhabitants.
The process of isolation is determined by local, regional and
individual conditions. In relation to educational attainment, the
low-qualified respondents constituted the greatest part of the
isolated group, but higher level of education does not
necessarily mean more active participation, as the graduates
were more likely to abstain from local community life than the
respondents with high school diploma.
In the case of the graduates, two distinctively separate
group were discovered: the active graduates are energetic, brisk
organisers and leaders of the community, and the isolated
graduates do not socialize with the low-qualified villagers, do
not communicate their opinions, but individually they are
indeed interested in local and national social life and politics.
In other words, a great part of the isolated group is composed
of the intellectuals, predominantly graduates, who do not wish
to participate in the village’s community life despite their
increased interest in social and political issues. As it has been
discussed earlier, the lack of education and financial security
mostly impede the social integration, thereby reducing the
chance of the development of the need for public participation.
However, it has now become obvious that one part of the
graduates refuses to engage in the improvement of local public
life with active social participation. This phenomenon is
evidently self-seclusion, not exclusion (Castel 1993).
The proportion of isolated men (43%) was significantly
higher than that of the isolated women (31%). Data suggest
that the attachment of women to the community and their
social vitality are stronger. This might be the consequence of
the work conditions of the male inhabitants, namely that they
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do exhausting physical work, or commute, so they have less
time and energy for community relations and social integration.
In relation to age, it was the young (26-35) age group that had
the fewer socially isolated members (27%). The respondents in
this age segment have already completed their studies which
enables them to lead a socially active life, while the majority of
the younger inhabitants still commute to school, and as it
typical for their age group, they are usually less interested in
local issues and socialize exclusively with their counterparts.
From the mid-twenties, people normally live in stable
relationships and found a family, and their new situation
increases their need for information and directs their attention
towards local institutions, local issues and public life. Below
and above this age group, slightly higher proportions of
respondents are socially isolated (30-33%); over sixty this
percentage reaches the half of the age group and it only grows
with age. In other words, more than half of the eldest is not
integrated into the community.
The comparison of the Hungarian villages in and
outside of Hungary confirmed that the village communities
were more cohesive in the second case. The two isolated
groups (isolated + partially isolated) encompassed a
considerably lower proportion of the respondents in the ethnic
villages (one third, 30%) than in the sample villages in
Hungary (42%). It was also revealed that the Hungarian
villages had twice as many ‘partially isolated’ inhabitants (the
respondents who were individually interested in local public
life, but did not participate in social life) as the Hungarian
ethnic villages. Because of the minority status, the compulsion
to preserve cultural unity and community cohesion has become
very significant persistent powers which decelerate atomization
and isolation.
However, it is a promising conclusion of the research that
the socially interested and integrated population constituted the
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majority in both village types. Hopefully, the small village
communities will encourage more and more inhabitants to
participate in local public life. It was nevertheless striking that
local leaders and intellectuals took a greater part in the
improvement of the community’s life in the Hungarian ethnic
villages, and this increased activity might be the example and
catalyst for a more comprehensive democratic participation. In
contrast, half of the graduates in Hungarian villages do not want
or cannot contribute to the local public life, and opt for self-
seclusion.
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X. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRUST AND
COMMUNITY ─ SAMPLES OF 28 EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
Sociologists have been trying to identify the causes of the
perceptible lack of trust in modern societies for decades. It was
assumed that the gradual loss of trust between individuals and
social groups is a consequence of the realignment of
relationships and communities generated by the socioeconomic
changes. Family farming was replaced by large-scale
production during the industrial capitalist development, the
traditional small communities crumbled, urbanisation
accelerated, economic competition and rivalry between
individuals and/or social groups aggravated, and the
restructured economic system modified the human value
preferences as well (Fukuyama 2000, Putnam 1995, Elster
1989, Kuczi-Lengyel 1996, Luhman 1979, Sztompka 1996).
In traditional societies, family farming and coexistence
in closed and small communities fostered the development of
strong and primary relationships, but in modern societies the
secondary ties constitute the majority of the individuals’
relationship network. Although the number of relationships that
connect the individual to others and to communities has not
decreased, the proportion of loose and trust-lacking relations
grew to the detriment of the reliable connections. Globalisation
has augmented the number of secondary relationships as well,
since the spread of the Internet lead to virtual acquaintances
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which are mainly weak ties rarely transformed into strong
bonds (Granovetter 1973, Wellman 2001).
Furthermore, profit-oriented and rationalized economy
combined with excessive bureaucracy of the consumer society
induce flux of functions, staff cutbacks and fluctuation of
workforce which afflict the trust content of human
relationships as well. Administration becomes more and more
depersonalized, as institutions enable online access and expand
virtual databases. Nowadays, the society lives in the
bureaucratic care and control of different public institutions
whose efficiency shapes the civic trust towards the authority, or
whose inefficiency arouses distrust, discontent and the sense of
helplessness in the citizens.
The trends of gradually reducing social trust, increasing
number of secondary relationships and scepticism about the
administration were accompanied by radical changes in the life
of communities. In contrast to traditional societies where
relationships were based on frequent face-to-face interactions,
so the trust content could be easily assessed, in the weak ties of
modern societies trust is deposited, as there is no time or
occasion to learn by experience.
Community relations are reconsidered and revalued in
modern-day society. According to our hypothesis, people with
wide and versatile relationship networks tend to trust others
and the authority, whereas reclusive people limit their reliance
to the closed family or immediate community, and exclude
others. The lack of trust does not only erode personal relations,
but it also hinders economic cooperation which normally
operates with long-term reciprocity. Trust is, therefore, the
indispensable catalyst of interpersonal relationships, as well as
of cultural or economic alliances of communities, nations or
societies (Polányi 1976.)
The present chapter discusses the correlation of
community and trust in European societies. It was designed to
 218 
find answers for the questions whether community relations
enhance trust and if yes, how significantly, and the reverse:
whether trust intensifies community life. Prior to the
comparison of certain European countries, the social and
demographic conditions, that are supposed to influence
individual and community life and the degree of trust, are
determined. Additionally, the chapter describes the
discrepancies in the degree of trust and intensity of community
relations of social, demographic or economic groups with
diverse living conditions, and examines whether these
discrepancies affect the social life and contentment in different
countries, or it is the reverse, and the conditions offered by
certain countries increase or destroy its citizens’ trust and
relationships. The research was based on the European Social
Survey’s database of 2008 (N=58454, 28 countries).
Methodology and Measures
Individual and institutional were regarded as two separate
dimensions of trust. Three 10-level scales were synthesised to
calculate individual trust in others, in ‘strangers’
(INDIVIDTRST).52 The institutional trust (INSTITRST) was
measured by seven questions that concerned the trust in the
authority and public institutions: in the parliament, in the
existing system, in the police, in politicians, in parties, in the
EU parliament, and in the UN. The measure of general trust
was created by the synthesis of the two trust dimensions
(GENTRUST).
                                                
52
 (1) Most people are trustworthy. (2) Most people are hindrance. (3) Most
people are helpful. The cumulative values of the three scales represented the
individual trust (INDIVIDTRST).
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The composite indexes were used to measure
community relations and social activity (GENSOCIET). One of
these arranged informal community relationships according to
the frequency of meetings (SCLEMEET). The second signified
the social activity (SOCACTIVITY) in political parties,
associations, organisations, and contact with political or state
leaders, petition signing, participation in protests and boycott
on products or charity in the year preceding the survey.53
The two scales of trust and the two indexes of
community and social life were synthesised into a factor index
(PARTICIPATION) the averages of which symbolise the
degree of social participation characteristic for the respondents,
for the included countries.
The Correlation between Trust and Community
Relations
According to our research thesis, trust correlates with
community relations; these two factors mainly intensify each
other’s positive or negative effects. Community emerges from
strong trustworthy relationships easily, and vice versa,
community creates opportunities for the members to get to
know each other, and this strengthens their mutual trust.
However, the degree of trust depends on the character of the
community. The basic criteria of the community: common
                                                
53
 (1) Did you participate in political party or political action in the last
year? (2) Were you involved in any organisations or associations in the last
year? (3) Did you have any contact with a political or state leader? (4) Did
you sign any petitions? (5) Did you participate in any permitted protests?
(6) Did you join any boycotts on products? (7) Were you involved in
charity?
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values, interests, aim or common origin, tradition, collective
identity and solidarity. These parameters increase the
members’ mutual trust within the community. It has been
proved previously that trust is the strongest in the smallest
circle of community relations, in the family (Weber 1987,
Tönnies 1983, Utasi 2009).
Reclusive families and other communities are
frequently mistrustful, especially in the two extreme cases, if
they are resourceless and cannot divide their possessions to
help others outside of their circles, or the reverse, if they are
privileged and preserve their status with exclusion.
In contrast, the more open-minded and sociable people
are, the more trust they have in others outside of their closed
circles. Informal or formal ties and social activity that
transgress boundaries of immediate community intensify trust
in ‘others’. Our research hypothesis was that general trust
arises from versatile community relations.
Effects of Different Living Conditions on Trust
and Community Ties
As a consequence of the disparities in demographic and
economic conditions and average level of education in different
societies, we prognosticated discrepancies in the degree of trust
and in social and community participation.
We also expected that the trends of general trust and
community and social indexes would vary significantly at the
international level according to the amount of material sources
and intangibles of different groups. General trust, community
involvement and social activity are usually characteristic for
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countries where respondents are relatively resourceful,
materially and culturally affluent.
High educational attainment, and its benefits, cultural
capital and higher income increase trust and social capital as
well, and predominantly well-educated and successful people
can afford to maintain wide relationship networks and to trust
confidently. Consequently, high degrees of trust and
community engagement are anticipated in the countries where
the proportions of well-qualified inhabitants are higher; and in
countries where the average level of educational attainment is
lower, the trend is prospectively reversed.
The size of the settlement and the number of its
inhabitants, as well as the density of community networks
influence the degree of trust. In countries where a great part of
the population live in small settlements (villages, suburbs),
relationships tend to be intensive and strong. Human
interactions are in this case direct and more transparent, and
this favours the development of community life and trust. The
most distrustful and deficiently interconnected samples derived
usually from the countries comprising high proportions of city
population, since the ratio of the strong primary relationships to
the weak secondary ones is highly imbalanced in the cities.
In sum, it is presumable that those countries will present
high degrees of general trust, stable community relations and
active social participation whose society is decently affluent,
where high proportions of the population are evenly resourceful
and the subjective contentment with income is general as a result
of relative social equality. Societies with higher average level of
educational attainment will be more trustful and their social
relations will be more intensive. Rural population with dense,
but clear-cut relationship networks will be more trusting than the
atomized population of the giant cities.
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Trustful and Distrustful Countries
One of the variables of the index of general trust measured the
individual trust, in other words the readiness of respondents to
trust ‘strangers’, people who were not included in their closed
cultural communities. Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece
were proved to be the most distrustful countries. These nations
differ from the other European countries of the sample both in
their religions and cultural value systems. In these societies,
community life is still closed and traditional; the majority of
the population live in small settlements where trust is limited to
the family and relatives. In addition, these three countries are
less resourceful than the others in the sample, and this also
hinders the emergence of trust.
The most open-minded and trusting nations were the
Scandinavian countries, especially Denmark, Norway, Finland
and Sweden, and the similarly affluent Switzerland and
Netherlands had just slightly lower results. In comparison with
other European countries, these nations are characterised by
prosperity, social equality and even distribution of goods which
are combined with Protestant moral and values, thus
contentment is more general and the average level of
educational attainment is higher. The number of large cities is
quite low in these welfare states; the majority of the population
live in traditional or modern suburban areas or villages. The
beneficial social conditions make the society resourceful and
strengthen both the confidence and the trust of individuals.
The trend of institutional trust was very similar to that
of individual trust. The citizens of Bulgaria and Greece, who
had low degrees of individual trust as well, were the most
distrustful of institutions, and Hungary, Croatia, Latvia and
Ukraine were the next in this case. The results of Turkey
deviated from the trend, as the population tended to trust the
institutions despite the individual distrust. The possible reason
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for the anomaly is the cultural difference, or the traditional
values, especially the respect for authority which stabilizes
institutional trust.
The degree of institutional trust was the highest in those
countries that were the first in the hierarchy of individual trust,
namely the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and the
Netherlands. The high degree of trust in institutions is the
result of the relative social equality and general contentment of
the population. The enhanced trust in the authority and its
institutions suggest that democracy function more effectively
here than in other European countries. As a result, the majority
of the population is satisfied with their living conditions, and
this increases and generalizes confidence and certitude.
The synthesised trend of individual and institutional
trust revealed that the composite value of trust was the lowest
in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia and Greece.
All of these are resourceless countries that had experienced a
lot of conflicts.
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Figure 27:
The synthesised index of individual and institutional trust
(GENTRUST) in the sample countries (Z-scores) (European Social
Survey, ESS4e03, 2008 N=58454)
Trends of Community and Social Activity
in European Countries
One of the indexes of social and community relations
measured the organised community activity characteristic in
different counties of the sample. Based on earlier examinations,
we presumed that the hierarchy of the countries would be
determined by their prosperity and the average level of
educational attainment. One third of the population of the
European countries in the sample were involved in organisations
or associations, but we found significant discrepancies between
the countries due to the different living conditions.
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The degree of civic participation and social activity was
above the average level in the efficient Scandinavian
democracies and in those welfare states that preserve strong
democratic traditions, namely Sweden, Denmark, Finland,
France and Germany.
In contrast with the previous list, the population of
Bulgaria, Turkey and Portugal was the least active in social
participation, and the other disadvantaged Southern and former
Eastern Bloc countries showed just slightly higher results. Civil
traditions had been underdeveloped and further impeded by
Communist governments, hence the deficient civic engagement
in the Eastern European countries. Before the political
transition, the civil communities and organisations were kept
under the strict control of the state, and even two decades after
the collapse of Socialism, the disadvantages still inhibit the
function of organisations and associations. Moreover, low level
or lack of contentment and education preclude the emergence
of need for organised community ties. Under these deprived
circumstances, the majority of people’s energy is absorbed by
the fulfilment of basic needs, so the degree of social
engagement cannot increase.
The intensity of personal relationships was found to be
strikingly low in Hungary and Romania, and the Greeks were
similarly passive.54 In the countries where the density of
personal ties is insufficient, traditional values have disappeared
and traditional communities have disintegrated due to the half-
modernized state of development, while the informal ties
provided by civil communities are still rare. Atomization is the
strongest in the cities and towns of these countries; therefore
the lack of friendship circles has become acute and easily
detectable. However, it is also true that the relatively strong
                                                
54
 Although Hungary was at the end of the international list, our research
revealed that personal ties are nevertheless more intensive in Hungary than
the organised ones (Hoskins 2009).
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and social-like family bonds mean some kind of compensation
in these societies.
Intensive personal ties accompanied the dense network
of civic organisations (Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and
Denmark), and the brisk community life of preserved
traditional relationships (Croatia, Portugal).
The two dimensions of relationship networks were
synthesised into one scale that revealed that community and social
ties were highly deficient in Hungary and Romania, and the
results of other post-communist and Southern-European countries,
except Portugal, were not much higher either. In contrast, both
informal and formal social connections are accumulated in the
Scandinavian countries, especially in Denmark, Norway and
Sweden.
Figure 28:
The averages of the composite index of civil and personal relationships
(GENSOCIET) in the sample countries (Z-scores) (European Social
Survey, ESS4e03, 2008 N=58454)
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Harmony and Disharmony of Trust and Community
Relations
The comparison of the general trust index (individual trust
index + institutional trust index, GENTRST) and the
synthesised index of organised and personal community
relations (GENSOCIET) verified that trust and community
correlate positively by strengthening or weakening one another.
There were only a few countries in the sample that presented a
different trend.
Positive or Negative Values of the Two Indexes
The two indexes correlated positively and harmoniously in the
countries that were in advantaged economic situation with
insignificant social inequalities and a democratic distribution of
wealth, namely in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the Netherlands. The most harmonious
correlation was found in Denmark where the interaction of the
authority with the society and the prosperity guarantees the
sustainment of the trust and cohesive communities.
The lack of trust and deficiency in community relations
were striking in Hungary. The asymmetric modernisation
process has disintegrated the traditional communities here, but
they could not be replaced by weak ties that are concomitants
of the urbanisation and migration processes, as the extremely
high degree of distrust hinders the emergence of all kinds of
relationships. Small communities have gradually lost trust due
to the economic changes, whereas the political transition failed
to meet the expectations, and this, combined with the
disadvantaged living conditions resulted in general discontent
of the population. Distrust in the institutions is similarly
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universal. Furthermore, insufficient social connections co-
occurred with distrust in Poland, Greece, Romania and Russia,
in other words, in countries with economic difficulties. The
self-seclusion from communities beyond the family circle is
typical, but the distrust and atomization are not yet as
aggravated as in Hungary.
Extreme distrust and loose community networks were
found in Ukraine and Bulgaria. The traditional small
communities still maintain the coherence of the society and
contribute to the social integration of individuals, but the
inhabitants are quite mistrustful of people from other cultures
in these two countries.
Variants of Disharmony of the Two Indexes
a) Reclusive Communities and High Degree of Distrust
The trend of the trust and community indexes occurred in
only those countries where the inner structure of the society
had been roiled by international traumas. The two indexes
were disharmonious in Croatia and Slovenia, as the armed
conflicts of the last decades had aggravated the distrust
towards strangers, but strengthened the traditional
protective relationships and the reclusive nature of the
communities. Similar results were caused by similar
reasons in Israel where the continuous wars destroy the
population’s trust, but communities become cohesive and
reclusive.
b) Weak Community Cohesion, Strong Trust
Disharmony of trust and community relations was found in
Cyprus and Estonia as well. However, the trend is reversed
in these two countries: trust is strong, whereas community
relationships are loose. The controversy is again caused by
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the dividing effects of wars on society and culture. Cyprus
was torn into a Greek and a Turkish half by international
politics, and both cultures maintained trust in their own
institutions, but personal and civil communities were ruined
by the cultural separation. In Estonia, the proportion of
Russian inhabitants is high as a consequence of forceful
population transfer realised in the Soviet era. Obviously,
historical wounds and traumas have not been forgiven yet.
Thus, separate cultures trust and seclude, but the
development of civil communities is frustrated by the past.
c) Reclusive Communities and Weak Trust
In Portugal, community consciousness was fairly strong,
but the degree of trust was low. Portuguese society has
preserved its traditional nature, and the low average level of
education and disadvantaged economy aggravate the
distrust of outsiders.
In sum, the disharmony of trust and community is a
consequence of wars, conflicts and divisions in the past whose
repercussions still last today and preclude the coexistence of
different cultures. This is the reason why the natural harmony
of trust and community is upset in people’s minds.
Social Participation in the Countries and Regions of Europe
In the analysis of the international data, we accepted that
community life rests on trust; consequently the discrepancies in
the social participation of different countries can be illustrated
with the correlation of trust and community relations
(organised and personal). It was assumed that the societies with
high degree of trust in outsiders, in the authorities and its
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institutions, with dense relationship networks and intensive
community life would have the highest levels of social
participation. As a concomitant of active social engagement,
public participation in democracy was expected to be intensive
as well.
In order to determine the participation level of each
country, we synthesised the indexes of different dimensions of
trust and community relations (with principal component
analysis). The separate levels of participation were
differentiated by the division of the scale into five groups with
cluster analysis. The averages of the participation index
reaffirmed that high proportions of the population were
engaged very intensively in social life in the countries of
advantaged economies, but disadvantaged economy led to
insufficient social participation. Based on the averages of the
participation index characteristic for certain nations, the
European countries of the sample were categorised into 5
hierarchic groups:
a) The averages were the highest in the Scandinavian
countries where the population showed an outstanding
level of social participation: Denmark, Norway, Finland,
Sweden, and also Switzerland and the Netherlands.
b) The good category comprised the welfare states of Western
Europe: Germany, Belgium, France and the United
Kingdom.
c) Medium or average level of social participation was
characteristic for Cyprus, Estonia, Spain and Israel.
d) The population of Latvia, Croatia, Poland, Portugal, the
Czech Republic, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia presented
weak social participation.
e) The averages revealed deficient social participation in
Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Turkey, Romania and Ukraine.
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Figure 29:
The averages of the factor index of social participation in the countries
of the sample (Z-scores) (European Social Survey, ESS4e03, 2008,
N=58454)
The hierarchy of the participation index clearly proved
that the needful Southern and post-communist countries lag far
behind the affluent and more egalitarian Western states in regard
to the population’s social and democratic participation. Scientists
often argue that the inhabitants of deprived and former Eastern
Bloc countries are still not accustomed to democracy yet.
However, we have discussed earlier that trust and engagement in
community and social life are significant in the resourceful
countries where the majority live in considerably good conditions
with high average levels of education. In other words, social
participation results from the advantaged and resourceful living
conditions in the Scandinavian countries, and not vice versa. The
economy developed harmoniously and integrally in the countries
that were saved from historic trauma and dictatorship in the recent
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past, and the certitude stabilised the high degree of trust and the
social engagement of the majority of the population, while the
preservation of traditional and civic communities ensured the
inclination for democratic participation.
The comparison of values of different European regions
reveals how geopolitical and geo-economic conditions influence
social participation. The chance of social participation was
multiplied in the Northern countries. The inhabitants of the
Scandinavian region were significantly active, even compared to
the population of Western Europe. In contrast to the two previous
groups, the post-communist countries of East-Central Europe
showed a strikingly low level of participation.
We believe that the difference of the Northern and
Western European countries proves that prosperity and high level
of education characteristic for both regions are not sufficient to
attain outstanding levels of social participation. To the
encouragement of the majority in the democratic participation and
in the formation of their own lives, a resolute social policy is
indispensable which aims for social integration through organic
solidarity and the fair distribution of resources.
Figure 29:
The averages of the factor index of social participation in the different
European regions (Z-scores) (European Social Survey, ESS4e03, 2008,
N=58454)
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Appendices
The averages of individual and institutional trust, and also of formal
and informal community life (Z-score)
(based on the file of ESS recorded in 2010, N=58454)
Country Individual trust Institutional trust Participation in
organised
communities
Participation in
personal
communities
Belgium 0,31339926 0,28148487 0,277095279 0,253315001
Bulgaria -0,463801525 -0,684754128 -0,363121309 0,093744006
Switzerland 0,611244835 0,635514151 0,364987979 0,282359462
Cyprus -0,032409576 0,534963998 -0,169457356 -0,298327776
Czech Republic 0,097084059 -0,216869635 -0,068283493 0,019256401
Germany 0,326462406 0,268854538 0,530210091 0,02608263
Denmark 1,029056791 1,012568862 0,567897575 0,403406897
Estonia 0,368452213 0,15075469 -0,240360485 -0,119613884
Spain 0,152292118 0,175887587 -0,03968145 0,417642205
Finland 0,8067947 0,90420445 0,539494341 0,207979765
France 0,144613327 0,163362165 0,483529025 0,28680856
United Kingdom 0,429072032 0,124366208 0,287956041 0,154560172
Greece -0,453258115 -0,235850477 -0,217720958 -0,326070116
Croatia -0,210605617 -0,521568699 0,019866335 0,461470081
Hungary -0,139646125 -0,465547268 -0,309338922 -0,545413075
Israel 0,283556023 -0,149780637 -0,215937059 0,291508145
Latvia 0,094535422 -0,504629699 -0,276903478 -0,126860107
Netherlands 0,623515797 0,643470462 0,350642182 0,405228317
Norway 0,898636595 0,775273894 0,65594361 0,436348043
Poland -0,180293541 -0,240820882 -0,305218859 -0,280947251
Portugal -0,206131202 -0,171426035 -0,388646706 0,403414253
Romania -0,45930414 -0,071025715 -0,293090822 -0,572268727
Russian
Federation -0,117786498 -0,281472744 -0,312279645 -0,233600209
Sweden 0,827703258 0,651337149 0,709107319 0,379804088
Slovenia 0,050078692 0,037417226 -0,198272797 -0,138871274
Slovakia -0,135532989 0,059814493 -0,162736814 -0,011795419
Turkey -0,883123113 0,141046309 -0,364148884 -0,025430923
Ukraine -0,245333728 -0,993461062 -0,28165533 -0,175205501
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The averages of general trust and social activity in the sample countries
(Z-scores)
(based on the file of ESS recorded in 2010, N=58454)
Country General trust Social activity
Belgium 0,337712968 0,326898955
Bulgaria -0,73517696 -0,144239121
Switzerland 0,734213508 0,401662691
Cyprus 0,429842601 -0,309205569
Czech Republic -0,148617239 -0,047468029
Germany 0,333623872 0,290232358
Denmark 1,199297322 0,610246922
Estonia 0,258370093 -0,251976465
Spain 0,210015145 0,281758149
Finland 1,021483981 0,438891395
France 0,178604384 0,471683135
United Kingdom 0,255632013 0,25453873
Greece -0,359309286 -0,409741506
Croatia -0,506137239 0,354851051
Hungary -0,42748144 -0,631418339
Israel -0,040330155 0,089869189
Latvia -0,383994373 -0,208593086
Netherlands 0,744781281 0,488719653
Norway 0,959271665 0,686387111
Poland -0,254495799 -0,408233805
Portugal -0,214833717 0,088390787
Romania -0,228460828 -0,578632817
Russian Federation -0,291537105 -0,34237823
Sweden 0,828398187 0,66913805
Slovenia 0,046811551 -0,249210012
Slovakia -0,004484819 -0,11828223
Turkey -0,219839831 -0,159073722
Ukraine -0,9357195 -0,279246794
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The averages of the factor index of social participation in the sample
countries (Z-scores)
(based on the file of ESS recorded in 2010, N=58454)
Country Factor index of social participation
(community relations + trust)
Belgium 0,394348388
Bulgaria -0,608623237
Switzerland 0,73164145
Cyprus 0,099389781
Czech Republic -0,170529196
Germany 0,380582426
Denmark 1,156062999
Estonia -1,03903E-05
Spain 0,302103002
Finland 0,912453205
France 0,383024519
United Kingdom 0,296045785
Greece -0,529316669
Coatia -0,12372723
Hungary -0,717591558
Israel 0,007084854
Latvia -0,404696663
Netherlands 0,766046357
Norway 1,049352001
Poland -0,429072214
Portugal -0,113431953
Romania -0,546182647
Russian Federation -0,424274909
Sweden 0,964943564
Slovenia -0,157290312
Slovakia -0,127338535
Turkey -0,266431694
Ukraine -0,811096308
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XII. COMMUNITY, PUBLIC LIFE, SOCIAL
PARTICIPATION SUMMARIZING THOUGHTS
The starting point for the experiment presented in this book
was the conception that active community and social life
increases the need for public life. Consequently, active social
participation could renew the democratic functions of society.
At the beginning of the research, it was assumed that under the
present social circumstances of new capitalism, the reformation
of democracy, its ‘re-democratisation’ is necessary. We did not
intend to examine the political or philosophical aspects of the
function of society; we used a network-based approach during
the experiment in order to determine the role of community
relationships in the formation of society and in the renewal of
democracy. We observed the proportion of those communities
and people in the society who are able to formulate and pursue
their interests, and we also considered the possibilities how this
proportion could be increased.
Parameters of the Community
The research was focused on relationships and community.
Identity, homogeneity of the members and mutual solidarity
were regarded as the essential elements of the definition of
community. Spirituality is added to these three basic criteria in
some exceptional moments of community experience that
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become memorable and joyful through this subtle, but quite
significant cohesive power.
Community does not exist without the components
listed above. However, people’s lives and their conditions
change continuously, and so do their relationships, but the new
connections are integrated into new structures. This process is
more perceptible in modern industrial societies where
interpersonal relations fluctuate constantly. Former
communities disintegrate in accordance with the alteration of
lifestyle or life cycles, but they are gradually replaced with new
structures in the lives individuals and societies.
In the actual post-industrial societies, communities
change and form more dynamically than they did in traditional
societies. Because of the changeability of relations, the positive
trust in others emerges more difficultly in individuals’ lives.
Without trust, the parameters of community develop more
difficultly as well. Max Weber’s theory is still valid today, as
common interests, values, traditions and/or emotions are the
cohesive power not only for communities, but for individual
relationships as well. But it is also true that trust and certitude
between members emerge the most easily, if their relationship
is based on tradition and customs. These ties are the strongest
even today, they accompany individuals from their birth to
their death, and they are mostly family relationships.
Globalisation has expanded the networks of
relationships, so they have become more versatile and more
dynamic. More and more people have social links with
communities in foreign countries and in different cultures.
However, communities comprising members of different
nationalities stay together rarely, because the distance and/or
the cultural differences reduce the time and possibilities of
finding and establishing common cultural aims, values and
traditions. As a result, international communities seldom
survive in the long term. International connections and
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communities generated by the effects of globalisation cohere
because of common interests which make them one-
dimensional and ensure them a shorter lifetime than the
communities reinforced by tradition, emotions and consistent
cultural values have.
In consumer society and as a result of industrialisation,
individuals can build new relations simultaneously in their
actual living environment or at their workplace, and sustain
their connections from their past. Technology and
telecommunication, mainly the telephone, cars and the Internet,
enable people to consolidate and reinforce their ties with
nearby communities repeatedly with face-to-face interactions.
On the other hand, one of the basic components of
communities, namely the mechanical solidarity works more
easily between those people who live close to each other.
The percentage of people engaged in political activity
was extremely low in our sample: only the 1, 2% of the
participants belonged to some kind of political community,
party or association. Considering these results, the civic
motivation provided by the political involvement was barely
measurable with statistical means. The altruistic work of the
members of everyday communities, the willingness to sacrifice
and the efforts motivated by the feeling of competence were
much more significant. According to our results, the
development of civic attitude and practice had several
prerequisites. The most important was the appropriate level of
education which is indispensable for comprehension of
information. A certain level of wealth and financial stability
was also important, because these factors allow people to
reproduce their living conditions; moreover, they provide
convenient freedom which is necessary for the development of
the social sense of responsibility and of the readiness to work
for the community and for other people altruistically.
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Sociability is usually acquired in childhood, partly in
the family (during the process of family socialisation or
through the example of familial community), and partly in the
school and in course of formal (e. g. workshops or trainings)
and informal (e. g. groups or gangs) activities outside the
school. Considering the socialisation effects of the community
models adopted during childhood, the family of orientation is
of primary importance. The research showed that the
respondents used to meet their relatives, friends or colleagues
of their parents in their childhood (i. e. decades ago) more
often than they meet their family members or present
colleagues now. This means that the intensity of the families’
social activity has decreased. It is also true that the family of
orientation transmitted more active community participation
patterns than the practice which the respondents developed in
their own lives. Only the ties of friendship have become
stronger that they were in the time of the participants’
childhood.
According to the collected data, different age or
lifecycles have a strong influence on the intensity of communal
activities. Relationships with the neighbours, for example, are
the strongest when a couple has small children or when they
are over the age of sixty, while these connections are in their
youth the weakest. It is also remarkable that young couples at
the time of founding their own families reduce their
community participation. At this time, even the closest family
connections loosen, the social activities, like going out, usually
become less frequent. Later, when the children grow up,
couples in their forties or fifties gradually open up to their
relatives and other communities. This means that the types of
communities, that individuals prefer, is determined by the tasks
of lifecycles and by living conditions, and community practice
changes according to age. Doubtlessly, the relationships to the
family of orientation (especially the connection with the
 250 
upbringing parents) endure these periodic changes the most
effectively and family seems to be the strongest community in
a person’s life.
Solidarity in Small Communities
We found that the relationship between upbringing parent(s)
and the child/children is the strongest and they are the basis of
the firmest community of solidarity. In spite of the high rates of
divorce and single-parent families, the communal and cohesive
power and everyday solidarity of families remain invariably
strong, the family as a community survives because of the
strong solidarity between two and later on between three
generations. Thus, the most significant form of community
solidarity develops between family generations, whilst the
other sources of mechanical solidarity can be the small
communities surrounding them (friendships and organised
communities).
The survey also affirmed that members of small
communities highly rely on the help, support and solidarity
expected from other members of their communities. The most
of the respondents who belonged to communities felt that they
would surely receive support in case of need. 80% of the
respondents trusted in family relationships or friendships, and
another 28% relied on their organised communities as well.
According to the data, mutual solidarity of everyday life works
not only in friendships, but in civil communities as well.
The consumer society had supposedly enticed a
significant percentage of the respondents with the wide choice
of goods, so many of them had become indebted, but we did
not intend to measure the exact proportion. Impoverishment
and increasing amount of debts were caused in resourceless
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countries by the desire of people in low income groups for the
goods that they normally could not afford. The majority of the
society believed that they had equal right to those products that
were financially suited the wealthier groups. In this specific
situation, the role of affluent relatives and patrons with high
social stratus has become more significant. Almost one third of
the participants (29%) had an influential acquaintance (in
economic sectors, in the media, in local governments or
political parties), and the majority of this sample segment
believed that their powerful relative(s) or friend(s) would help
if they needed.
It was assumed that the connections between common
members of the society and their influential relatives or friends
constitute a special patron-client network under the current
circumstances of economic crisis. Almost everybody who
belongs to a community could land up in either of these
changeable roles: a patron can become a client depending on
the help of others overnight. This explains why the majority of
participants trusted the support of their influential acquaintance
or other community relationships. It has to be noted that the
earlier meaning of the relationship (a powerful patron with a
fully-dependent client) has changed; it is today rather a special
kind of network in which everybody keeps a count of those
affluent persons in their environment who can help them in
case of need. Under more balanced economic circumstances,
the support works reciprocally between people of similar social
status and resources, but the asymmetric patron-client
connection is exaggerated by the extreme discrepancies which
are typical for indebted societies with high unemployment
rates.
The participants of our survey sent greetings on special
occasion to their distant acquaintances even if they did not
keep in contact regularly, because they wanted to strengthen
their ties symbolically, at least once or twice a year. The ritual
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connections are integrated into a broad network in which
people express their mutual sympathy, empathy or solidarity,
and assure each other that they share joy or sorrow on special
occasions. The birthday or name day greetings, graduations,
funerals, promotions and honours create and demonstrate the
symbolic networks of relations that mean extra certitude for the
individuals in wider social network. The amplitude of ritual
connections shows how securely and how deeply the
individuals are woven in the texture of society. Our survey
proved that the circle of ritual connections is significantly
extensive, generally 22 per person, though wish and reality are
often mixed in the reported number of greetings. The ritual
connections have intensified lately because of the advantages
of telecommunication. Thus, the amount of ritual connections
of the youngest individuals in the sample was twice as high as
the ritual connection of the eldest.
Community Identities
In addition to solidarity, another dominant criterion of
community is identity. However, communal identity, just like
community itself, has several levels, and we accepted the
possibility that individuals might have double or plural
identities in relation to different communities.
According to our data, the communities of primary
relationships form various continuously expanding concentric
circles. It has become obvious that the most essential primary
community was the family for almost everyone in the sample.
Four fifths of the participants regarded family as one of the
most important communities.
The blank spots in the inner circle of the concentric circles
of primary communities were the participants who did not
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consider any community, not even the family important (12, 0%).
For only one third of the sample (33, 2%) was the family as the
only primary community satisfactory, friendship circles on their
own meant contentment for only a few percentage (5, 8%) and
civic organisations for only 7, 6% of the respondents. For the
majority not only family identity, but friendships, membership in
a club or organisation were also very important (41, 5%).
Macro-communal identity is the next level of
communal identity. Macro-identity is attached to the wider
community networks in the environment of the participants, to
those communities in which the individual participates, but
does not know all of the fellow members. Homogeneity also
appeared among the members of the macro-community that
was designated as identity-providing community by the
participants. In case of macro-identity, we were also aware of
the possibility of multiple identities, so we regarded the first
and the second choices of the respondents as identity-
providing communities.
The hierarchy of macro-identities selected by participants
as primary or secondary was the following: most people
identified themselves with their occupational community (36%),
community of the birthplace (30%), national community (22,
4%) and the community of the living place (20, 6%). One tenths
(9, 2%) had religious identities and only 2, 4% chose some kind
of political community. Macro-identities of international level
were rarely named: citizenship of the EU had 2, 5%, class
identity 7, 3% and ethnicity only 3, 5%.
We aimed to specify the macro-identities that were
preferred by communities with different living conditions. We
found that social groups in the most favourable situation
preferred to choose professional identity, ideological (religious
or political) identity and national identity. The identities of the
birth or living place community are less significant in the
affluent groups. In opposition, the disadvantaged people found
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the identity of the living place and national identity the most
important. In the middle social strata occupational identity
appeared as well.
For people of high social status who were also involved
in public life the professional identity was the most important,
in other words, the attitude of the leaders of public life was
formed predominantly by the their professional ambitions and
by ideological identity. Most of them also adopted national
identity, but local communal identity was less characteristic for
them. Consequently, the actions of the leaders in social life
were motivated by the wish for further prestige and ideological
identity, and not by the interests of local community.
The identity categories and solidarity networks reveal
the differences in the relationship structures of individuals and
communities. Our survey tried to measure the intensity and the
significance of the relationship-building activities (e. g. the
expansion of relationship networks through making new
acquaintances, inviting guests or social representation) in the
participants’ lives. Intensive and frequent community practice
was characteristic for one fourth of our sample, but half of the
respondents did not participate frequently in community life.
The sample segment of frequent community participation
together with the rarely engaging respondents made up two
thirds of the sample.
Illness and solitude are the most common hindrances of
community practice. In opposition, youth, romantic
relationships and high level of education ensure a wide and
versatile relationship network. The research indicated that
isolation from the community is more aggravated in the case of
less severe illness that are not admitted or ‘legitimised’ by the
immediate community than in the case of serious illness. It is
also true than less serious illness frequently leads to self-
imposed exclusion and consequently to loneliness.
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Informal Groups of Friends
The main aim of our research was to determine the degree of
social integration by social ties beyond the family. We were
also interested in the proportion of the respondents who had the
need for community life which is the foundation of social
engagement and democratic participation. Previous analyses
showed that the majority of the society is not attached to any
civil communities but their families, so it was presumed that
the individuals who have no families lived an isolated life.
Our examination of the ego-networks revealed that the
major part of the society has a small community beyond the
family: groups of friends whose role in the social integration is
similar to the role of the family, as they ensure a comparably
strong solidarity network, emotionally intensive relationships
and community identity. In friendship circles, the problems of
private life, as well as public questions are discussed. These
private groups can direct the attention of its members to social
issues, and they might become in this way a ‘rehearsal’ for
public participation.
In connection with the groups of friends, we accepted the
respondents’ subjective classification. Our question was whether
the respondents had a community of friends comprising at least
three other people than relatives who they considered as friends
and who they meet regularly for amusement, celebration,
discussion of news and sharing their views. According to our
research definition, people are members of a friendship group, if
they have a socially homogeneous community that ensures
solidarity and collective identity. The absolute majority of our
sample (77, 5%) had at least one group of friends in their lives.
Solidarity was also quite significant in the friendships, since the
members trusted each other and believed that their friends would
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support them if needed. According to the collected data, the
reason for this strong trust was the homogeneity of the members’
social status. Trust emerges more easily between people with
similar social background and reciprocity functions more
effectively even in the long term. As a result of the similarity,
trust, mutual solidarity and a collective identity develops in these
friendship groups.
The groups of friends comprise people from the
immediate or former communities, actual or former
collaborations, people with similar emotions, goals or values,
or individuals whose secondary relationships gain in
importance for some reason. Our research revealed that the
respondents with more favourable living conditions (young
people of higher social status) were more likely to have groups
of friends, and their communities had various sources.
The majority of the informal groups in the society
consist of members with similar life circumstances, identical
values and empathy. In opposition to pre-industrial societies,
most people have numerous life scenes in modern societies,
thus they make friends from different sources in terms of time
and space. Therefore, many people are members in more
friendship groups simultaneously, sometimes in various
settlements with different members. The exchange of
information works uninterruptedly through the ego-networks in
each group and between all groups.
However, the intensity of the contact with the different
friendship groups varies with distance. The participants who
had friends interacted with the geographically closest group at
least once a week in person. Technology (telephone, the
Internet) also facilitated the sustaining of relationships. It was
revealed that those individuals had virtual friendships who
were involved in real-life friendships circle as well, so the
Internet meant a secondary source of community relationships
for the majority of the sample.
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The meeting places of the groups of friends, i.e. the
scenes of social life usually differ. The more affluent groups,
the young adults who did not own a flat or house and single
people usually met in restaurants, pubs or cafés; others visited
their friends, while individuals of the lower social strata met
mainly in public spaces.
The number of friendship groups correlated with the
individual property. One fifth of the sample did not belong to
any informal community. Two thirds of this sample segment
lived an isolated life, secluded in the family, they esteemed the
time spent with their relatives highly and they had neither the
need, nor the possibility to build other social relations. The
participants of the sample segment without friends were mostly
low-qualified and their financial situation was so unfortunate
that they could not distribute their possessions further as the
principle of reciprocal solidarity of friendship would require.
They usually did not want to remain indebted to anyone,
possibly this was the reason why they were not integrated in
any friendship circles.
It was also verified by the research that friendship
groups are the second most common form of community after
family in modern societies. Friendship plays a very important
role in individuals’ lives; it secures social capital and enhances
the life quality of those who have already favourable living
conditions. It is also possible that the discussions or the
information exchange in the friendly meetings direct the
members’ attention to the problems of wider society, especially
to the local problems, and intensifies their willingness to act for
the community. This increase in the need for public
participation is more probable in the communities where the
operation of the local government is transparent, where the
individual lack of property does not hinder the development of
social sense, the living conditions are well-organised and
definite and the members of the local friendship groups are
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well-informed. The high proportion of those participants who
had groups of friends indicates that the need for wider
community network is quite general, and this secures the
chance of participation in wider public life.
Organised communities
In addition to groups of friends, the most important small
communities for the respondents were institutionalised civil
communities or associations. The solidarity of the members, their
common identity and the homogeneity of social status were
detectable in these small communities as well, but in opposition to
groups of friends these organisations function with written rules
and the members cooperate in order to achieve common goals, to
pursue shared interests, or to preserve common values. The
organised communities differ from the frequent mass movements,
since the latters are devoid of the parameters of community that
we have determined previously. Although mass movements
cannot be regarded as communities, they reflect the need for
social participation and collaboration, and they can be organised
very quickly nowadays, especially via the Internet.
Almost one third of the sample (28%) belonged to an
organised civil community, mainly to associations of sports,
religion, environment protection or charity. But even the sport
associations that were the most popular in the sample could
mobilise only 18% of the respondents. Mostly the graduates with
higher social status were members of civil communities, as this
kind of membership contributes to the further increase of their
personal prestige very significantly.
The comparison of the activities in different settlement
types revealed that organised community participation is the least
significant in the large villages where traditional communities
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have disappeared almost entirely, whilst the civic values are still
quite underdeveloped and the modernisation is asymmetric.
Furthermore, the proportion of commuting inhabitants hinders the
foundation of local civil communities or associations. As far as
the age groups are concerned, the eldest and the youngest are the
least involved in civil organisations.
We also asked the respondents in our survey whether they
would become members of organised communities, if they had
more time or if an association whose aims corresponded to the
interests of the respondents was founded close to their living
place. One third of the sample would join some kind of civil
groups under the appropriate circumstances. The expectations of
the participants diverged. Most of them would collaborate with
the others for entertainment, a further 39, 5% for environment or
animal protection, and a relatively small proportion would be
motivated by charity, by local or national interests, or by the wish
for appreciation and recognition (34- 37, 7%).
The members of the organised communities lived an
active social life; two third of them met their communities more
than once monthly. Four fifths of the members also expected
support, solidarity and help with everyday problems from the
fellow members of the organised community.
Homogeneity of social status was observed in case of the
organised communities as well: more than the half of the
participants described their fellow members as having similar
social backgrounds. A further 40% reported that their
communities comprised people of mixed social standing. In other
words, organised communities have almost as high level of status-
homogeneity as friendship groups do. The youngest participants
were rarely members of organised communities, but if they did
join associations, they chose primarily groups where the members
had similar social status to their own. The self-separation of social
classes reflects aggravating social inequalities.
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Virtual Communities
In our survey, we studied the differences between real and
virtual communities, and it was obvious that virtual groups lack
the parameters of solidarity and common identity. Yet, we
could conclude that two thirds of the members of online
communities belonged to an ‘offline’ community as well, most
of them were earlier members of children’s or other public
organisations, and their absolute majority (93%) had friendship
groups as well at the time of the research.
More than four fifths of the members of virtual
communities were in their forties or younger. The geographical
distribution of the members was not significant; the settlement
size did not influence the proportion of the Internet users.
The collected data confirmed that the virtual
communities frequently doubled the number of the members’
social ties, since they simultaneously belonged to organised or
personal communities as well. As the result of their online
relationships, the respondents’ real-life community connections
have intensified. It was also concluded that people who have
inclination for participation in public life online are usually
engaged in real-life civic activity as well.
Community Life
We analysed the most general small communities beyond
families, and our results indicated that the respondents were
members of different communities, they had different chances of
being involved and their participation was motivated by divergent
expectation, desires and needs. We measured the community life
of the respondents with a linear index that combined the indexes
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of memberships in personal and formal communities, and the
need for participation in these communities. Community life is a
lifestyle with a particular community quality. The linear
regression showed that community life is determined
predominantly by the financial situation, the childhood
community practice and the educational attainment of the father.
In relation to age groups, it was obvious that the youngest
had the best chance of community life; the middle-aged had the
worst, they were usually compelled to give up their social activity
temporarily because of their small children. Community life was
the most active in cities, especially in the capital and in the county
towns, whilst large villages fell behind due to the social
consequences of their anomalous state of development.
The linear index of community life was divided into five
hierarchical categories (with cluster analysis) that revealed how
differentiated the opportunities of individuals were to participate
in community life. The proportion of the respondents who had
outstanding community life was low in our sample (7, 1%), but
together with the respondents who had good community life (12,
2%) they made up one fifth of the sample. The group of
participants with medium community activity (22, 8%) - people
with average degree of interconnection- meant another fifth of the
sample. People in the two lowest categories with weak (30, 8%)
and isolated (27, 1%) community life had a reduced number of
social connections.
Attitude towards Public Life
Public life involves the actions and manifestations that are
designed to achieve common goals of the community. We
believe that community life correlates with public life interact:
they mutually intensify or abate each other. As it was presumed
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in the research hypothesis, activity in public life is a
prerequisite of civic participation and of the renewal of
democracy. The collected data revealed that public
participation was more intensive in the social groups whose
members had advantaged financial conditions and higher
educational attainment (at least high school diploma).
We examined both the attitude towards public life and
civic practice. We differentiated between two types of
attitudes. The participants had altruistic attitude, if they
reported that they would be willing to act in the interest of
others, even if it did not correspond to their own interests. The
second type was the prestige-oriented attitude: if the
participants considered both their own and community
interests, and felt that their participation was expected by their
communities.
According to the collected data, prestige-oriented
attitude is more prevalent in society than altruistic. The
correlation of the synthetized index of the two attitude types
was the most significant with community life, educational
attainment and childhood community practice.
In relation to settlement size, the composite index of
attitude towards public life had the highest values in the county
towns; the lowest in the capital and in villages. However, the
values grew with educational attainment everywhere. From the
age groups, the youngest participants had the highest averages
of the composite attitude index, but they had the strikingly high
averages of prestige-oriented attitude, but extremely low
averages of altruistic attitude.
Our main research objective was to study the
relationship between community life and public participation.
The relationship between public participation and attitude
towards public life indicated that prestige-oriented attitude
results more likely in public participation than altruistic attitude
does. In other words, the sociable people with active public
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participation and intensive community relationships tend to
participate because of their prestige-oriented attitude that
combines their own interests and the expectation of others, and
not because of their altruistic attitude which would often
require the disregard of their own interests.
Civic Practice
Civic practice was defined in our survey as the willingness of
people to express their discontent over the abuse of authorities.
In our survey, the readiness to sign a petition, to participate in
permitted protests or to join unannounced demonstrations were
the indicators of civic practice. The correlation of the
participation in permitted protest with community life was the
most significant. However, we also learned from the data that
intensive community life was no prerequisite for participation
in remonstrative manifestations. In other words, the correlation
of the radical manifestations against political abuse with the
community life was considerably insignificant; radical
measures are characteristic for isolated and individual ‘freedom
fighters’ and not for sociable people.
Civic participation and community life intensified each
other in the case of the younger respondents, but not in the case
of the elderly. It should be also noted that the averages of
community life were normally higher than the averages civic
participation in the sample, but civic participation was
strikingly more significant than community life by the
sympathisers of the most powerful opposition parties.
Apparently, politically committed young supporters of political
parties tend to replace community life with public
participation.
 264 
Social Participation
We also intended to specify what proportions of the society
does or does not participate in public issues, and what
proportion is isolated and marginalized due to the lack of
community relationships. The indexes of community life,
attitude towards public life and civic practice were aggregated
into the index of social participation. With cluster analysis we
differentiated between five levels of social participation.
Only 3, 6% of the respondents belonged to the highest
category, and 17, 4% to the second level. These two upper
categories comprised the publicly and socially very active one
fifth. The members of these two groups had extensive
relationship networks with active community practice and high
degree of need for social participation; moreover, their attitude
towards public life, their public participation and their civic
practice were significant as well. According to the statistics of
linear regression, the chance of getting into the two upper
groups depended on the respondents’ childhood community
practice and educational attainment. In other words, the most
active participants of community and public life had already
started to build community relations in their childhood. Later,
in their adulthood, the high educational attainment enabled
them to comprehend the necessary information about public
issues and prompted an active social participation.
One third of the sample (31, 5%) belonged to the
medium category. People in this group had an average level of
social and public activity. Half of the sample was distributed
between the two lowest levels of social participation index
(37% on the weak level and 10, 5% on the passive level), thus
every second respondent was left out of communities or
refused to participate in public life.
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The two upper levels of participation index (only one
fifth of the sample) meant the small proportion of the
population that was actively involved in social participation.
Most of these participants had at least high school diploma.
The percentage of men was higher in these groups than the
percentage of women. Two thirds of these participants (64,
3%) belonged to the upper two quintiles if income categories.
Our data suggested more people would join communities and
participate in social and public life actively with the
improvement of financial security and the increase of average
educational level.
However, the results of our survey indicated clearly that
the community and public life of the present society is
controlled by the upper one fifth. The macro-identity of the
upper one fifth included occupational, ideological (religious or
political) and national identities. They identify themselves less
frequently with the majority of the society, for example, their
local identity was weak. This means that the most active one
fifth of social participation is engaged in public life usually
because of the wish for further prestige or because of an
ideological or national identity. They rarely consider the
interests of their direct environment and do not feel attached to
their immediate communities.
In sum, the proportion of the socially and civically
active citizens would increase, if the average level of education
improved, the number of people with stable financial
background grew and the local identity strengthened
simultaneously. If these conditions are fulfilled, people can
participate in community and public life more actively first at
local and later at national level.
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Community Life and Public Life of Villages
– Seven Villages of Three Countries
Our research hypothesis presumed that public life is more
intensive in local communities because of frequent face-to-face
interactions. In contrast with our assumption, the survey proved
that the socially-publicly most active upper fifth of the society-
the most important actors of social life- did not adopt any local
identities and compared to other groups their social ties to their
immediate environment are weaker. In order to find the reason
for this phenomenon and to answer other questions about the
relationship between local communities and public life, we
examined the population of seven Hungarian villages of three
countries.
In the sample settlements, more than half of the
respondents were engaged actively in agricultural production.
In addition to agricultural work, most of the people commuted
to work. A few decades ago when industry have developed
extensively, many families have moved to the nearby cities or
industrial centres. Nowadays, young people prefer commuting,
since technology facilitates it. They do their ‘primary’ work in
another settlement, but they build their homes and plan their
future in the village. The number of families who flee the urban
life grows as well. Some of these families were not able to
cope with the high costs of urban life and try to recover
financially in the countryside, but there are some families who
chose rural life because of the proximity of nature and healthier
living conditions.
Previously (especially in the youth of the now elderly
generations) inhabitants of the Hungarian villages outside of
Hungary were more often compelled to seek employment
abroad than the inhabitants of the Hungarian villages. Fourth
fifths of the respondents of Hungarian ethnic villages outside
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of Hungary had relatives abroad, while only every third
participants of the Hungarian villages had relatives in a foreign
country. The more affluent a village was in Hungary and the
more employment opportunities its inhabitants had because of
the proximity of a city, the less people worked abroad. The
inhabitants of villages leave their home only in case of
financial problems, since the persistent power of the village is
still very strong. Three fourths of the sample never considered
leaving their home villages. Members of the younger
generation plan their future locally, even if they are compelled
to leave temporarily due to unemployment and economic
circumstances, but they want to return.
The trust in others, in strangers is the strongest in the
villages of Transylvania and Vojvodina. Traditional relations,
ethnic interdependence and the need for cooperation are the
reasons for this high degree of trust. In case of Hungary, the
trust was the weakest in those villages where the proximity of a
city intensified the effects of urbanisation. In addition to
urbanisation, poverty and social inequality influenced the
degree of trust negatively. Accordingly, trust is weak in
affluent and urbanised villages in the proximity of cities, and in
the villages where the living conditions are the most unequal.
One of the most criteria of community is solidarity.
According to our result, only an insignificant part of the village
sample was left out of the solidarity networks. Apart from
some percentage, every participant had received help from
others (in form of money, work or emotional support) in year
preceding the survey. Ethnic identity seems to preserve
traditional solidarity values the most effectively. Help with
material goods (money, work or other products) was motivated
in ethnic villages by tradition, while in the most disadvantaged
regions by need, but it was still significant in both cases.
Civilisation, wealth and urbanisation did not decrease the level
of material help, but it diminished emotional support. In
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contrast material help remained frequent in the ethnic
Hungarian villages even if it was not economically
indispensable anymore, because solidarity facilitates the
preservation of cultural unity.
Surprisingly, the inhabitants of villages devalued the
cohesion of their communities. The reason for the discontent
was possibly the fact that the interest and obligation to help
with material solidarity generated many conflicts among the
inhabitants. The community, the willingness to help and the
cohesion of the village was evaluated the most positively and
generally appreciated in the villages where fewer residents
participated in the solidarity network because of the great
number of the commuters, where the cohesion is created by
shared amusement and enjoyable free-time activities, and not
in the villages where the interdependence of the inhabitants is
strong so they are compelled to cooperate. As a result of the
celebrations and ‘ritual’ interactions of free-time activities, the
commuters esteemed the community of the village highly,
especially compared to the impersonal relations of the cities.
More than two thirds of the villagers had groups of
friends. There were huge discrepancies between the villages in
Hungary and the Hungarian villages outside of Hungary. The
latters had a higher proportion of people who had friends than
Hungarian villages did. In the ethnic Hungarian villages,
traditionally strong local connections evolve into friendships,
while the percentage of people with friendship circles was
higher in cities in Hungary. Most of the traditional
relationships have already disappeared in the Hungarian
villages, but new civil relationships have failed to emerge. As
we have mentioned above, the inhabitants of Hungarian
villages were less trustful e as well.
In sum, human interconnection was less satisfactory in
Hungarian villages, and consequently the number of friendship
groups was lower than in the Hungarian villages outside of
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Hungary. Despite this fact, friendships seemed to be the second
most important community ties (beyond family) even in
Hungarian villages. The common amusement with friends was
more frequent in the villages where the effects of urbanisation
and civilisation were stronger because of the nearby city,
namely in the Hungarian villages.
Two thirds of the villagers (69%) had friendship circles.
A smaller percentage was involved in an organised community
(59%), and without the religious communities, the proportion
of organised community participation dropped to 33% (one
third of the sample). In other words, our results showed that the
proportion of members of organised communities was higher in
the rural sample than in the nationally representative sample. In
other words, the collected data confirmed our research
hypothesis: the network of small communities was denser in
villages than in the cities.
The proportion of isolated individuals was low in the
rural sample; it was only every sixth person who was not
engaged in informal or formal small communities. The
majority was integrated in some kind of small community of
the village, and this means a chance of the improvement of
public participation and democratic activity. However, the
proportion of participants who was not interested in civic and
political participation was still high, 41%.
According to our results, villagers with more intensive
community ties were more likely to get involved in local public
and social life. The proportion of community relationships and
the level of participation in public life mainly correlated in the
villages: more intensive community relations meant more
active participation in public and political life. We found only
one exceptional village where the number of the commuters
and the average level of education were higher; here the
inhabitants were considerably interested in public and political
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issues, but they did not participate in local communities, and
their community ties were quite weak.
The integrity of villages and the proportion of the
inhabitants who were capable of community and civic
participation were revealed with the synthesis of the scales of
community relations and civic attention. Two thirds of the
sample was integrated somehow into the community of the
village and participated in community and public life actively.
The isolated one third was divided; some of them were isolated
only from the community of the village, but they were
interested in individually in public life and participated in
organisations. They realised their public activity outside of the
village. Unfortunately, these people cannot contribute to the
democratisation of local communities.
We intended to answer the question whether the active
community life in the villages and the dense network of
relationships developed the need for the participation in local
public and democratic life. The research confirmed that the
majority of the villagers were interested in public life, but those
who would participate in formalized public or political
manifestations (petition, protest) constituted the minority. At
least two thirds of the sample were interested in local public
life. The discontent with formalized manifestation originated in
party politics which rather disturbed the inhabitants of the
village in its current forms, so it did not contribute to the
development of the need for the improvement of local
democracy. The local elections divided the population
temporarily, but the village continued to function as an
integrated unity after the end of the elections. In contrast, party
politics generated conflicts continuously, the instructions of
leaders of political parties disintegrated the local community,
and these factors affected local public life negatively.
In other words, the renewal of local democracy would
be possible, if the representatives of the political parties were
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appointed and elected by the inhabitants of the village, the
public and political demands were formulated locally, and the
political parties consulted the community opinion in the local
assembly. If macrosociety regards local democracy as a
superfluous and disturbing factor, and ignores the local
communities and emphasized the superiority of party politics, a
small privileged power group takes over control, and there is
no chance of the renewal of democracy.
International Trends of Community Life, Trust and Social
Participation
The international differences of social participation were
examined through the correlation of the indexes of community
life and trust in the 2008 database of the European Social
Survey. We intended to reveal the influence of macrosocial
living conditions in certain countries on the degree of general
trust, on the community and public relations and on social
participation. We synthesised the scales of the institutional and
individual trust, and the organised and informal community
relationships, and we used this composite index to determine
the degree of social participation in different countries. The
European countries were classified into five hierarchical
groups according to their national averages of the participation
index, according to the average level of social participation:
Excellent: Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland,
and Holland
Good: Germany, Belgium, France, United Kingdom
Medium or average: Cyprus, Estonia, Spain, Israel
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Weak: Latvia, Croatia, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia
Deficient: Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece, Turkey, Romania,
Ukraine
It is obvious from the list that the general trust of the
inhabitants, the community and social participation and
democratic activity of southern or post-communist countries is
insufficient compared to the prosperous Northern European
countries where the distribution of wealth is more balanced.
Trust and community and social participation are more
intensive in those countries where the majority of the people
live in relative affluence with higher average level of
educational attainment. Accordingly, social participation is a
result of resourceful living conditions provided by wealthy,
educated, egalitarian and democratic society, and not vice
versa. The economies of the countries which were not affected
by international traumas and dictatorships developed
harmoniously and integrally. Because of the favourable
economic and social conditions, trust increased, moreover,
traditional and civil communities were preserved which
intensified the citizens’ need for active democratic
participation.
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